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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Lessons in Turkish Identity: 
National vs. State Identity in Turkey and Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations 
 
Eide, Karalyn 
 
Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
May 2007 
 
 
There is an abundance of oversimplified labels about Turkey, and this thesis attempts, 
with a strong angle toward history and patterns, to look deeper into Turkish identity. It 
will be argued that Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, packaged for the Turks an 
identity to which they could subscribe. The various components of this initial identity 
will be distinguished. 
 
The nation and state of Turkey overlapped nearly perfectly in the republic’s early years, 
and the goal was for them to stay so, with Turkey being a pure nation-state in the true 
sense of the word, but a detachment has developed. This is Turkey’s identity crisis, more 
than any political or social polarizations in the country today.   
 
American ignorance of Turkey’s identity has encouraged Turkish anti-Americanism. The 
two countries are supposedly ‘faithful allies’ on the political level, but what is understood 
(or rather misunderstood) on the public level does much relational harm. Mutual 
ignorance of each must be overcome between these two countries. The Kurdish problem 
will be discussed as an example of mutual misunderstanding.  
 
 
Keywords: Turkish identity, anti-Americanism, critical security studies, U.S.-
Turkey relationship, geopolitics, strategy 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
 
Türk Kimliğine Bakış: 
Türkiye'deki Ulus ve Devlet Kimliği ve A.B.D- Türkiye İlişkilerine Etkisi 
 
Eide, Karalyn 
 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrdç Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
Mayıs 2007 
 
 
Türkiye hakkında fazla basitleştirilmiş bir çok etiket vardır. Bu tez tarih ve kalıplara 
bakarak Türk kimliğine derinden bakmayı amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye'nin kurucusu 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Türklerin onaylayabileceği kimlik  yarattığı iddia 
edilmektedir. Bu kimliğin farklı yönleri ortaya koyulacaktır.  
 
Türkiye'nin kelimenin tam anlamıyla bir ulu devlet olmasıyla, Türk ulusu ve devleti 
cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında kusursuz bir şekilde  çakışmıştır, ancak zamanla bir ayrılık 
gelişmiştir. Politik ve sosyal kutuplaşmalardan çok, Türkiye'nin kimlik sorunu budur. 
 
Amerika'nın Türkiye hakkındaki bilgisizliği Türkiye'deki Amerikan düşmanlığını 
körüklemiştir. İki ülke politik düzeyde 'sadık müttefikler' olarak görülseler de, kamuoyu 
anlayışı (ya da yanlış anlayışı) ilişkilerde sorun yaratmaktadır. Bu karşılıklı bilgisizlik 
ortadan kaldırılmalıdır. Bu yanlış anlaşılmaya örnek olarak Kürt sorunu tartışılacaktır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk kimliği, Amerikan karşıtlığı, kritik güvenlik çalışmaları, 
A.B.D- Türkiye ilişkileri, jeopolitika, strateji  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Until the past few years, Turkey has been largely addressed in a Cold War 
framework, focusing on land blocks and strategy. In many ways this was necessary 
during the Cold War, when overriding ideologies prevailed, splitting the world into two 
clearly defined camps and presenting the very real threat of Mutually Assured 
Destruction.  
But since the Cold War ended, its terminology and lingo are no longer very 
helpful, and are often harmful. The United States has produced many geostrategic 
metaphors for Turkey, all based on global positioning and potential instrumentality, and 
Turks respond in one of two ways. They either assimilate to these metaphors and repeat 
them back, because they hear from the West that this will help them to remain “relevant” 
after the Cold War. Or, they resent these metaphors and this leads to further estrangement 
from a former “friend,” who, as it turns out, does not really know them at all.  
Turkey and America have, in the past, cooperated to a large extent. While it does 
not seem like the two will ever divorce each other, it can be pretty miserable for both 
sides when a bellicose man and woman are living together in supposed marriage under 
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the same roof. Turkey and the U.S. are in such a marriage, by virtue of NATO and the 
official alliance at the government level, and also by nature of the past they share, but it is 
a relationship full of offense and fault, suffering from misunderstanding and a lack of 
communication. It is widely accepted that communication, and the resulting level of 
understanding, are key to a relationship. While the Realist emphasis on military and 
economic capabilities of states is important, this analysis will turn to the constraints and 
capabilities created by identity, by looking at how identity is formed and influences the 
national conception. Especially in the U.S.-Turkey case, international relations are 
fraught with unforgiven slights, misconceptions, vulnerabilities, insecurities, and false 
assumptions. In an attempt to uncover a new level of understanding, this paper is a study 
of Turkish identity.  
 
1.1 Literature Review 
Turkish identity is a popular topic, now filtering down to common culture. This 
has happened especially since the freedom-inhibiting Article 301 (of Turkey’s Penal 
Code), which was new in 2005, prohibits a Turk from “degrading Turkishness.” With this 
law’s inhibition of freedom of speech, it has been an issue hanging over the Turkey-EU 
relationship, spawning popular concern and investigation into the meaning of Turkish 
identity and Turkishness.  
However, Turkish identity is only very recent as an area of study and is almost 
non-existent among non-Turkish scholars. Western scholars have examined Turkey 
strategically and historically, but have not, overall, looked at Turkey from an identity 
standpoint, and how that historical identity impacts its behavior today.  
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The first Western works on the Republic of Turkey were mostly exploratory, 
much like a National Geographic article, meant just to familiarize the Western reader 
with a new people group and its cultural and political forms. Turkey was another Eastern 
country for the West to re-discover, and the West seemed to look at the Turks as another 
oriental group to be ruled, forgetting that the Turks themselves were recent heirs of an 
empire. One Western author noted this conflict quite condescendingly in 1925: 
 
The Turks without exception hated us... The British air of superiority drove them 
to fury, but, forced to keep it pent up, they raged inwardly, and their hatred 
became as full of bitter poison as an unlanced boil… and British officials failed to 
realize that they were a ruling people and not Hindus or negroes to be treated as 
subjects. It was only a few years since they had possessed a great empire.1 
 
Other works of this type describe Turkey to be in “a healthy state of affairs” and include 
pictures of Anatolian peoples in their villages and garments for the Westerner’s viewing 
interest.2 The overall effect is quite comical, especially with a photograph of Turkish 
peasants in modern day clothes; one sports a toothless grin in new “civilized” clothes that 
are clearly mismatched to his lifestyle.3 Another work informs the West, in quite savage 
terms, that “Ataturk took this nation by the neck at the end of World War II and shook it, 
demanding that it become modern.”4  
 Then, during the Cold War, strategic works were often concentrated on containing 
the Soviet Union. The literature on Turkey, therefore, was regarding Turkey’s role as a 
buffer, as NATO’s “Southern Flank” piece that would hold the Soviet Union in from the 
                                                 
1
 Harold Armstrong, Turkey in Travail: The Birth of a New Nation (London: John Lane The Bodley Head 
Limited, 1925), 178. 
2
 M. Philips Price, A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1956), 218. 
3
 See Appendix A.  
4
 William O. Douglas, “Introduction,” in Turkey and the World, by Altemur Kiliç (Washington, D.C.: 
Public Affairs Press, 1959), 5. 
 4 
bottom.5 Turkey was thus formally accepted into the West based on a realization of the 
value of its geostrategic position and its ability to serve Western interests.  
The next grouping of literature on the Republic of Turkey came in the decade that 
followed the Cold War. These were mostly marked by the “new” geostrategy and 
geopolitics of Turkey. It was in a key spot on the international playing field, and must be 
utilized not only for its blockage of the former Soviet Union, but also for access to other 
regions. But its position was also one of uncertainty, situated precariously between 
regions on a chunk of land valuable for its waterways, size, richness, and proximity to 
other areas. Even a cursory glance at titles shows the prevailing tendency to consider 
Turkey in terms of the “trouble” it was in or the benefits it might bring to the West. A 
classic is the RAND document by Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West 
After the Cold War,” (1992). Others include Turkey: Thwarted Ambition (1997), by 
Simon V. Mayall, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position (2001) by 
Bülent Araş, and another RAND publication called The Future of Turkish-Western 
Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan (2000) by Ian O. Lesser, Zalmay Khalilzad, and F. 
Stephen Larrabee. Khalilzad’s chapter in particular in this book highlights how “Turkey 
is very important to Western interests.” Mustafa Aydın’s edited volume of  1998, Turkey 
at the Threshold of the 21st Century, has sections referring to Turkey as a “bridge 
between continents” or a regional “balance holder.” Thus Turkey continued, even after its 
primary blockage role, to be famously functional. 
 The third wave of literature, almost all written by Turks studying or working in 
America, has been the product of recent positive steps toward really understanding 
                                                 
5
 See Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey and the Southern Flank,” a chapter in NATO's Southern Allies: Internal 
and External Challenges (1988), edited by John Chipman, as an example, or any of the documents 
produced by policy reseach of the RAND Corporation during that era. 
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Turkey at a deeper level. Worth mentioning are three recent publications from Routledge: 
Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is A Turk? (2006) by Soner 
Çağaptay, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity (2003) by Yücel Bozdağlıoğu, 
and Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition 
(2004) by Ömer Taşpınar. All include deeper thinking on the issue of identity in Turkey, 
from authors who have lived out the identity questions and seen them from a foreign 
perspective as well. Taşpınar has also written the paper “An Uneven Fit? The ‘Turkish 
Model’ and the Arab World” (2003), suggesting that the “model” idea is not so great after 
all. Many works studying the European Union’s identity, and Turkey’s identity in relation 
to accession probability, have also been published in recent years.  
Lerna Yanık’s award-winning 2006 paper, “Beyond 'Bridges,' 'Crossroads' and 
'Buffer Zones': Defining a New International Role for Turkey,” also argues against 
reliance on the typical, overused Cold War metaphors, explaining that such usage forces 
Turkey into a role of passivity and uniformity in foreign policy. An insightful view into 
how the Turks’ view the Turkish-American relationship can be found in a recently 
published chapter by Nur Bilge Criss called, “Turkish Perspectives of the United States 
of America,” in the edited volume What They Think of Us: International Perceptions of 
the United States and the War on Terrorism. Taşpınar’s paper from the Brookings 
Institution in 2005, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey,” similarly offers a 
deeper look at this phenomenon, based on Turkey’s internal identity conflict, and offers 
specific policy recommendations. Even RAND strategist Ian O. Lesser has begun to 
change his tune, in a new work called “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of 
Geopolitics,” published in Survival in 2006. This article, which advocates a distancing 
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from the tendency to consider Turkey only in terms of geopolitics, is a drastic departure 
from his previous titles.  
 However, some recent works have continued to rely on the same theme of the 
strategic use of Turkey. In the prelude to a speech by the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Abdullah Gül, in July 2006 at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Strobe 
Talbott, current president of the institution, opened by praising Turkey for its contribution 
to the West, as a “vital ally of the United States for decades, from the Korean conflict to 
standing with us on the front lines of the Cold War.” Gül then proceeded to play on the 
U.S. desire for Turkey to serve as a “Muslim model” in the Middle East, saying Turkish 
democracy “is a gift to the world because the Turkish experience shows that Islam is 
compatible with democracy and because it inspires other Muslim societies as well.”6 
 This work will be an effort by a non-Turk to move from an outsider’s perspective 
to a more thoughtful insider’s perspective, really trying to understand what is going on 
beneath the surface. Moving away from sources that are heavily geostrategic, as well as 
recent ones that begin to stress identity, I looked at sources outside of all this and drew 
conclusions on my own. But the biggest source is the time I have spent in Turkey, living 
with Turks, hearing their opinions, learning their language, and adapting to their culture. 
While this may be an inductivist approach, it is valuable nonetheless for descriptiveness 
and insight. The goal is not scientific conclusions, but  “understanding,” as in Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith’s distinction between explaining and understanding in this field of 
study. One point of their famous work argues that in nature there is often an “absolute” 
truth because nature is not a human invention. However, the social world is in some ways 
                                                 
6
 See: http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060706turkey.pdf 
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a human creation and therefore the goal of international relations should be understanding 
this social world rather than explaining it.7  
In terms of such “understanding,” very few, if any, Western authors have the 
time, desire, and availability to get into the shoes of the other side, as regards Turkey. 
This kind of effort is evident before the Cold War, as in Chester M. Tobin’s 1944 book 
Turkey: Key to the East. Despite its cold geostrategic title, Tobin’s warm effort shines 
through. In the introduction he writes: 
I came to know the finer characteristics and the worthy national ambitions of the 
Turks. I associated with them for years. I learned their language. I believe I 
understand in fair measure their problems and their desires. I personally like the 
Turks. I thrill at their remarkable resurgence to become a great nation.8 
 
But since the Cold War such personal texture has been replaced by themes of geostrategic 
needs that continue long after the Soviet Union’s collapse. With that, my own goal agrees 
almost word for word with Price’s in 1944:  
…I have been endeavoring to portray to Americans the real Turks and their 
vibrant progressive nation. Now, more than ever, I feel there is need for a clear, 
concise, historical picture of the old Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. An 
accurate interpretation of Turkey’s position in the maelstrom swirling about this 
two-continent nation is essential to all Americans thinking and warring globally 
today…It can help to piece together the average American’s jumble of truth and 
fiction about Turkey into the picturesque, important pattern that it is.9 
 
 
1.2 The Aim of Research 
Many scholars have examined Turkish nationhood and Turkish nationality, and 
are starting to mention Turkish identity in their works, although there has not yet been a 
book or major article devoted solely to the study of Turkish identity. This country needs 
                                                 
7
 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding in International Relations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990).  
8
 Chester M. Tobin, Turkey: Key to the East, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1944), 13. 
9
 Tobin, 13.  
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to be studied in the framework of identity, however, because of its unique location and 
the circumstances that surround it and thus shape its identity, as will be further argued in 
the chapter to follow. Unfortunately this unique location is exactly what has kept Turkey 
to being studied mostly from a geopolitical or geostrategic point of view, especially by 
Westerners. Turkey tends to be seen as place of instrumentality for greater powers’ use, 
rather than an instrument in the concert in its own right.  
This thesis aims to take identity studies, which have become popular recently 
especially with the advent of critical security studies, and apply it to Turkey. This 
involves a strong examination of history, politics, and sociology in the initial 
development of identity. While many works are written on the history of the republic, this 
research will look at the history with regard to identity development under Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. It will also give special attention to nation versus state in the identity 
framework, and provide a visual diagram I developed for clarity on Turkish identity.  
This thesis also intends to apply some of the identity understanding to the U.S.-
Turkey relationship, with the question of what identity shows us in terms of stemming the 
tide of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This is not a prescriptive aim, but more of a 
shedding of light, with possible suggestions, in the final sections of the thesis, for 
increasing mutual understanding. 
 
1.3 Précis 
There is no shortage of oversimplified labels about Turkey, so this thesis aims to 
delve beyond geostrategic classifications, in order to look deeper into the complex 
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Turkish identity. It will be argued, in an implicitly Constructivist framework10 and with 
strong consideration of history and historical patterns, that the founder of modern Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, packaged for the Turks an identity to which they could adhere. 
In the early years of the republic, the nation and state of Turkey overlapped nearly 
perfectly, and the goal was for them to remain so, being a pure nation-state in the true 
sense of the word. But a detachment has developed. This is the identity crisis with which 
Turkey has been struggling. Many movements have risen to prominence, promoting 
various ideologies in the name of Atatürk. Today, more than any political or social issue, 
it is the question of Turkish identity that polarizes Turks, bewilders the West, and roils 
international relations.  
The United States and Turkey have been called “faithful allies” on the political 
level and the two countries have indeed enjoyed a positive relationship. However, what is 
understood (or rather misunderstood) on the public level does much relational harm. It is 
unfortunate that this once healthy bond has deteriorated so heavily. American ignorance 
of Turkey’s identity has played a key role in this decline and encouraged Turkish anti-
Americanism. Likewise, Turkey does not fully understand America. The labels and 
challenges can be overcome—and must be—if Turkey and America are to recover the 
lost alliance, leading to greater peace and prosperity in the future. 
 
1.4 Structure 
 
                                                 
10
 Constructivists argue that the world is socially constructed by humans, and that in order to understand we 
must de-construct the some of the realities we assume to be true, especially mutually understood but not 
always clear concepts like sovereignty, freedom, security, or identity. The concepts are in the collective 
consciousness, but not as natural facts of the world. They are creations of the human mind, enabling us to 
discuss issues and comprehend each other, but the concepts can become too entrenched. This then has 
potential to block creative approaches to problem-solving and assuming as foregone conclusions that are 
actually only products of our conceptualization. 
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Chapter 2 will provide theoretical background on identity studies and clarification 
of the term “identity.” Following that, the understanding of identity will be applied to 
Turkey in chapter 3, which will show the development of the republic historically, the 
research barrier inherent in identity as a sociology study versus identity as a historical 
study, and an overview of the components of Turkish national identity. Chapter 4 will be 
solely devoted to national identity, expanding on these components and developing them 
in a vivid metaphor extending throughout the chapter. This will show how Atatürk 
packaged a new Turkish identity for the new republic. Then, chapter 5 will fit the state 
into this metaphor of the nation, first with focus on the state’s function internally in 
relation to the nation. The second part will concentrate externally on Turkey’s 
international region, role, and rough neighborhood. Chapter 6 will then turn to the 
Turkey-America relationship, and how the two suffer from a lack of understanding of one 
another. This will be specifically applied to the Kurdish case as a real example, and then 
suggestions will be made for promoting mutual understanding in general. 
 
1.5 Sources 
 
This study is based on primary and secondary sources, both old and recent, 
published in English and Turkish. It includes newspaper articles, congressional 
proceedings, speeches, lectures, discussions, surveys, and personal conversations. For 
secondary sources, it uses historical works, strategic assessments, books and papers from 
think-tank institutions, theoretical volumes, investigative pieces, analytical books, and 
works by scholars, journalists, specialists, government employees, and citizens. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY 
 
 
The vague concept of Türklük—and the related Penal Code article #301 banning 
its insult—is ever more frequently in the news in Turkey. The English translation into the 
awkward and forced word “Turkishness,” sounds even murkier. Yet it is the basis not 
only for myriad legal claims, but also for the very identity of every Turkish person. Its 
cousin phrase, Türk Kimliği (Turkish Identity), holds a similarly high rank, and any 
perceived or real insult to either one is considered not only traitorous, but also criminal. 
Somewhere down in the recesses of the Turks’ self-conception, and deep in the 
pockets of the republican state Gazi Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) created out of 
Ottoman Empire ruins in 1923, there is an unshakable sense of both Turkish identity, and 
the need to defend it. The Republic of Turkey, the borders of Turkey, and the people of 
Turkey must be defended at all costs, exclaimed the great leader in many a speech to the 
people of the newly formed country. While the republic of Turkey, despite pitfalls and 
potholes along the way, has remained very much intact, and the borders of Turkey have 
not been credibly challenged since then, it’s the people of Turkey that remain at risk—or 
at least perceive it that way. 
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With this in mind, strategists who claim identity security or identity protection is 
too small a matter11 are missing a major factor influencing not only domestic conflict but 
also foreign policy and therefore international relations. This thesis will examine what it 
means to be a Turk in Turkey, and what it means to be Turkey in the world.  
These are questions that Americans (and Turks alike, to their own disadvantage, 
going along with the West) have largely ignored. Americans tend to ask instead, “how 
does Turkey fit into our American puzzle and our strategy?” or “How can we make 
Turkey relevant and useful for us?” Although such questions must be asked in a 
realpolitik world, the aim of this paper is to move away from study based on strategy, and 
instead center on identity, specifically Turkish identity, with a belief that more informed 
understanding of it will ultimately further the valued strategic purposes of both countries. 
One of the purposes of this paper is to dig deeper into the lives of the Turkish 
people—their history, mindset, self-identification, and sense of placement. Thus, identity 
studies enter the picture. And with the introduction of such a broad yet vital word as 
identity, it is first necessary to delineate exactly what the word means and seeks to 
explain. The following questions will be addressed: What is identity? What is it 
composed of? How does it form? Is there always one identity? Are there different kinds 
of identity? Can it be fully known for a particular country, group, or individual? Is 
identity fixed or fluid, historically permanent or a modern creation? How is it different 
from nationalism or nationhood or culture or society? Is it separate from ethnicity and 
race? Does it fit into one of the known theoretical frameworks for international relations? 
How does it relate to foreign policy, and is it even worth studying?  
                                                 
11
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2.1 Identity Defined and Formulated 
At its most basic level, identity is an understanding of who “we” are or “I” am in 
relation to the “other.” The we can be classified any number of ways and so can the other, 
but the important aspect is the relation between the two. The principle is that one knows 
oneself best when contrasted with another or others.  
Thus, “national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations and 
states.”12 This becomes quite interesting for Turkey, which is plagued with what is 
known as the “Encirclement Syndrome,” a peril felt by nation-states that are surrounded 
by real and potential enemies. Turkey’s internationally geographic positioning has also 
been characterized, since the Cold War, as a “Tough Neighborhood.” Even with only 
those thoughts in mind, Turkey’s sense of self versus other is extremely salient.  
The basic level of identity as self-conception, however, only scratches the surface 
of a vast subtext of meanings, traditions, rhetoric, expectations, and pride. For a working 
definition of national identity, leading scholar Anthony Smith’s outline of the 
fundamental factors of national identity will be used: 
1. an historic territory, or homeland 
2. common myths and historical memories 
3. a common, mass public culture 
4. common legal rights and duties for all members 
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members. 
 
According to Smith, “a nation can therefore be defined as a named human population” 
sharing the five features above.13 Thus, national identity is quite broad, and in speaking 
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of a particular country’s identity, scholars draw from components such as religion, myth, 
education, leadership, ethnicity, race, arts and music, language, geography, and cultural 
norms. But how do all of those components form? Part of it is the natural outflow of 
history and culture, based on the characteristics just listed. But perhaps an even larger 
part of it is the actual packaging of such characteristics, into a compressed and digestible 
understanding of oneself. The “whos” and “hows” and “whens” of the packaging process 
are intriguing, and will be discussed in the case study of Turkey throughout this paper.  
A related question is that of identity’s sources. One academic, Stephen Saideman, 
in summarizing a collection of essays on Middle Eastern nations’ identities reveals three 
primary sources of political identity in particular. They are: 1) leaders and power elite, 2) 
societal forces/domestic conflict, and 3) international factors, especially the ends of 
empires (particularly interesting for Turkey, which is built on the not-too-distant ruins of 
a collapsed Ottoman Empire). Yet, such concise categories aside, Saideman still notes 
that “in sum, the contributors have not arrived at a consensus on what shapes identity. 
The authors largely concur that multiple identities exist and that the salience of each one 
varies over time.”14 
This then begs the question of identity versus identities. Specifically, does Turkey 
have one, clear, and easily defensible identity, or does it have multiple, conflicting, and 
sometimes-contradictory identities? Sources—and even a cursory look at Turkish 
society—suggest the latter. To assume that nation-states have just one identity would be 
oversimplification; there are different identities and even various types of identities.  
 One fundamental distinction is between collective and individual identity.  
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Individual identity speaks for itself, and tends to the focus of psychology, but collective 
identity spreads to the realm of sociology and nation-state studies. Regarding collective 
identity, David Snow writes: 
…discussions of the concept invariably suggest that its essence resides in a shared 
sense of “one-ness” or “we-ness” anchored in real or imagined shared attributes 
and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or 
contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of “others.”15  
 
Within this is the collective process of identity-formation, which can arise subconsciously 
from the group, or can be directed by an effective leader. Before the Republic of Turkey, 
any sense of identity in being Turk came from the former route, whereas with the 
establishment of the republic, collective identity of the nation was purposefully directed 
by its leader. The process itself (even more so than the end result) of directing collective 
identity is vital to understanding a group’s identity, for it can be seen and grasped, 
whereas the identity itself is often nebulous at best, or utterly indefinable at worst. The 
works on collective identity also emphasize that “collective identity is, at its core, a 
process rather than a property of social actors” and that in the course of actors 
recognizing themselves as a collectivity, “this process is more vital to conceptualizing 
collective identity than any resultant product or property.”16 
 
2.2 State vs. National 
When talking collectively about a country of people, one of the most important 
distinctions that emerged in recent years is “state identity” versus “national identity.” 
Liberal German historian Friedrich Meinecke did a great service by first making this 
distinction, in his 1908 Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des 
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deutschen Nationalstaates (Worldcitizendom and [the] Nation-State: Studies on the 
Genesis of German Nation-States). He separated “the Kulturnation, the largely passive 
cultural community, from the Staatsnation, the active, self-determining political 
nation.”17 This is a vital difference, for, on top of Smith’s definition of national identity 
above—that “named human population” group—there is placed a state. Sometimes a 
state is formed first and the people gradually fill it. But in most cases, as in Turkey’s, the 
state structure is laid upon that pre-existing nation of people (whether collectively aware 
of themselves or not) to give it leaders, government, institutions, and especially foreign 
policy, and a viable organ in the international system.  
Anthony Smith’s hallmark work on national identity notes the “profound gulf” 
between nation and state, with the state referring “exclusively to public institutions, 
differentiated from, and autonomous from, other social institutions and exercising a 
monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory.”18 Since his work, this 
difference has been further highlighted, both by academics and by history itself. Since his 
1991 publishing of the book, and with developments in the post-Cold War world, it has 
become both more clear and crucial that “the state and the nation are not coterminous in 
much of the world.”19 For the purposes of identity studies, the distinction has been further 
clarified and codified. Telhami and Barnett, echoing Smith’s definition, present the 
distinction between the two—national and state—identities:  
State identity can be understood as the corporate and officially demarcated 
identity linked to the state apparatus; national identity can be defined as a group 
of people who aspire to or have a historical homeland, share a common myth and 
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historical memories, have legal rights or duties for all members, and have markers 
to distinguish themselves from others.20 
 
Telhami and Barnett’s volume notes that “In the Middle East the state’s identity can be 
quite distinct from national identities of the local population, generating the domestic 
insecurities apparent to even the casual observer.”21 Their collection of essays does not 
include Turkey (which is often considered more a part of Europe, or the ever-elusive 
“Eurasia”), but is the aim of this thesis to do so, and to link aforementioned “domestic 
insecurities” to the Turkish-American relationship so both the U.S. and Turkey can 
perhaps make more reasonably informed and self-reflective foreign policy decisions.  
This thesis, in applying this distinction to Turkey, recognizes that the government 
of a country, although representing it abroad, does not fully embody its identity. Nor do 
the people of a country, although inhabiting and comprising it, fully embody the identity. 
A country’s collective identity is found somewhere between the state and national 
identities, and the two may or may not be aligned with each other.  
Overall, national identity seems to present itself as the deeper, primary, 
antecedent identity, in that states must “legitimate themselves in national and popular 
terms as the states of particular nations….”22 Mustafa Kemal, in creating a state, also had 
to take a loose, scattered, and unconnected population, which had plenty of cultural and 
religious substance, but no real conception of identity as a group, and give them a 
packaged national identity worth dying for—thus justifying Turkey as the state for the 
nation of the Turks. He indeed worked toward exactly that principle of legitimization. 
Today, however, particularly in relation to Turkey’s identity and security on the 
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international stage, the vital linkage appears impeded. This is more dangerous than a 
mere intellectual phenomenon, in that “the lack of overlap between state and national 
identity can generate an inherently unstable and precarious situation, one that results in 
political, economic, and symbolic exercises by the state in order to shift subnational 
loyalties to the symbols of the state”23 Indeed, this is what Turkey may be experiencing 
currently, and has experienced periodically since the foundation of the republic. The two 
(conflicting) identities will be discussed subsequently.  
 
2.3 Identity Changeability 
Beyond the “state” versus “national” distinctions, there are always multiple 
identities at work in a country. Each individual, collectivity, nation, or state can possess 
various identities, such as identities along religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, gender, or 
political lines.  Perhaps miraculously, “sometimes these identities can be integrated in a 
relatively harmonious way.”24 However, most of the time the case is that these identities 
conflict more than they synchronize, and in the instance of Turkey, there seems to be 
more cacophony than harmony at times and in recent days. Possibly more applicable to 
Turkey is to “think of a hierarchy of identities, one that constitutes the core and others 
that are ‘activated’ during certain social situations and do not undermine the pillar.”25 
Turkey’s “pillar” would be Türklük (Turkishness) since the founding of the republic,26 
but as evidenced in the frequent challenges to the penal code article protecting it, plenty 
of other identities revolve around this pillar.  
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As follows, scholars widely agree that identity is not clear-cut and unitary. 
However, there is debate in academia as to whether identity is fixed or created. 
Primordialists believe identity is fixed, meaning they argue that communal identities are 
a “given of social existence.”27 Instrumentalists, on the other hand, believe identity is 
created. This distinction is important, because it determines whether politicians are able 
to influence identity, or whether identity is a constraint on politics and politicians than an 
opportunity for social and behavioral manipulation.28  
Primordialists tend to see identity as natural, a constant throughout history, 
whereby the nation and its identity—whether discovered or not—always existed, and it is 
just the study of nation and identity that is recent. Instrumentalists view identity and 
nation as recent creations in and of themselves, generated through our ways of grasping 
the world and through our tools of study, arguing that humans did not always see 
themselves in terms of national groups or cluster together within common identities, but 
that leaders and elites created these organizational structures. 
In this case study of Turkey, the notion of identity falls somewhere between 
Primordialism and Instrumentalism. It falls short of extreme Instrumentalism, because it 
assumes instead that identity is not just the result of leaders manipulating the masses and 
is not something one can just imagine and choose to impose on people. Something has to 
exist beforehand. But on the other side of the coin, identity and nation are not prior, 
overriding, and determining influences in a defined sense. Leaders have to make it that, 
but they also have to start with material that is already there. This taking of the raw 
substance that is indeed “foregoing,” and naming and organizing and shaping it into a 
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cohesive identity, is what I call packaging, as noted above and to be further detailed in 
later chapters. It is taking what the Primordialists find to have existed throughout history 
and successfully and neatly wrapping it up in a process of what Instrumentalists view as 
creation of identity. More specifically, it is a process of condensing, codifying, 
proclaiming, and instilling.  Sometimes it may happen for a nation gradually or quite by 
accident, but in the case of the Republic of Turkey, it was done swiftly and successfully 
by the Kemalist regime in the 1920s and 1930s.  
It follows that if identity is partially a created animal, then it must be fluid as 
well, in that it can be tamed, treated, tampered with; essentially, it is always open to re-
creation. Such a characteristic of identity—its changing nature—makes it all the more 
difficult to study, but all the more necessary as well. It is a dependent variable with a 
heavy influence not only in domestic politics but also with a large spillover into 
international relations.29 Rather than giving up on identity as something too “soft” and 
intangible to study, we should instead understand how and why it forms in a particular 
country, and what impact it has on worldview, self-perception, and decision-making. As 
sociologist Bill McSweeney argues, “Identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of 
negotiation among people and interest groups… Identity is not to be taken as an 
independent variable tout court; it is often the outcome of a labeling process which 
reflects a conflict of interests at the political level.”30 It is this process that will be 
expounded upon in the chapters to follow.    
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2.4 Identity, Nationalism, and Culture 
Identity must be explained in relation to a couple key terms that will fit into the 
identity puzzle throughout this thesis. One question is that of nationalism, which certainly 
ties in with identity and is clearly part of Turkey’s case. Ernest Gellner, one of the other 
leading scholars in this field, handled the connection between nationalism and culture in a 
way that offers a clear context for understanding how identity fits. In defining the theme 
and title of his book Nationalism, Gellner writes, “Nationalism is a political principle 
which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond. Whatever principles of 
authority may exist between people depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the 
members of the group concerned are of the same culture.”31 With this basis, one must ask 
how identity relates to nationalism and how it relates to culture. In the grand scheme, it 
appears to fall between the two. Nationalism arises from intense identity solidarity, but 
identity itself arises from intense cultural solidarity, especially as guided and directed by 
leaders. Thus, identity is largely cultural awareness intensified—and when used to draw 
lines in terms of unity and differentiation, it often leads to nationalism.  
As a side note, nationalism itself is a difficult word to comprehend in Turkish. 
Two words are used in the newspapers to mean nationalism: milliyetçilik and ulusalcılık, 
and there is confusion and debate even among Turks as to the meanings attached to each 
one.32 There are also subcategories of nationalism, like Atatürk milliyetçiliği (“Atatürk 
nationalism”) and kafatası milliyetçiliği (“skull nationalism”).33 Nationalism is tightly 
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wrapped up in Turkish identity, Turkish politics, and these days, Turkish crime.34 It is 
used to accuse and defend claims of discrimination and exclusivity, and between political 
parties as a rhetorical device. Nationalism is a common bedfellow of identity. It will be 
discussed in much detail, with specific regard to Turkey, in later chapters.  
In sum, identity itself, for the purposes of this paper, is linguistically situated in a 
society somewhere between culture and nationalism, in an abstract but important place. 
This place takes mere culture (language, food, arts, clothing, habits, manners, tendencies) 
to a place of belonging and non-belonging, often classified in the more restrictive 
“ethnicity” term. Societally speaking, identity is what makes a particular society 
particular, setting it off from world society in general and from other clustered societies 
around it. By this avenue of identity, a social bond of culture, as in Gellner’s definition, 
becomes something powerful and even dangerous in the potential transformation to 
extreme nationalism. 
 
2.5 Family, Race, Ethnicity 
Within society and identity-speak, there is an added concern of whether an 
identity is racial or ethnic, and the sparks and issues that fly off from such demarcation 
and differentiation. While this thesis does not center on ethnic identity, it deserves some 
explanation based on the overwhelming presence of ethnic problems (or, more correctly, 
what the West terms as ethnic problems) in Turkey.  
Kathryn Manzo, who advocates an argument that nationalist practices are a sort of 
“political religion,” explains nations and nationalism as follows: “Nations are imagined 
as kinship groups under the authority of a god-like and frequently masculinized state; 
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those outside the boundaries created and maintained by nationalism are treated as a 
different…species of either human or animal….”35 Therefore, it follows that those inside 
the boundaries are the same species. Applied to Turkey, everyone is the same 
“species”36—that is, Turk—but to an outsiders’ perspective, there are different “species” 
that require acknowledgement and minority rights. Although Atatürk made every effort to 
define Turkey and Turks not by race, as will be elucidated in later chapters, Manzo points 
out that “race remains alive in collective memory and common sense” despite all efforts 
to unify under terms of “culture” or “ethnicity.”37 Even ethnicity becomes familial, 
though, as Smith notes: “linkage between family and nation reappears in nationalist 
mythologies and testifies to the continuing centrality of this attribute of ethnicity.”38 
Indeed, the very word “nation” in the English language was taken from roots in the word 
“family,” and “the word race entered the English language in 1508 as a synonym for 
family lineage.”39  
However, though both are associated with family, there are important differences 
between ethnicity and race. As ethnicity is the most inextricable from collective national 
identity, and has crucial distinctions from race, it deserves a more complete definition. 
While instrumentalism might argue that ethnic identity is purely ‘situational’ and 
primordialists might say ethnic identity is permanent, existing outside of time and space, 
there is a more appropriate middle road. “Between these two extremes lie those 
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approaches that stress the historical and symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity.”40 
Smith accordingly characterizes “ethnic community,” or the often-used French word 
ethnie, by these attributes: 
1- a collective proper name 
2- a myth of common ancestry 
3- shared historical memories 
4- one or more differentiating elements of common culture 
5- an association with a specific ‘homeland’ 
6- a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population41 
 
Accordingly, by this definition, ethnicity is a description very different from race, which 
is biological and genetic. “Such a community must be sharply differentiated from a race 
in the sense of a social group that is held to possess unique hereditary biological traits 
that allegedly determine the mental attributes of the group.”42 Ethnicity, on the other 
hand, is largely subjective. It has a sense of some permanency, but not bloodlines and 
biological backing. “Most important, it is myths of common ancestry, not any fact of 
ancestry (which is usually difficult to ascertain), that are crucial. It is fictive descent and 
putative ancestry that matters for the sense of ethnic identification.”43 This distinction of 
ancestral myth versus factual bloodlines will be important later for studying Atatürk’s 
understanding of being Turk and how the nation was incorporated under one (cultural) 
identity. Drawing lines of nationality based on race is considered racism, but ethnicity 
has more of an element of choice. Can one choose to be Turk or not?  
Thus, family and race and nation are more tied together than one might suspect, 
and even Western models of nation are “more racial than they often seem.”44 It follows 
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that understandings of national identity will almost always tie in components of race and 
ethnicity, whether they claim so or not. While Manzo observes how ethnicity is powerful 
in “collective memory,” Saideman’s essay asserts that it is also powerful in the hands of 
national leaders: 
…politicians can use the circumstances of ethnic kin to emphasize certain ethnic 
identities at the expense of other identities and issues. When constituents focus on 
economic problems or other troublesome issues, a politician can use a foreign 
event to increase the salience of ethnic identity, creating unity at least for the short 
term.45 
 
 
2.6 Why Identity? 
So why does all of this matter for studying foreign relations? Keeping in mind 
information about what identity is and what it is not; knowledge of its different 
categorizations; its changeability; its “fixed” versus “created” aspects; and its place in the 
bigger picture of culture, society, nation, ethnicity, and race—what does it offer to the 
study of international politics?  
Before answering this question, it helps to take a step back and understand how 
each theoretical framework treats the issue of identity, and to hone in on the most 
appropriate one. According to Saideman, the treatment of four main approaches in 
international relations toward identity can be summarized as follows: 
 Realism- “identity does not matter” 
 Institutionalism- identity “constrains foreign policy” 
Constructivism- “identity essentially constructs the world so that perceptions of 
one’s state and the others are defined by one’s identity”  
Liberalism – identity “influences the ethnopolitical strategies (and, thus, the 
foreign policies) of rational politicians”46  
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This paper essentially takes a Constructivist viewpoint, while affirming that identity does 
indeed also limit foreign policy options (as in Institutionalism) and impact the strategies 
of politicians (as in Liberalism). To say “identity does not matter,” as in the Realist 
viewpoint, is to ignore why people feel they need security in the first place. It would 
reduce international behavior only to the protection of borders and the formulation of 
strategy, as was indeed done throughout most of history. But there are deeper layers of 
human desire underneath, and something nearer and dearer to be protected.  
Going back to the original means of defining identity, as an understanding of 
“self” versus “other,” identity becomes the basic venue for differentiation among nation-
states: for separation, disagreement, enemies, allies, treaties, etc. Once two groups of 
people (“nations”) understand themselves to be separate as such, and especially after they 
draw boundary lines around their land as political states, there is potential for conflict 
between opposing entities defined by the states and nations with which the people 
identify themselves. This potential for conflict, and the means of preventing, handling, 
and solving it, is, in short, international relations.  
More specifically within this conflict potential, security is generally the main 
objective of any nation-state in the international system. The state itself, to be protected 
as a political unit, needs to ensure autonomy, self-rule, and its borders from invasion. But 
the people of the state, besides the protection of a political unit to bind and rule them, 
need another layer of security, a type that has come to be called “societal security.” 
According to the classic work on this issue by Ole Wæver, et al., and well-noted by Bill 
McSweeney in his response chapter,47 state security’s ultimate criterion is sovereignty, 
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while societal security’s standard is identity.48 Thus, state and society are two separate 
items. Rather than societal security being considered a category or pillar within state 
security, the work of academics such as Buzan and Wæver in the 1990s separated the two 
and highlighted the importance of each in its own right. Identity can be a slippery word, 
but it is crucial in its parallel to sovereignty: 
Both concern survival. Sovereignty is the name of the game of survival for a state 
– if it loses its sovereignty, it has not survived as a state…[but] Survival for a 
society is a question of identity, because this is the way a society talks about 
existential threats: if this happens, we will no longer be able to live as ‘us’.49 
 
Thus, identity is more than an ephemeral term that stumps academics across many fields. 
At its core, combining both a primordialist and an instrumentalist view, it is a concept 
that is both the main root of and the main tool for national survival. If a state does not 
have an identity to rally around, will it fight—and die—only for political structures? 
 
2.7 Eight Reasons 
As in any other country, Turkey’s identity defines its people and its people define 
its identity, and the presence of that identity keeps people feeling secure (i.e. “we” know 
who “we” are in relation to “them”).  Accordingly, that identity is crucial to self-
definition and must be protected from outside or even internal corruption. It is this very 
protection of identity—along with the formation, cultivation, proclamation, and 
distribution that accompany it—that, when studied, can shed light on Turks’ self-
perception and international role, as well as the Turkish-American relationship. Turkey 
needs to be studied from an identity perspective, for eight main reasons. 
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First is the problem of “Turkishness,” mentioned above. What Turkishness 
exactly means is not transparent, but to insult it is criminal. It is used, in the media at 
least, as a synonym for Turkish identity, and is often criminalized in situations related to 
publication and broadcasting, as with the charges last year against Turkish writer Elif 
Şafak for Türklüğü aşağılamak (“degrading Turkishness”). Turkish nationalists brought 
her to trial “on charges of denigrating Turkish identity under controversial Article 301 of 
the revised Turkish Penal Code.”50 The reason was the content of fictional dialogue in her 
best-selling novel, The Bastard of Istanbul. One of the Armenian characters speaks of 
Turkish “butchers” killing his ancestors in a 1915 genocide.51 The so-called ‘genocide’ is 
a weighty, almost taboo topic in Turkey, with the state’s official claim that there was no 
ordered genocide and that both sides lost many men in the battles. Şafak was acquitted, 
but not without a display of reaction by the nationalists, with one lawyer informing the 
media, “It's unacceptable that people can insult our state with the excuse of writing 
literature.”52 The fact that Şafak could even be charged for insulting identity shows it to 
be a precious commodity, especially to the Turkish state. In short, the Turks have made 
Turkish identity important to study. “We choose our security problems as we choose the 
interests and identity which accompany them.”53  
Secondly, Turkey’s geographical position, while ideal in some ways, presents a 
high degree of nearby danger and plenty of instances of “other” with which to contrast 
itself. There are seven directly neighboring countries, so the “Encirclement Syndrome” is 
highly salient and easily activated. Additionally, with a republic formed only through 
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violently repulsing encroaching powers eager to seize Turkey’s well-positioned land, it 
became crucial for Turks to know who they were in contrast to those around them. The 
empire had been one grand mix of identities, races, ethnicities, and cultures, so to build a 
unified country on those remains required a unified identity. “Everyone can understand 
Atatürk’s need to forge unity from division in order to establish and maintain the new 
republic under extraordinarily difficult circumstances,”54 offers one American writer with 
deep insight into Turkey. However, not everyone actually understands this, and this 
whole process of republic-formation, Atatürk’s need, and a lack of understanding by 
those outside the republic will be extensively examined. 
The Ottoman Empire and the young age of the new republic present a third 
reason: disassociation from the past. In many ways there is carryover from the empire to 
the republic, but there was a desire to create distance. Turkey was not to be the Republic 
of the Ottomans, but the Republic of the Turks. The Ottoman Empire had died a long, 
slow death, and the new republic was by any means to avoid the “sick man of Europe” 
characteristic that Europe had bestowed on it.55 That is to say, the “Eastern Question” 
was now out of the question.  
Fourthly, one of the most bitterly experienced legacies of the fallen empire is the 
idea of capitulations, which meant privileges extended to foreigners inside the empire. 
Gradually, and especially by the start of World War I, “the capitulations, extraterritorial 
commercial and judiciary rights, once granted from a point of strength, had become a 
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heavy burden.”56 To be rid of these capitulations became a goal of the Young Turks’ 
instigating revolution, and the abhorrence of foreigners’ real and perceived interference 
in Turkey extends even to today. The capitulations left their mark and their legacy.  
Related is the idea of regional affiliation, or lack thereof, as it were. With Turkey 
and Turks not fitting into the categorization of either Middle Eastern or European, there 
is a complexity of being “on our own.” There has at times been a tone of near desperation 
to join the European Union (EU), yet always from the outside looking in, for 150 years 
and counting. Turks remain somewhat rejected by both Arabs, who resent the Turkish 
dilution of Islam, and by Europeans, who seem to the Turks to spurn the possible 
presence of Islam and “third-worldness” in their EU club. Turks are left seemingly alone, 
and thus to be a “Turk” must be something special in and of itself, since there’s no 
overriding regional identity to instill any pride. Truth be told, it is not a source of dignity 
and satisfaction these days for one to be a “Eurasian.”  
Along with this idea of regional unaffiliation is a lack of security, and the 
subsequent sixth reason: a fear of being bargained over. One ramification of not 
belonging to a system is that other nations can bargain over you, as the Turks found out 
quite miserably in 1917 based on agreements between Tsarist Russia and Britain, or in 
1962 in the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union bargained over 
missile presence on Turkish territory. Indeed, it is this fear of being bargained over that 
has historically made Turks lean toward Europe. Jobs, economy, and plenty of other 
reasons play a role, but it is first and foremost a matter of security. 
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Seventh, not only does being a “Turk” have to be something special and worthy, 
but it had to be converted from an insulting word to an identity bursting with pride. The 
Europeans feared Turks as one fears a monster in the night. “In Shakespeare’s day and 
for centuries thereafter, Christians in Europe… considered ‘the general enemy Ottoman,’ 
better known simply as ‘the Turk,’ to be the scourge of civilization. His chief 
characteristics were thought to include mendacity, unbridled lust, sudden violence and a 
passion for gratuitous cruelty.”57 The idea of being a “Turk” (literally, nomadic as 
opposed to civilized urban living) thus surmounted extraordinary negative connotations 
to become a positive term for Anatolian people. Turkish identity, and the related laws and 
punishments meant to protect it, is now wrapped up in what it means to label oneself with 
that word and bear it proudly. Bernard Lewis captures this in the opening paragraph to his 
classic and long-authoritative tome of the history of the republic: 
‘The Turks are a people who speak Turkish and live in Turkey.’ At first glance, 
this does not seem to be a proposition of any striking originality, nor of any very 
revolutionary content. Yet the introduction and propagation of this idea in Turkey, 
and its eventual acceptance by the Turkish people as expressing the nature of their 
corporate identity and statehood, has been one of the major revolutions of modern 
times, involving a radical and violent break with the social, cultural, and political 
traditions of the past.58 
  
Lastly, Turkey needs to be examined in light of identity issues because of the 
tangled ethnic issue and a presumed homogeneity of the republic that the rest of the 
world does not quite see in the same way. This difference of viewpoint creates huge 
problems for Turkey in terms of how it is seen in the West. In North America and 
Europe, the Kurds are seen as a minority whose rights are suppressed. In Turkey though, 
Kurds are not seen as a minority, because there is one nationality. This goes along with 
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the Muslim idea of an umma, or community of people. Race does not factor into this 
Turkish umma that was created in 1923. There is a distinction made between Turks, 
Persians, and Arabs, but not a separate distinction for Kurds. Even as Anthony Smith 
notes more generally (apart from the Turkey’s specific case), through the vein of national 
identity and especially in mass education, “state authorities hope to inculcate national 
devotion and a distinctive, homogenous culture, an activity that most regimes pursue with 
considerable energy under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and 
unity.”59 The homogeneity of Turkey will be a major theme of this thesis. 
For Turkey specifically, the effort within its borders turns into a problem beyond 
its borders, to the point where it is a predicament being played out on the international 
stage. In German analyst Heinz Kramer’s chapter “The Myth of National Homogeneity 
and the ‘Kurdish Reality,’” he asserts that “the core of the problem, at least for the 
proponents of Kurdish nationalist claims, is a political issue: the recognition of a Kurdish 
identity in the state’s policy toward the region” (emphasis added).60 There is a mutual 
mistrust between Turkey and the West over this issue, in which the West feels Turkey 
does not understand and Turkey feels misunderstood. The sensitivity of this subject, at 
home and abroad, causes huge identity issues for the Republic of Turkey and what it 
means to be Turk.   
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
For now, I am using the term “Turk” instead of “Turkishness” in order to be 
historically accurate. In defining the new identity of “Turk” for the people of Anatolia, 
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Mustafa Kemal was, in effect, defining “Turkishness” as well, but that term was not used. 
To employ it from the outset of identity formation in the early republic would be an 
anachronism, because the term was not coined until much later. This will be further 
explained in chapter 5, along with the legal measures surrounding Turkishness today.  
In essence, what follows is a study of the knowledge of what it means to be 
nationally a “Turk,” and civically a citizen of Turkey—how they have been formulated 
through history and largely by the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This can then be 
applied to alter the downhill slide of American-Turkish relations. Chapter 3 will start 
with historic background, introducing Mustafa Kemal and the national label “Turk” as it 
came into being. The national identity of Turkey will then be elaborated extensively in 
chapter 4 with a corresponding diagram that sets apart the main aspects as I perceive 
them. Chapter 5 will then turn to state identity, differentiating it from national identity 
and adding it into the metaphorical picture painted in the preceding chapter. Lastly, 
chapter 6 will turn these identity issues to the Turkish-American relationship, which has 
faltered for lack of depth and mutual understanding. America needs to peer deeper than 
geostrategic necessity regarding Turkey, and see the actual Turkish people, if it is going 
to keep this country in good favor.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE NATION ARISES 
 
 
This chapter will attempt to build a bridge from the theoretical to Turkey 
specifically, through 1) an outline of the history of the republic, 2) an evaluation of 
whether Atatürk created Turkey’s national identity or maneuvered pre-existing 
components, and 3) an overview of some of these components. In general, by focusing on 
national identity, this chapter will examine identity as it relates to the people. The state, 
which represents a political unit, government institutions, and official foreign policy, will 
be the subject of chapter 5.  
 
3.1 The Late Ottoman Empire 
It is widely documented that the word “Turk” faced a centuries-long negative 
connotation. In Europe and subsequently exported to America, published accounts were 
based on a typical reaction to that which is utterly unknown and foreign to the individual: 
fear. The “hated” Turk, the “barbarian” Turk, the “terrible” Turk, all made it into 
European literature as the ideal dark-skinned “bad guy”: 
Europeans considered the Ottomans cruel sinners even after the tide of history 
began to turn against them. ‘I shall always hate the Turks,’ Voltaire wrote to King 
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Frederick II of Prussia. ‘What wretched barbarians!’ Jane Austen mused in one of 
her novels about ‘the turban’d Turk who scorns the world.’61 
 
Books written by European travelers and observers, then translated and shipped to 
America, biased those in the new world quite early on about the region called ‘Turkey’: 
“…in Turkey they destroy everything, and repair nothing…The spirit of the Turkish 
government is, to ruin the labours of past ages, and destroy the hopes of future times, 
because the barbarity of ignorant despotism never considers to-morrow.”62 This sounds 
quite like an unfair bias of the unknown, like Orientalism, even like bigotry, but one 
cannot fully know Mr. Volney’s experience; only the descriptions are available. “By the 
late 1800s, support for Armenian relief efforts entered the American mindset that already 
perceived the Turks as ‘Terrible,’ and “a new generation of Americans had been 
introduced to the ‘Eastern Question’ in terms of describing Turks as barbaric oppressors 
and Armenians as ‘hapless victims.’”63  
Furthermore, to be a Turk was not only a bad word in Europe and America,64 but 
even an insult to the Ottomans up until the 20th century:  
The people had once called themselves Turks, and the language they spoke was 
still called Turkish, but in the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term 
Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the 
Turcoman nomads or, later, the ignorant and uncouth Turkish-speaking peasants 
of the Anatolian villages. To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinople 
would have been an in insult.65 
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Savage in Europe, denigrating in Istanbul, terrible in America, it becomes clear just how 
miraculous was the transformation of the word and identity “Turk.”  
 Stepping back though, “Turks” (in Anatolia) were only a small part of the larger 
umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, and were much more aware of an Ottoman identity than 
a collective Turkish one. Once representing strength, power, and domination (however 
savage or uncivilized), the Ottoman by the late 19th century was the weak and ill player in 
European eyes. Too late in starting official diplomatic relations with the European 
countries, too distant from the European power centers, and too expansive to stay unified 
under the appetites of growing European empires, the Ottoman Empire was in its dying 
days. In 1877, with the Russian-Turkish War, it lost much territory as peoples in the 
Balkans broke out from under Ottoman rule.  
All of Europe had its gaze upon the “sick man”66 crumbling in the southeast 
corner of the continent. Europeans then watched as the Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP, but known to the world as “Young Turks”), a militarized reformist-nationalist 
group formed in the 1890s, rose up in revolt in 1908 against the Sultan Abdul Hamid II, 
who capitulated. The Young Turks deposed him, and put his brother Muhammed V on 
the throne in 1909. The new sultan had no actual power; rather, the Young Turks 
established a regime, reopened free debate and free press, and held elections for a new 
parliament.67 But, “unfortunately for the empire, the brave hopes of 1908 proved 
stillborn.”68 Internal problems broke apart the ‘Young Turk’ regime, and from 1913 the 
administration was run, in effect, by Enver Pasha, one of the leaders of that revolution. 
The government was in flux as the Great War began, and the European powers were all 
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tacitly considering “the Eastern Question”: that is, how to eventually divide up the 
Ottoman Empire, who gets what, and how to prevent another war over the territory when 
the empire dissolved. 
 
3.2 Young Kemal 
Meanwhile, a young boy named Mustafa Kemal was growing up in Salonika 
(now in modern Greece but then a province of the Ottoman Empire) under the heavy 
influence of Western thought, especially French, which was disseminated by the Jews, as 
it was the largest Jewish city in all Europe at the time and had an Ottoman Jewish 
population. Originally, Mustafa’s mother, Zübeyde, wanted him to study the Koran and 
perhaps become a religious leader. Kemal, however, found his inspiration elsewhere. In 
the absence of a father, who died when Kemal was young, he began to look to the men 
around town, especially those in military uniform and in particular a neighbor named 
Ahmet. “There awakened in him an irresistible desire to become a soldier, to show 
himself off in gold braid like them and carry a sword”69 At the ripe age of 12, Kemal 
announced to Ahmet that he would become a soldier as well.70 
The pride of the uniform aside, Kemal was also a serious scholar, and a leader 
among his classmates, who tended to follow him naturally and implicitly. He was 
interested in the study of “the life of nations and men,” and even though he had a 
following among his friends, he spent many hours alone in contemplation. Something 
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deep inside him “realized that the hour had come for the Ottoman Empire, as it had for all 
the others, whose domination had been imposed with the edge of the sword.”71 
It was when young Kemal headed to military high school in Manastır that his 
mind and future really opened. There he met his friend Fethi, who helped introduce him 
to Europe in general, and France in particular. Kemal learned about French political 
thought and the French Revolution, gradually realizing the importance of the French 
language as well. After at first making little progress with the language, he committed 
himself to learning it during one summer holiday. And thus began the young man’s 
westward leaning, to be discussed later in this paper as a prominent theme of the bright 
new future he was sculpting for Turkey.    
 
3.3 The Partition 
Twenty-two years after young Mustafa Kemal’s declaration of his future 
occupation in the military, he was not only in the military, but was rising to the post of 
general and leading the Gallipoli campaign against the Allied Forces over control of the 
Dardanelles.72 The victory here earned the Turks great reputation as fighting men in the 
world, and Kemal great status as the leading general in Turkey. 
To the astonishment of Europe and the world, in 1915 a Turkish force managed to 
resist and then repel British-led invaders whose battle plan had been drawn up by 
no less a personage than First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill… In 
fierce fighting that lasted eight months and cost tens of thousands of lives, 
Turkish soldiers managed to hold their peninsula, keep their strait and ultimately 
overwhelm the Allied expeditionary force. The commander who achieved this, 
thereby winning the only important Turkish victory of the war, was Mustafa 
Kemal.73 
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Despite this one victory, with the overall defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 
Great War in 1918, the Anatolian territory was set to be partitioned by Europe. The 
“Eastern Question” had finally come officially to the table. Nothing was certain about the 
future of Ottoman land, except that European powers wanted it. Their desires came to 
fruition in the Treaty of Sèvres, a miserable partitioning of the entire land of modern 
Turkey into various strips and sections for the European powers. Italy was to get the 
southern region along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Greece was to have the Aegean 
Region extending quite far inland, France would get the region of Hatay including 
present-day Adana, and the straits in Istanbul were to come under international control. 
Additionally, in eastern Anatolia, an independent Armenian state would be established in 
the areas that are now the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, and Bitlis, and the Kurds 
were to have a scheme for ‘local autonomy’ coordinated by the Western European 
powers, and likely leading to eventual full independence.74 The only land left for a future 
Turkish state was a comparatively small remnant in northern Anatolia, undesirable land 
that lacked the richness, warm coastlines, natural resources, or international value of the 
other regions.  
The partitioning magnitude of this treaty, with the European powers eagerly 
grabbing their share of the loot, and the incredible resistance the Turks would put up to 
prevent it, have had a huge impact on the Turkish identity that continues today.75 The 
defunct Ottoman government was prepared to accept this treaty, a point for which they 
were later castigated and demonized for weak surrender of all that was the Turks’ by 
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right and inheritance. In fact, several representatives did sign the treaty at the 1920 
ceremony in the Paris suburb after which it is named.76 The treaty, however, was never 
fully ratified, legalized, or carried out. For, as the European powers did indeed begin to 
execute its measures even before the 1920 signing, the Turks, organized and rallied by 
none other than Mustafa Kemal, fought back for their independence.  
 
3.4 The Resistance 
After his victory in World War I, with his new clout and with various identity 
tactics to be expounded on later, Kemal was able to gain a popular political following 
among Anatolian dwellers. In the summer of 1919, at the Erzurum congress, a gathering 
of former CUP members and old army officials, Kemal was elected chairman and “issued 
a proclamation declaring that ‘the entire country within its [undefined] national frontiers 
is an undivided whole’, and that any foreign occupation of it would be resisted by 
force.”77 Indeed, the Turks would need to resist by force. However, they were tired and 
weary, and 
…by the end of the war, the number of deserters who roamed the countryside was 
four times that of the soldiers remaining in the army. This population of 
miserable, hungry, bereaved and uprooted individuals could only be motivated to 
take up arms again by a direct threat to its existence. In 1919 this threat came…78 
 
From the new capital of Ankara, where Kemal established headquarters in December 
1919, he coordinated what came to be known as the Milli Mücadele (National 
Struggle).79 As described by Simon Mayall, “In disgust at the Istanbul Government’s 
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craven submission to Allied will, societies for ‘the defense of rights’ sprang up to contest 
the occupation and division of Turkish soil, particularly by the hated Greeks.”80 
It was amidst this struggle that the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) was born. An 
official statement for the rallying cry of the new nationalist government, this document 
was to be defended to the letter, rejecting and replacing most of what was written on the 
scroll of Sèvres. It demarcated the boundaries of a Turkey the nationalists thought 
acceptable, meaning it let go of the Arab-majority lands of the former Ottoman Empire, 
but demanded the lands in which there was an “Ottoman Muslim” (in effect, Turkish or 
Kurdish) majority.81 It was at this point of the identity-building story that the people of 
the future Turkey, under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership, first declared and defended their 
“historic homeland,” which is the first of Anthony Smith’s five prongs of “national 
identity” cited in chapter 2.  
The nationalists sealed their determination with the first convening of the Türkiye 
Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly) in Ankara on 23 April 1920; during this 
meeting they proclaimed the sovereignty of Turkey as a nation. However, that same 
month the Sèvres terms were published, and the nationalists’ contemporaries back in the 
sultan’s administration in Istanbul then, in essence, “sold out” Turkey by signing Sèvres 
in August. These events “effectively dashed hopes that the Turkish nationalists might be 
able to negotiate their way out of the partition plan, or could do so in collaboration with 
the Istanbul government.”82 The National Struggle was to turn to a military effort.  
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And at this moment in the nationalist Turks’ history, it is no exaggeration to say 
they rose up in astounding unity and courage on the battlefield to assert their sovereignty 
to the Greeks, the rest of the Europeans, and the world at large. They stood up, 
incredibly, to defend a territory newly demarcated and an identity not yet established. 
The Turks proved their determination and stamina to an unsuspecting group of 
preoccupied and equally war-weary European powers unprepared for such a coordinated 
resistance. This is a phenomenon still highly honored and memorialized in every Turkish 
citizens’ mind, but the awesomeness of it all was appreciated outside of Turkey too. 
Indeed, Churchill himself was later to dramatically describe the situation as such: 
Loaded with follies, stained with crimes, rotted with misgovernment, shattered by 
battle, worn down by long disastrous wars, his empire falling to pieces around 
him, the Turk was still alive. In his breast was beating the heart of a race that had 
challenged the world, and for centuries had contended victoriously against all 
comers. In his hands was once again the equipment of a modern army, and at his 
head a Captain, who with all that is learned of him, ranks among the four or five 
outstanding figures of the cataclysm…83 
 
 
3.5 Victory and Independence 
The Turks fought their Kurtuluş Şavaşı (Independence War) against incredible 
odds, but also had luck on their side in terms of Europe’s fatigue and general lack of will. 
“British or French conscripts who had just been told that they had won ‘the war to end 
wars’ would not now be prepared to go back to fight another one, in a remote region 
where no obvious national interests could be identified.”84 The Turks were also fortunate 
in terms of the Soviets’ exclusion from Sèvres, leaving their northern neighbor with a 
bitter taste of the Entente and willingness to side with the Turkish nationalists.  For all 
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Churchill’s dramatics, the heaviest of opponents the Turks faced was indeed not the 
British, but the Greeks, who had by July 1921 managed to advance from the Aegean Sea 
all the way inland as far as the Sakarya River, just 50 miles west of Ankara. It was there 
that the war hit a turning point, as memorialized with displays, paintings, and sound 
effects for visitors to the museum below Mustafa Kemal’s mausoleum in Ankara today.  
This military engagement ushers in for Turkey the establishment of the second of 
Smith’s “national identity” definitive characteristics: “common myths and historical 
memories.” The victories of this war and the ensuing forced retreat the following year of 
the Greeks back to the coast and off of Turkey’s demarcated territory was not only 
recounted vividly by Mustafa Kemal himself in a glorified six-day speech to the Turks a 
number of years later, but remains a vital piece of Turkish national pride that is part of 
the curriculum in schools to this day. Kemal’s decisive victory against the Greeks at 
Dumlupınar on 30 August 1922 is celebrated annually as Turkey’s Zafer Bayramı, or 
“Victory Holiday.” 
Victory Day, Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı (National Sovereignty and 
Children’s Day) on 23 April, Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı (Youth and Sport Holiday) on 19 
May, and the anniversary of Kemal’s death on 10 November are all state holidays that 
today memorialize and reinforce the Turks’ historical memories, but none is as important 
as 29 October, Cumhuriyet Bayramı (Republic Day). This commemorates the day the 
Republic of Turkey was formally declared, in 1923. After the Treaty of Sèvres was 
proved null and void by the events on the battlefield, the powers came to the drawing 
board again in Lausanne, Switzerland—this time with Turkey’s new nationalist 
government and the Istanbul sultanate government both invited—to compose a new 
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treaty. This new convening on 21 November 1922, plus the Grand National Assembly’s 
abolition of the sultanate only four days before,85 resulted in the Lausanne Treaty, a 
document much more amenable to the Turks. Signed in July 1923, the new treaty 
afforded Turks almost all of their territorial demands in the National Pact, with the 
exception of some outer lying regions including Hatay and Mosul, to be decided upon 
later with France and Britain respectively.  
Three results, broadly categorized, came of all this, each of which will be 
thematic in this thesis. First, it was thus that the Turks established their sovereignty, a 
value so precious after the nightmare of Sèvres and the late years of the Ottoman 
experience, when European hands reached freely into their territory especially in the form 
of land claims and judicial capitulations. Now, Turks had let the world know that they 
were not willing to be bargained over or bullied. An October 1922 memorandum by the 
British General Staff acknowledged, “We can no longer treat the Turks as a conquered 
nation to whom it is possible to dictate any terms we wish.”86 This category will be 
broadly characterized as “sovereignty/history.”  
Second, this marks the moment that Turkey became an entity in and of itself, and 
began the process of acquiring geo-strategic labels by the greater powers. British foreign 
secretary Lord Curzon’s new strategy “consisted of aiding the establishment of an 
independent Turkey as an anti-Soviet barrier, while protecting British interests.”87 This 
category will be loosely called the “international factor,” as it relates to Turkey’s 
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placement in the world, politically and geographically, and what the rest of the world 
thought of it. 
Thirdly, the first two characteristics of national identity had been jump-started, 
but lying before Mustafa Kemal and his regime was the equally great task of defining just 
exactly who the Turks were. “A Turk is a person living in the Republic of Turkey,” he 
proclaimed, but territorial location of living is not a sufficient in and of itself for one’s 
identity, and Kemal knew that. Establishment of a common, mass public culture, 
common legal rights and duties for all members, and a common economy with territorial 
mobility for members (the last three of Smith’s five prongs) lay in the rhetoric and 
reforms he would institute in the days to come. This third resulting category—the task set 
before Kemal’s regime—could be called “re-paving” or “packaging” identity.  
Of these three categories, one is historical; one is based on international policy, 
orientation, and outside factors; and one is based on Kemal and his efforts. And if these 
three factors all have weight, and Smith’s whole definition fits into just one of them (the 
third—those aspects instituted by Kemal) then it follows that Smith’s tight definition is 
not expansive enough for Turkish identity. 
 
3.6 Kemal’s Creation, or Kemal’s Modification? 
All this history brings us to the question Did Mustafa Kemal create Turkish 
identity, or did he mold and shape it based on pre-existing factors? According to 
sociologist Anthony Smith, identity is based on five prongs (listed in chapter 2). In 
sociology, however, there is a tendency to come up with neat concepts and ideas, but it 
does not always fit perfectly when applied to a case study, in this case Turkey. Thus a 
puzzle in research arises. Although Turks existed loosely under the Ottoman Empire, it 
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was a diffused arrangement, and the peoples’ attachment was more to Islam than 
anything else. Therefore, in trying to determine which of the five prongs were products of 
Kemal, it would seem to be all of them. So did Kemal himself single-handedly create 
Turkey’s national identity? Did no substance of identity exist before him? 
 “Turk,” as stated earlier, although an unpleasant term representing a disjointed 
group of people who might not even characterize themselves as such, was at least 
something. The historical outline in this chapter describes how Turkey as a state began, 
but Turkey as a nation—as a group of people—existed long before. They were a scattered 
people, across a vast land space, who were loosely Ottoman, had very real local (not 
national) culture and myths, and strongly identified with family or tribal units. But, over 
and above all, it was to Islam, not Turkishness or the region of Turkey, that they attached 
their identity: 
Until the nineteenth century the Turks thought of themselves primarily as 
Muslims; their loyalty belonged, on different levels, to Islam and to the Ottoman 
house and state. The language a man spoke, the territory he inhabited, the race 
from which he claimed descent, might be of personal, sentimental, or social 
significance. They had no political relevance. So completely had the Turks 
identified themselves with Islam that the very concept of a Turkish nationality 
was submerged—and this despite the survival of the Turkish language and the 
existence of what was in fact though not in theory a Turkish state. Among the 
common people, the rustics and the nomads, a sense of Turkishness survived, and 
found expression in a rich but neglected folk literature.88 
 
In this vein, Mustafa Kemal did not start from scratch in constructing Turkey’s 
new identity. He had the historic Turk people, layered with an imported and embraced 
Islamic culture; and he had the substance of the empire, a pre-existing intellectual and 
institutional infrastructure on which to build. Fortunately for his regime, this 
infrastructure was not accompanied by a deep sense of Ottoman identity. The identity 
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was instead found in Islam, which became a tool through which the Kemalists could 
spread nationalism. In addition to this base were the mistakes and lessons learned by the 
empire, as cornerstones for building new identity.89 
Herein lies a problem with the definition of national identity promulgated by 
sociologist Anthony Smith, because in an analysis, none of the five components of 
identity existed in any significant or measurable way among the Turks before Mustafa 
Kemal. For “historical territory” (#1) there was a land there of course, but the Turks were 
not aware of it as a “homeland” as such. Regarding “common myths and memories,” (#2) 
there were powerful local village stories and legends, but most Anatolians were not aware 
of their larger history, or of Istanbul and the events there. And, as mentioned above, any 
sense of nationality was ‘submerged.’ As far as a “mass, public culture,” (#3) there was 
none.90 And there were no “common legal rights and duties” (#4) because there was no 
state structure to impose them, although there were police forces and courts as a part of 
the empire, to enforce rights. Lastly, with respect to a “common economy,” (#5) again, 
there was not a state under which the economy could be united. Trading, buying, and 
selling existed, but only among networks of villages in a non-collective manner. 
Therefore, in analyzing Smith’s definition as applied to the Republic of Turkey, 
one would assume Atatürk created a national identity for the Turks, because before his 
leadership and reforms no “prongs” of national identity existed saliently, but afterward 
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they all did. Yet in reality Atatürk did not create the Turks’ identity. This is where a 
heavily instrumentalist view of identity falters, and the disciplines of sociology and 
history collide. International Relations studies are by nature interdisciplinary, but the 
various disciplines do not always lend themselves to soluble mixing. The problem in this 
case of applying a new sociological framework to the past lies in being ahistorical—
devoid of historical data. (This is a strength of the primordialists, who see identity as 
something deeply rooted and always existing.)  
On the one hand, tight terms and frameworks like Smith’s are helpful; in an 
enlightening article on ideology by Michael H. Hunt, this point is addressed: “To move in 
a world of infinite complexity, individuals and societies need to reduce that world to 
finite terms. Only then can they pretend an understanding of their environment and have 
the confidence to talk about it and the courage to act on it.”91 On the other hand, the 
terminology of today does not fit neatly with yesterday’s data. This is a methodological 
problem. Defining “ideology” as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that 
reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms 
and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality,”92 Hunt asserts the following: 
Any attempt to assign ideology its proper influence and to anchor it in a specific 
social and economic context is attended by a daunting array of pitfalls. 
Reductionism is the most frequently mentioned. Stressing one complex of ideas, 
the anxious contend, not only will fail to illuminate the complexity of policy 
making but may also divert attention from other, more eligible kinds of 
explanations. While those concerns are justified, diplomatic historians should take 
them, not as a deterrent, but (as they have proved for intellectual historians) as a 
spur to try fresh approaches and rethink old ones.93 
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This study is aiming to be such a “fresh approach,” utilizing the components of historical 
continuity and international setting in addition to Smith’s definition, which, while 
seeming comprehensive on paper, is overly general and does not work in fully capturing 
the Turkish identity. More components play a part in the identity development.  
This is not to attack Smith’s definition; it is indeed quite helpful as a guideline for 
components in the third category of assessment for Turkey. Rather, it is a recognition 
pointing to the insufficiency of modern sociological wording as a framework for analysis 
of Turkey’s history and identity. Smith himself, in the few pages of his seminal work that 
are devoted to the case of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, refers to Atatürk’s identity 
work for Turkey in terms that imply historical engineering, not creation, of identity.  
It was this Turkic ideal, shorn of its extra-Anatolian irredentism, that Kemal 
Atatürk made the basis of his secular, westernizing nationalism. In effect he 
engineered the secession of the Turkish heartlands from the Ottoman empire and 
caliphate, repudiating Ottomanism and Islam and pushing through a series of 
modernizing social and cultural reforms in the cities that would redefine the 
empire as a compact territorial political community aligned to the ethnic nation of 
Anatolian Turks. But, realizing that territorial and civic concepts of the nation 
require a solitary basis in a national cultural identity, the Kemalists attempted to 
furnish the necessary ethnic myths, memories, values and symbols by utilizing the 
theory of Turkish origins in Central Asia….94 (emphasis added) 
 
Smith might well recognize the historical carryover implicated in identity, but his 5-
pronged definition does not leave room for it, at least in Turkey’s case. Even though a 
couple of the five characteristics refer to historical factors (i.e. historical territory and 
memories), neither really existed before Atatürk because the people as a group were not 
aware of them. Yet, as we have seen and will see, Atatürk did not create something out of 
nothing. He did more shifting, shuffling, reorganizing, and rejuvenating.  
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Thus, Smith’s definition will be used in terms of the aspects of identity that were 
not created by Atatürk, but that were—based on past experience and lessons as well as 
individual wisdom—modified, consolidated, and especially packaged95 for the people. 
But what was he packaging and how did he do this? This, the third of the three 
categories, will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter and the following one. The 
category of the international factor, which doesn’t appear in Smith’s ‘national identity’ 
definition at all, will then appear in chapter 5 on state identity. The historical carryover 
feature will run like a ribbon woven throughout both, as it is the backdrop for both 
identity packaging (thus proving the Kemalist Regime’s work to be indeed a processing 
job instead of a creating one) and for international and domestic views of Turkey as a 
state.  The coalescence of all three categories makes up the identity of the Republic of 
Turkey.   
 
3.7 Packaging—What to package 
 
In examining Atatürk’s packaging of Turkish national identity, this chapter and 
the following will focus on the identity-bestowing process (which, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, is a more important aspect of collective identity than the outcome itself) with 
the broader questions of what and how. This analysis is looking at the socio-ethno-
national identity that Atatürk and the Kemalist Regime gave the people and not the 
official political definition of Kemalism, although there will be some overlap. As 
McSweeney writes, “Identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among 
people and interest groups. Being English, Irish, Danish is a consequence of a political 
process, and it is that process, not the label which symbolizes it, which constitutes the 
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reality which needs explication.”96 In this vein, the process will be examined. But first, 
what was to be processed? 
In terms of a new identity for the Turkish nation, Atatürk’s reforms and rhetoric—
built upon mistakes from the past, lessons from other nations, and his own masterful 
sense of the possible—centered on 1) a “nation-first” mentality of nationalism, 2) 
Westernization as the only and best choice for orientation, 3) secularism as the state 
religion, 4) an understanding of homogeneity for Turks (regardless of ethnicity), and 5) 
civilization and modernization as priorities for catching up with other countries and not 
being “left out.” These will be detailed and applied to a vivid analogy in the following 
chapter, but for now this chapter will conclude with a quick overview of each. These 
were to be the material, the wrapping paper, of Atatürk’s packaging of identity.  
 
3.7.1 Nationalism 
 
Fierce nationalism was a theme that slipped into almost all of Atatürk’s rhetoric. 
In creating a new country out of rubble and remains, and ensuring its defense and ability 
to stand in the future, he did not have much choice but to glorify the new state and its 
people frequently to the public. “Oh Turkish Youth! Your first duty is forever to protect 
and defend the Republic of Turkey and Turkish independence. This is the sole foundation 
of your existence and future.”97 Atatürk spoke with force and passion to give the Turkish 
people something worthy to fight for. If Turkey was going to achieve the ideals of 
(retaining) independence, and (progress toward) westernized civilization, modernization, 
and international relevance, Turks were going to have to always put their country first. In 
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this way, Atatürk packaged his ideas and objectives for Turkey in terms of Turkish 
nationalism, or the “national ideal”: 
[He] defined in general but statesmanlike terms the broad basis on which the new 
Turkey must be built up if it was to exist. Her deeds, he said, were science and 
knowledge and a high state of civilisation, a free mentality and independence. The 
Turks must set to work seriously, thinking only of their country and of nothing but 
their country. He reminded his listeners that selfish aims were characteristic of 
their former rulers, and the bane of the country itself. The objective of all Turks 
must, he stated, be the national ideal. The aim of the nation must be to occupy in 
the world the rank of a civilised state… Those who looked back were condemned 
to be overwhelmed beneath the advancing flood of universal civilisation.98 
(emphasis added) 
 
The terms millet and millî (“Nation” and “National”) were the key words of Kemal’s 
rhetoric. In Sivas, where another nationalist congress was held in summer 1919, shortly 
after the Erzurum one, Kemal said those words 41 times in a 15-minute opening speech.99  
 Mustafa Kemal’s regime also had to take action against local and regional 
enemies to their cause. The Istanbul government was a distant and militarily weak 
enemy, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the authority it still held over many of 
the people. It was busy issuing fatwas against Kemal’s regime, inciting the people to 
rebellion at a time when the nationalists most needed support and adherence in local 
villages. Thus the rebellions were dealt with harshly, with makeshift structures of the 
fledgling new government: 
Among the nationalists’ countermeasures were the adoption of the ‘High Treason 
Law’ (Hiyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) and the institution of revolutionary courts, the 
so-called ‘Independence Tribunals’ (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri), which dealt very 
severely with Ankara’s opponents, as well as deserters.100 
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3.7.2 Westernization 
 
Mustafa Kemal’s battlefield victories and road to establishment of the Turkish 
state earned him global recognition. He appeared on the fourth issue ever published of 
Time magazine in the United States, with a large drawing of his bust in military garb, and 
the title “Where is a Turk his Own Master?”101 The answer was: in Turkey, a newly 
forming state carved from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Seven months after that Time 
issue, Atatürk founded Turkey as its own independent, sovereign nation, with the new 
capital city in Ankara instead of Istanbul. He had deposed the sultan and would similarly 
abolish the caliphate one year later, with both ending their terms in exile, one voluntarily 
and one by force. The Time magazine article, dated March 24, 1923, described Kemal in 
glowing terms: “He stands today as the Emancipator of Turkey. He has lifted the people 
out of the slough of servile submission to alien authority, brought them to a realization of 
their inherent qualities and to an independence of thought and action.”102  
Thus, with a rejection of the religious-based and “alien” authority in Istanbul, 
Atatürk’s direction for the nascent republic dictated that Western orientation was to 
become one of the basic principles of the new Turkish Republic. This was actually where 
he differed from one of the key academics who influenced him, Ziya Gökalp, who—
especially early on—advocated  a “return to pre-Muslim Turkish customs,”103 embracing 
Turkic roots from Central Asian ancestors and capitalizing on those as a rallying point in 
terms of cultural cohesion. But Atatürk saw where the world was heading, and knew 
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Turkey had to jump on board, or risk getting left behind. This “left behind” lesson was 
one learned from the Ottomans, who in 1836 had been far too late in trying to get in with 
the European system. Besides, Mustafa Kemal was a forward-thinker.  
In Kemal’s mind, whether Turkey was ready for the westernization jump or not, it 
had to be made. This would later lead to severe polarization in Turkey; but for the time 
being and the time crunch, it was Atatürk’s only option for a nascent republic. While 
some of his contemporaries were indulging in the romanticism of ethnic politics, 
straining for what Gökalp called the “phantom” of (pan-Turkic) Turanism, “Mustafa 
Kemal was sober in his approach to his career.”104 He knew where the power lay, and 
what he must do for Turkey to be aligned with it. As one of his European biographers 
later wrote, “He would tolerate no half-measures, no piecemeal efforts. Nothing less than 
the latest European civilization would satisfy him…Mustafa Kemal decided for the 
West.”105    
 
3.7.3 Secularism 
 
The Anatolian peoples’ Islamic identity was firm and widespread as Mustafa 
Kemal came to power, and as a wise politician, he knew Islam would not be cast aside 
easily—if at all. Thus, although he was not a religious man and did not support pan-
Islamism, and although he pursued secularism as his aim, he did not attempt any sort of 
immediate advocacy of thorough secularism. Nor did he, in the most early stages of 
garnering support, speak of abolishing the sultanate or caliphate, the peoples’ political 
and religious authority in Istanbul. There was no talk early on of the anti-religious laws 
                                                 
104
 Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: John Murray Ltd, 1999), 97. 
105
 Hanns Froembgen, Kemal Atatürk: A Biography, trans. Kenneth Kirkness (Freeport, NY: Books for 
Libraries Press, 1971), 258. 
 55 
and reforms he was to later impose on the people.106 Instead, Kemal, knowing that 
politics is the art of the possible, navigated the religious waters with superior expertise in 
such a way that Islam was on his side. Rather than harm the emerging nationalist identity, 
Islam in fact helped it. As James Kellas notes, “When church and nation coincide, as they 
often do, the effect is to reinforce a sense of national identity.”107 
Hence, in establishing secularism for Turkey, Mustafa Kemal dealt with the 
strong Islamic identity in Turkey with three clever steps: (1) Utilization of Islam as a tool 
to promote the nationalist cause, by invoking names, terms, and symbols (while letting 
Europeans fear that there might be a swell of Pan-Islam, when in reality he pursued 
nothing of that sort).108 (2) Placement of Islam under the thumb of the nation-state and 
establishment of a new, Turkey-specific (“Turkified”) brand of Islam that would de-
emphasize religious leadership and reinforce the authority of the new state. (3) 
Development of nationalism as a sort of “political religion”109 whereby fiery passions and 
devotions that were once directed toward religion could now be directed toward the 
glorified nation, supporting his cause. Thus, in light of secularism, instead of Islam, 
nationalism became the state “religion.” These ideas will be further elucidated in the next 
chapter on how identity was packaged and delivered, in this case through the channel of 
religious rhetoric. 
Although much has changed in the 85 years since Atatürk’s work and Islamism 
keeps emerging out from under the thumb of the state, nationalism-as-religion still hits 
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the mark, and Atatürk himself is exalted despite the lack of desire he ever expressed for 
worship of himself. Much like Allah Baba (Father God) there is Devlet Baba (Father 
State) and recently, a friend described her childhood understanding of Atatürk, mostly 
based on what she learned in public elementary school, as: “I thought, actually, that 
Atatürk was perfect—that he and Allah were walking arm-in-arm in Heaven.”110 
 
3.7.4 Homogeneity  
 
The issue of Turkish homogeneity is a muddled and complicated one, but as it 
was one of Mustafa Kemal’s unspoken values underlying the founding and cohesiveness 
of the Republic of Turkey, it deserves a prominent place among the components of 
Turkish identity. Although Kemal specifically called the new country “Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti” (Republic of Turkey) and not “Türk Cumhuriyet” (Turkish Republic), thus 
implying a non-ethnic ownership, this was not out of desire for political correctness as we 
understand it today. Rather, it shows superb rhetorical skills with an intentional message, 
and a sincerely different view of ethnicity than that of the West—a mixture of conscious 
effort and subconscious difference.111 
Ethnicity is a tricky concept. Part of the problem comes from a linguistic and 
therefore conceptual difference. As there is no good translation in Turkish for the English 
word ethnicity, it appears as an alien term from another language—and thus an alien 
concept as well. The top three translations used are ırksal, which is better interpreted as 
“racial”; milli, which most definitely means “national”; and etnik, which is just the 
Western word, recently added and made pronounceable for the Turkish tongue—and 
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lacking deep meaning in Turkish language and history. Even the English word ethnicity 
faces vastly different meanings and interpretations both in academia and in everyday use.  
In the case of Atatürk’s unifying measures, he promoted the value of homogeneity 
through the unity of the Turkish nationality over and above differences of race. Today, to 
the West at least, this looks like suppression of ethnic minorities. To the Turks of the 
early republican years however, and even to most Turkish minds today, Kurds and other 
racial groups are not seen as a “minority,” because there is one nationality: Turk. The 
Turks recognized Persians, Arabs, and Turks as three separate and highly distinct groups 
with language, race, and culture differences, but the Kurds were not seen as another 
separate group. They were within the borders of the New Turkey and thus expected to 
become nationally “Turk” just like the rest. How they were encouraged in “Turkifying” 
will be further expanded in the following chapter. 
Atatürk wanted a uniform society—not a mixing bowl. The Ottoman Empire had 
made its mistakes in being too much of a mixing pot of people, languages, cultures, and 
races, and it was time to homogenize. It was far too scattered and patched together, and 
the new republic could only be formed by consolidation and a more realistic sense of 
boundary. And from Atatürk’s view at that time, perhaps quite understandably judging by 
the trials from which the Turks had just emerged, the only way the nation could succeed 
was homogenously. However,  
when the Turkish republic was created in 1923, a large proportion of its 
population consisted of recent immigrants of Slavic, Albanian, Greek, Circassian, 
Abkhaz, and Chechen origin, whereas people that could claim descent from the 
Turkic tribes that had come from Central Asia were certainly a minority of 
Anatolia’s population. It was in this complex setting that Ataturk and his 
associates aimed to create a modern nation-state, an integrated, unitary polity of 
the French type. For that reason, the model of the nation that Ataturk and his 
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associates adopted was civic… To be a Turk meant to live within the boundaries 
of the republic and thereby be its citizen.112  
 
However, as a civic identity was not readily acknowledged by the people113 he 
had to rally them around a different central commonality: Islam. Despite Kemal’s future 
secular goals, this homogeneity was a Muslim-centered one. With no unifying identity, 
culture, or Turkishness yet in place in Anatolia, Islam was the only flag around which 
they could unite. One of the congress reports of 1919 clarifies whom the nationalists 
regarded as their constituency:  
It purports to speak on behalf of ‘the Muslims who form one nation (millet), 
consisting of Turks and Kurds’ and ‘the Muslim majority consisting of Turks and 
Kurds who for centuries have mixed their blood in an intimate relationship and 
who form the community (ümmet) of one prophet.’ The statutes of the society 
organizing the Erzurum congress are even more explicit: they speak about ‘all 
Islamic elements (bilcümle anasır-i islâmiye) of the population’ and say that ‘all 
Muslim compatriots (bilumûm islâm vatandaşlar) are natural members of this 
society.’114 
 
3.7.5 Civilization and Modernization 
 
 With Western orientation as the goal, to Kemal, anything that was Western was 
thereby “civilized” and “modernized.” The West was to be Turkey’s direction: it 
embodied the very essence of the civilization and modernization toward which he strove. 
 Civilization meant expected behavior, ordered codes of conduct, becoming a part 
of civic society, i.e. the West. It meant changes in manners and norms, and the 
development of institutions and education. The people were to be enlightened and refined 
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in the ways of the world. In essence, it meant not being an outsider to the civilized West, 
rough and backwards, but joining in the refined concert of European cultivation.  
 Modernization meant advancement, and thorough change of the ideas, styles, and 
attitudes of the people; these were to become “sophisticated.” Technology, methods, 
language—all was to be up-to-date in terms of highest success and “catching up.” It was 
to be a renewal for the people, a revised life that fit with Kemal’s revisions.  
 Reforms were to be the route for achieving these two goals, and in achieving 
them, to westernize. Some of the reforms were restrictive, like bans on certain articles of 
clothing. Others were difficult, such as language reform for the entirety of the Turkish 
language. Still others were organizational, like the adoption of last names. And others 
appeared quite progressive, like giving women the right to vote and to hold office.115 All 
of these would help with international recognition as well. These reforms will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.  
Lastly, as long as the people knew civilization and modernization were good 
things, Kemal could shape exactly what they meant. Usually they meant whatever the 
West was doing. He encouraged the Turks to participate in this blessed advancement. He 
painted a grand picture for his people, using broad strokes of glory: “I have no doubt that 
this quality and skill of the Turkish nation to be contemporary will rise like a new sun in 
the horizon of future civilization.”116 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE NATION PACKAGED 
 
 
At the dawn of the republic, Mustafa Kemal played a more important role than 
any other figure in forging Turkey’s character. He was larger than life: “The directions 
and the dimensions of the transformation that Atatürk wrought, appear to be nothing short 
of the miraculous.”117 Most importantly, for the purposes of this paper, he brought the 
concept of national identity to the forefront: 
Especially our nation, suffered a lot from being far away from nationality… We 
understood that our fault was forgetting ourselves. If we are expecting the world 
to respect us, first of all, we should show ourselves and nationality this respect in 
terms of feelings, ideas, and in all our behaviour and actions. We should also be 
aware of the fact that the countries who could not adopt their national identity as 
their own are definitely prey to other nations.”118 
 
In packaging Turkey’s identity, Mustafa Kemal utilized two major techniques, 
one of language and one of action: (1) rhetoric, mostly a rhetoric of nationalism, and (2) 
reforms, mostly modernizing and westernizing. Underneath the umbrella of these two 
were various sub-methods and strategies such as ties to history, instilling of national 
pride, his own leadership skills and charisma, occasional violence, and educational 
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edification and cultural channels as a way of reaching the masses. Additionally, in an 
emotional sense, he played into the peoples’ paternal inclinations, fear of 
dismemberment, distrust of neighboring states, and desire to catch up to the modernized 
world—sometimes instilling these emotions and sometimes simply reinforcing them. 
This chapter will discuss first the rhetoric (words), then the reforms (actions), and 
conclude with a summary of some of the specific channels through which both the 
reforms and the rhetoric were dispersed and enforced throughout the new republic.  
A visual diagram will bring the idea of Turkish identity to life throughout the 
chapter. The embodiment of Turkish identity, how it fits together and supports itself, will 
be depicted through the figure of a horse. A noble Turkish animal, quite fitting for 
Turkey’s character, the horse is an image of pride for Turks, with a prominent place in 
the history of the nation. In 1453, Sultan Mehmet rode into the newly conquered 
Constantinople upon a white horse, completing his historic capture of the city, henceforth 
a city for the Muslims. Mustafa Kemal, 468 years later, led the rising new nation of Turks 
in a victorious tide-turning battle, once again claiming back from the “infidel” the land 
that belonged to the Muslims. This was the battle of Sakarya,119 later the name of 
Atatürk’s horse, and therefore an apt name for this Turkish Identity Horse.120  
This chapter will take the components listed at the end of chapter 3 and flesh them 
out in an analogy. The diagram will begin with Sakarya’s two hind legs, homogeneity 
and religion, the two basic pillars of support for the formation and packaging of Turkish 
identity. These two legs start off the rhetoric part of the packaging process. The actual 
body of the horse will be Turkish nationalism, with the tail representing the ever-
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connected Ottoman past. All of this is part of the rhetoric section. Moving to the reforms, 
the horse’s front legs of civilization and modernization, and its head of westernization, 
will be detailed. The chapter will finish with the routes through which Kemal 
disseminated all this rhetoric and reform.  
 
4.1  Hind Leg #1: Homogeneity 
The idea of a Turkish national identity was not, in fact, brand-new with the 
Republic of Turkey. According to Kemal Karpat, it started in the late Ottoman period. 
Earlier in the Ottoman Empire, the structure of government was such that the political 
elites were distant from the masses, with the job of upholding allegiance to the sultanate 
and acting apart from ethnic affiliation. Meanwhile, the ethnic and religious identities of 
the common people were cohesively bound together in their local groupings, called 
millets, or religious communities. “In practice therefore, the subjects were faced with a 
clear separation between political allegiance on the one hand and ethnic and religious 
identity and loyalty on the other.”121 However, this 15th century arrangement began to 
change in the 18th century when a new wave of elites:  
began to emerge among the Balkan Christians and to search for support among 
the masses through religious and ethnic-national identification. This was followed 
by the efforts of the Ottoman governmental elites to identify themselves with the 
Muslim masses by adopting the popular concepts of Islam and popular ways of 
expression…Eventually—late in the nineteenth century—the Ottoman elites 
developed a sense of Turkish national identity.122 
 
And yet, this Ottoman state was still a mixing bowl of religions, ethnicities, cultures and 
races, which could finally no longer be held together as a united whole under the sultan.  
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From the subsequent and gradual dismemberment of the multicultural empire, 
Mustafa Kemal emerged with an eye toward homogeneity. Unlike some of his other 
principles, this one was not proclaimed publicly as a value toward which Turks should 
strive, but was delivered more backhandedly as a given, an unquestioned fact that simply 
existed. He and the Kemalists achieved this homogenous packaging of the new republic 
mostly through rhetorical emphasis. This emphasis was to be successfully passed on to 
the following generations as a matter of principle. Kramer describes how future 
development of the Turkish state politically was hindered “by the persistence and defense 
of the Kemalist core values by the state elite and the military. The republican principle, 
the national and social homogeneity of the Turkish nation, and the secular character of 
the republic were givens that could not be openly debated or even questioned…”123 
In a different vivid metaphor for Turkish identity, Soner Çağaptay’s new work 
addresses the effort of the young Turkish Republic’s leadership to “construct the 
homogenous Turkish identity that constituted the ‘Turk,’”124 and concludes that the 
resulting product is much like Russian matryoshka dolls—the type that nest inside one 
another: “Yet, a bit like Russian dolls, there exists a complex and layered, if not 
graduated, relationship between the outer doll representing official ‘Turkishness’ and the 
inner ones colored by the multitude of ethnic and religious identities that characterize 
Turkish society.”125 This metaphor helpfully portrays the multicultural anatomy of 
Turkish identity—despite what Kemal hoped for—whereas the horse metaphor shall 
depict Turkish identity’s formation.  
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The question follows that if the new republic did indeed incorporate a 
heterogeneous mix, what was the nature of the rhetoric that made it pass for 
homogenous? Here Turkey displays a remarkable divergence from the practices of other 
nation-states emerging from the Ottoman Empire. As Karpat explains, the gradual 
disintegration of the Ottoman state was accompanied by the breakdown of traditional 
modes of organization. 
[The] universal religious communities disintegrated into ethnic units which were 
eventually incorporated into national states. The numerically superior group 
usually became dominant and treated the different linguistic and religious groups 
as minorities. The dominant group tried to remold the other groups according to 
its own concept of national culture…126 
 
This prepared the way for a process in the forming republic that did indeed 
“remold,” but without the categorization of “minorities.” Turkey intended to assimilate 
“her own Arab and Kurdish minorities,”127 while not considering them to be minorities as 
such. Those regarded as minorities, rather, were of different religions, particularly 
Christians, and this issue was treated differently. While fellow Muslims of different 
ethnicity or race were absorbed, a few Christian and Jewish communities were tolerated 
as minorities, but most were “exchanged.” This occurred in a mutually-agreed-upon 
“Population Exchange” with Greece in the years 1924-1930, whereby some 900,000 
Greek Orthodox people of Anatolia were exchanged with some 400,000 Muslims from 
Greece who came to the new Turkey.128 According to Bernard Lewis,  
What took place was not an exchange of Greeks and Turks, but rather an 
exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims. A Western 
observer, accustomed to a different system of social and national classification, 
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might even conclude that this was no repatriation at all, but two deportations into 
exile—of Christian Turks to Greece, and of Muslim Greeks to Turkey.129 
 
Religious identities had been thus purified to the point where the new republic was now 
98 percent Muslim.130 
The idea then, is that when Mustafa Kemal demarcated a smaller territory to be 
the future state, the demarcation cut out the different groups so the remaining people 
were homogenous. In fact, the homogeneity achieved was only a religious one, secured 
by this population exchange, and not an ethnic, racial, linguistic, or cultural homogeneity. 
The Kemalist regime solved this (or attempted to solve it, in seeing a need for cohesive 
homogeneity) by imposing over all the diversity a “national” homogeneity, declaring that 
all people in the newly formed boundaries were of the Turk “nationality,” and under this 
new umbrella, the remaining diversities were dealt with as follows.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, “ethnic” as a concept did not exist in the Turkish 
language (or very much in the world yet, for that matter) and so was not an issue. Race 
was superceded by nation, the idea being that they who lived in the new Republic of 
Turkey were all Turk, and to be a Turk was noble. This was reinforced in the schools, 
media, “Peoples’ Houses,”131 and other venues throughout Turkey. In fact, race as a 
unifier was deliberately avoided. Regarding language, for purposes of modernization and 
reform, Turkish was both purified and exalted, and by rule of law made to be both the 
language of schooling and written only in the new Latin alphabet, reforms to be described 
below. As Turkey expert Andrew Mango explains, “Mustafa Kemal Paşa, as he then was, 
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led a national movement of resistance to the designs of ethnic adversaries, who were 
threatening the largely Turkish-speaking Muslim population of Anatolia….”132 
Finally, the cultural type of diversity was superceded by the new overriding 
Turkish culture, which Mustafa Kemal slowly and deliberately directed and fed to the 
people by means of various channels, to be discussed below. Here one can see the point 
of view of the Instrumentalists, who argue, among other things, that identity is not always 
existent but a tool in the hands of clever politicians. In examining politicians’ abilities to 
choose among available identities to secure for the people, Stephen Saideman asks: 
“Under what conditions will politicians succeed in emphasizing one identity at the 
expense of others?” Examining various international cases, he concludes generally that: 
“Although leaders may not be able to repress identities, they can shape the debates, 
and…they can try to frame issues and to set agendas in ways that highlight the preferred 
identities.”133  
Kemal’s “shaping,” “framing,” and “highlighting” would direct Turks toward a 
new, re-made Turkish cultural homogeneity that would reflect both their past and the 
westernization and modernization aims for the future. Thus, “homogeneity” as a national 
characteristic is not entirely natural but somewhat artificial, for better or for worse, as 
summed up well by Cemal Kafadar: “It now seems that homogeneity is in part a cultural 
construction, built through not only historical exigencies and certain forms of 
exclusivism but also a linear narrative of the story of ‘our true nation, one united people 
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across time’” (emphasis added).134 Turks today are quick to point out that Atatürk was 
not ethnocentric. At a state ceremony on Atatürk and Turkish identity in 1994, one 
academic informed the audience that Atatürk “used the term ‘our noble nation.’ 
Undoubtedly, this term should not be interpreted with a racist approach. This term was a 
symbol of the importance he gave to Turkish nation. It was an attempt to transfer the 
conscience of ‘Ottomanism’ to the conscience of ‘Turkish Identity.’”135 And yet, 
accusations of racism left aside, there was still a form of suppression that occurred to 
some degree:  
But whereas the Turkish national conception was benign compared with the 
fascist ones triumphing in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, becoming a Turk 
entailed the suppression of an individual’s own ethnic identity. In other words, 
Atatürk’s maxim was generous in allowing everyone who desired to do so to 
become a Turkish citizen, but it did not provide a solution for those who were not 
prepared to abandon their previous identities in favor of the new national idea.136 
 
In summary, the Kemalist regime packaged Turkish identity in a uniform 
wrapping, a homogeneous understanding that would continue to shape Turkish thinking 
for decades to come. The result is a conception that looks somewhat like racism or ethnic 
suppression to the West, but is a matter of perception in the eyes of a Turk who has 
grown up with this frame of thinking. And Mustafa Kemal achieved this national 
worldview not by mere creation and design, but by embracing and building upon history. 
Identity does not emerge out of nothingness, and does not occur in a vacuum.  
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4.2  Hind Leg #2: Religion/Secularism 
By far the most powerful force already binding the Ottoman-turned-Turk citizens 
at the dawn of the republic was that of Islam, the rhetoric of which provides us with 
Sakarya’s other foundational hind leg. Mustafa Kemal could hardly be considered a 
religious man, but he was still a Muslim by name and recognized the peoples’ primary 
devotion to their faith and practices. Though secularism for Turkey was his long-term 
goal, he and his contemporaries framed the nationalist struggle in the context of religion. 
He was a clever politician in government settings, but appealed to traditional means to 
reach the masses. For example, in Samsun in 1919 where Kemal was gathering support, 
he would attend services in the main mosque with prayers for success, followed 
immediately by meetings held in the town square.137 He was a man of strategy. “In 
former days, Mustafa Kemal had not been particularly noted for his piety. His friends 
considered him rather a free thinker. Now, wherever he was, he made it a point to go out 
of his way to visit a mosque and to keep company with all sorts of clerics.”138 When the 
Sheikh ul-Islam in Istanbul (under the sultan) issued a religious fatwa against Kemal, 
condemning him to death, he responded with another fatwa, signed by religious 
personalities on his side, and distributed it among towns and villages of Anatolia.139  
Kemal also circulated pictures of himself with religious men, included turbaned 
religious figures in the Parliament for the public to see, disseminated circulars filled with 
religious language, and otherwise “served to guarantee the orthodox character of the 
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Anatolian government.”140 The opening line of a circular a few days before inauguration 
of the Parliament is revealing: 
With Divine Assistance, on Friday, April 23, after the Friday prayer, the Grand 
National Assembly will be inaugurated…After the prayer, we will go to the 
premises specially fitted out with the flag and the sacred relic. Before entering the 
building, a thanksgiving prayer will be said and a sheep immolated.141 
 
Such rhetoric seems quite ironic in hindsight, knowing one of the main points of Kemal’s 
ideology was to be secularism. But without the bastion of religion on his side in the early 
days, he could never have succeeded in winning support among the Anatolian peoples.  
The support garnered, the National Struggle won, the republic well on its way to 
foundation, Kemal found the right time to abolish the sultanate in November 1922 and 
the caliphate in March 1924. Kemal’s battle victories and successful defense of Turkey 
from the “infidel” (whereas the sultan succumbed to the European pressure and was 
ready to hand Turks’ rightful land over meekly to the invaders) earned him the authority 
to make these moves. This was a sharp turnaround from what only a few years prior had 
been a battle waged in the name of the sultan, but only the more religious constituents 
were very concerned about this apparent contradiction. His berating attacks on the 
incompetence of the sultan and Istanbul government seemed to be quite true. 
Additionally, in Turkish culture the sense of Allah as the granter of victory is very strong, 
so Kemal, through battlefield success, had proved the Divine Hand was with him.  
Indeed, even before Kemal, the Ottomans were beginning a process of 
secularization in theory and practice. This is rarely acknowledged because the two sides 
are often painted as black and white, with the Ottomans being religious and the Kemalists 
being strictly secular, but in reality, it was more gray. According to Selim Deringil, 
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“Ottoman nationality was beginning to be envisioned in more and more secular terms 
despite the religious language in which it was couched.”142 But Kemal, among 
contemporaries who were doing revolutionary thinking, was a man of both thought and 
action, a “practical force,”143 and it was he who really initiated the secularization process. 
As the new president of Turkey, he immediately began to make reforms that would bring 
Islam under the thumb of the state and transform it into a “Turkified” version. Through 
the process of secularism, “the Muslim institution was dismantled on the surface but in 
actuality it was absorbed into the Republican bureaucratic structure.”144 There, in the 
“structure” was the safest place—according to nationalist goals—for Islam to be: out of 
the way and under the state’s watchful eye.  
The Ministry of Religious Affairs was demoted to a “Directorate of Religious 
Affairs,” education became secularized, and with religion under government control, the 
new format was laicism, a “political system characterized by the exclusion of 
ecclesiastical control and influence.”145 The original constitution of the new republic in 
1924 had proclaimed Islam as the religion of the Turkish state, and had vested the 
Parliament with the responsibility of enforcing religious laws. However, in a revision 
four years later, these were suppressed and Islam was no longer even present in the 
constitution.146 The Friday sermons in the mosques, a sacred tradition in Islam, serve as a 
magnifying glass as to what was happening: the sultan’s name was removed from the 
sermon, showing clearly his loss of legitimacy, and the rhetoric that replaced it was that 
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of the state. “Although the name of the President or the Chief Executive is never 
mentioned in Friday sermons today, there is a consistent refrain about the continuity of 
the state and republic.  Friday sermons continue to serve as a tool of legitimization.”147 
The sermons, as with other religious themes and practices, became a conduit for this 
legitimization. The rituals were continued in their familiarity, but the content could be re-
orchestrated for the Kemalist cause. Dumont’s incisive article entitled “Hojas for the 
Revolution” communicated this clearly:  
Reforms aimed at modernizing and Turkifying the religious ritual, could not by 
themselves be very efficient. It was still more important to revise the contents of 
religious messages preached to the citizens. Turkey needed a nationalist, 
scientific, Western, Republican, statist, secularist, populist, and progressive Islam, 
in short, an Islam able to help in the propagation of Kemalist ideas. This Islam 
had yet to be found.148 
 
While these transformations of course faced some heavy rebellion in certain 
patches of the country (to be detailed further below), Kemal had, as mentioned, an overall 
handle on authority because of his clout. “While there were occasional outbursts… all in 
all, the new regime had little to fear.”149 To support this idea, an in-depth study by Gavin 
D. Brockett on the Anatolian masses reveals that unlike the common (unresearched) 
assumption that the Kemalist imposition of reforms quite naturally resulted in 
conservative “reactions,” instead the people largely worked with this new identity, 
bringing it alongside the still-dominant Muslim identity. His research on Muslim leaders 
and brotherhoods among the population led to the conclusion that, “Rather than spawn 
automatic rejection of change, they provided Turks with sufficient stability and security 
to assess the circumstances, and to accommodate, adapt, or reject those secular policies 
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that they did encounter.”150 The outcome of this, Brockett notes, was a “hybrid identity,” 
a sort of “Turkish-Muslim synthesis” that survives to this day.151 The synthesis theory is 
essentially “…the idea that Islam and the pre-Islamic culture of the Turks showed up a 
great number of similarities. Turks were therefore naturally attracted to Islam and 
destined to be its soldiers.”152 As proof, a quotation by Nationalist Action Party leader 
Alparslan Türkeş in the 1970s runs as follows: “We are as Turk as the Tengri mountain, 
as Muslim as the Hira mountain. Both philosophies are our principles.” (The Tengri is in 
Central Asia where the MHP believes Turks’ ancestors migrated from, and the Hira is 
located Muslim holy lands in Saudi Arabia.)153 
Overall, Kemal considered the Turks’ Islam to be “a most efficient revolutionary 
tool”154 but it also had the potential for rallying people too far, uniting them in something 
more deeply rooted and powerfully felt than their nascent citizenship, and thus it had to 
be overcome by a stronger ideological force: nationality. Here, one can witness a form of 
nationality-as-religion, or as Kathryn Manzo terms it, a ‘political religion.’ According to 
Manzo, nationalism may be officially secular, but “when it treats the immortalized nation 
as an entity worth dying for—as the ultimate object of individual loyalty—nationalism 
operates as a political religion.”155  
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Kemal faced a nation already religiously passionate, yet distanced enough from 
their religious authorities in Istanbul, and he worked to transfer that passion to a “political 
religion” in place of a spiritual one. Where there had been no unifying identity, he 
packaged one up in “being a Turk” and made the widely held religious identity 
submissive to it. He took Islam and garnered it under the state, so that Islam played a 
subservient, dependent role, while the state became its paternalistic distributor.  
 In a way, Mustafa Kemal was an ‘Awakener,’ to use a term from nationalist 
vocabulary exemplifying the religiosity of nationalism. According to Gellner, the idea 
behind “Awakening” is this: 
Man needs to be awakened… to his national identity and the political imperatives 
implicit in it: the need to protect the national culture by endowing it with its own 
state-protector, the need to unmask, neutralize and drive out the foreigners who 
wish to destroy and debase that culture.156 
 
If there was anyone who warned his people against foreigners who “wish to destroy and 
debase,” it was Mustafa Kemal. Gellner further explains, “For those for whom human 
fulfillment is linked to the attainment of national consciousness…national awakening is 
more important than spiritual awakening; indeed, it is a form of spiritual awakening, 
perhaps its highest form.”157 Kemal made such a link for the Turkish people, and thus can 
be seen as an “Awakener” of societal identity. Through this role he advocated a Turkified 
form of Islam in service of the nation and a new type of ‘religion’ that would reach a 
deeper place in the hearts of Turks. This leads into the body of nationalism itself in the 
new Republic of Turkey. Religion was a hind leg of support but no longer the binding 
characteristic of the body of people. Instead, “the principle of nationalism was to be the 
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integrating link substituting for the idea of ümmet or religious community and for 
Ottoman din-ü-devlet or the unity of state and religion.”158 
 
4.3  The Body: National Rhetoric 
With two strong hind legs in place, we now look to the body of Sakarya, the 
Identity Horse. The massive bulk of identity for the Turkish nation is Turkish 
nationalism, the pride of being Turk, the fullness of Turkish citizenship. Mustafa Kemal 
had to find a way to tell the people, “Look, you are no longer Ottomans; you are 
something else.” This “something else” found its fulfillment in the newly forming 
definition of the word Turk. “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!” (How happy are they who call 
themselves Turk!), Kemal crowed to people who had long perceived the word “Turk” 
negatively. “The early republican period under the leadership of Atatürk is interpreted as 
the glorification of Turkish nationalism… Atatürk is considered to be the greatest of all 
Turkish nationalists. The first phase of the republic deserves utmost respect, because it 
takes ‘national culture’ as its basis.”159 
This new nation of people, within the tradition of the time period, was defined 
based on the country’s newly won borders. This left some confusion with regard to those 
living within the new Turkish borders who were of other ethnicity or race, as mentioned 
before. The requisite for becoming Turk was quite interesting. All that was necessary was 
to live within the republic’s geographical borders, and to call yourself a Turk. In labeling 
oneself a Turk, one was expected to love Turkey and conform to all the cultural and 
linguistic attributes of being “Turk,” partly as understood from the past, and partly as 
directed by Mustafa Kemal.   
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Thus, the word Turk defined a new national community into which individuals, 
irrespective of ethnicity, would be able to integrate…It is against this background 
that every person living within the borders of the republic and accepting its basic 
principles was welcome to be its citizen. Immigrants to Anatolia of Caucasian or 
Slavic origin and indigenous populations of Kurdish, Laz, or Arabic origin all 
became Turks in their own right, whereas ethnically Turkish minorities outside 
the boundaries of the republic, in the Middle East or the Balkans, were 
disqualified from membership in the national community.160 (emphasis added) 
 
Actually, Atatürk’s boundary-based conception of nationality was not so different 
from international precedent. In a 1919 speech, he “justified the fight for national 
independence in terms of the prevailing patterns of international relations: ‘Today the 
nations of the whole world recognize only one sovereignty: national sovereignty.’”161 It 
was thus a method first for cohesion and consolidation domestically, and second for 
survival internationally.  
Nationalism, and the accompanying concept of nation, was also an avenue to 
stability in the face of change. Broad-scale change does not occur overnight, especially 
regarding worldviews and mentalities. However, change will come immediately in the 
wake of war or revolution. In the case of the making of the Republic of Turkey, there 
were both. The republic itself was born out of the throes of two wars, World War I and 
the War of Independence; then Atatürk’s Kemalism that followed was “a revolution in 
the true sense of the world” in that “the ideas of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ and the 
‘state of Turkey’ were novel and revolutionary.”162 With such revolutionary ideas, 
stability was needed. Part of this came from religion, as mentioned above, but another 
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part of stability was found in the prose and symbols of nationalism. As Smith writes in an 
essay entitled “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?”:  
…in eras of rapid social mobilization, people have an overriding need to feel that 
they belong to a community, hierarchy or belief system. There is also an 
overriding need, in such destabilizing circumstances, to mask the radicalism of 
social change with a veil of tradition and continuity with an assumed past, usually 
a national one.163 
 
As a skillful leader, Atatürk realized this, and he used a combination of the glories 
of the recent past (largely his own victory in battle) and the glory of the nation to 
formulate a measure of stability and continuity. The most famous speech Atatürk 
delivered, known as Nutuk (Great Speech), was an astounding feat of six days straight, in 
October 1927, in front of the deputies of the Republican People’s Party, but directed 
toward the Turkish public in general. This speech, which seems during many sections to 
be a rambling narrative of Atatürk’s own military and political conquests, indeed had a 
clear purpose: “From the mouth of the great leader of the party, it was thought politic to 
allow them to hear the history of the National Movement from its very inception so that 
Turkey’s sons and daughters might, in their turn, learn their history from the desired 
angle.”164  
Alongside this speech, immortalized in Turkey’s Republican history, were the 
İstiklal Marşı (Independence March—which became the national anthem) and the 
Öğrenci Andı (Student Vow—much like the United States’ “Pledge of Allegiance”). The 
Independence March is full of symbols of nationalism, religion, and a homeland that is 
paradise. First printed by poet Mehmet Akif Ersoy in 1921 and formalized as the national 
anthem in 1923, the poem-turned-anthem is filled with the “emotional intensity of Akif’s 
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blend of Islamic and Turkish-nationalist feeling.”165 The final stanza below provides a 
glimpse into the heart of nationalism—a unique blend of religion, battlefield glory and 
honor in bloodshed, a right to freedom and sovereignty, independence, and a sense of 
belonging to—and pride in—a people group.  
Float on then, crescent [symbol on Turkish flag] like the dawns, in glorious flight. 
Proudly I shed my blood to its last drop in your full sight. 
Never shall you, shall my people be confounded in this fight. 
My free-born flag’s eternal right is freedom. 
And independence is my godly nation’s God-entrusted right.166 
 
In the “Student Vow,” schoolchildren across Turkey since 23 April 1933 have 
pledged to love their country and nation first and foremost, and to improve both the 
country and themselves. They also affirm value in being Turk, paying tribute to 
Atatürk,167 who showed the way for the nation to succeed, and pledge to walk in these 
ways. 
I’m a Turk, I’m righteous, I’m hard-working. My principle is to protect the 
younger ones, respect my elders, to love my land and my nation more than my 
essence. My ideal is to improve and advance. (Oh, great Atatürk! I pledge that I 
will walk unceasingly in the road you opened, the goal you showed us.) My 
existence shall be devoted to the Turkish entity. (How happy are they who call 
themselves Turk!)168 
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With these and other national texts and songs in place, Kemal helped to assemble 
a sense of one of Smith’s prongs of national identity: “common legal rights and duties for 
all members.”169 Both of these texts establish and affirm a sense of membership and duty. 
 In addition to these new passages of nationalist rhetoric dispersed successfully 
among the masses were Mustafa Kemal’s own speeches, sound bytes, and excellent use 
of the media. He inspired Turks with an imitable example of personal humility mixed 
with national pride. “Do not try to attribute me super, extraordinary qualities. The only 
thing extraordinary in my birth is my being born as a TURKISH person.”170 With strong 
words like these, he gave validity to their nascent national identity. Atatürk believed in 
the true greatness of the Turkish people, and he frequently told them so! 
Atatürk’s packaging—his official delineations and definitions—has remained 
doctrinal for Turkey since his time. According to the most recent constitution, of 1982,  
“Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk” and “No 
Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act incompatible with loyalty 
to the motherland.”171 Thus, to say ‘I am a Turk,’ and to live in Turkey as its citizen is to 
be a Turk. This is the essence of the national ideal upon which the republic was founded. 
 
4.4  The Necessary Tail End: Historical Rhetoric 
 
There is one other part of the horse in the region of its hind legs and attached to 
the bulk of its central body.172 Frivolous and unnecessary as a horse’s tail may seem, it 
actually provides vital balance for the animal. While telling the people they were no 
longer Ottomans and while heavily criticizing and condemning the Ottoman government 
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in Istanbul before it was abolished, the Kemalist regime still could not survive by 
divorcing completely from its Ottoman history. The Republic of Turkey carries its 
Ottoman past behind it much like a horse’s tail. It is forever connected, shaping the 
balance of Turkey today, sometimes getting in the way, sometimes quite convenient, 
always there. The tail of the past is a driving part of the body of identity, although at first 
glance it might look like just an add-on, possibly for show. Indeed the tail of the Ottoman 
past does give an impressive show, but it also taught, and continues to teach, vital lessons 
for Turkish identity, and despite all the talk of detaching from the past to start afresh, the 
Turkish nation cannot do without it. 
Mustafa Kemal himself wisely realized that the new republic could not arrive on 
the world stage out of nowhere, much as he wanted a complete break from the Ottoman 
Empire. Just as a horse looks ridiculous and cannot be taken seriously without a tail, an 
emerging nation had to use its history to demonstrate “administrative ability” and present 
itself to the “civilized world”173: 
Such arguments resonated with one of the basic principles in the “new world 
order” between the two great wars: a people had a right to nationhood in a 
civilized world only if they could prove that they had in their historical experience 
what it takes to create a stable state and to govern in a civilized manner. That is 
one of the most important reasons why nation-states took up the construction of a 
past as avidly as they drew plans for industrialized modernity. New generations 
had to, as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put it in a saying that is now inscribed on many 
public sites in Turkey, “be proud [of the nation’s past achievements], work hard, 
and be confident [of the future].”174 
 
A second reason for connection to the past was for the people themselves. As 
stated before, a people, a culture, an identity of some sort, existed, although not cohesive 
and not even necessarily “Turk” in the way it is understood today. The people could not 
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be cut off from their history, from their past—any more than a horse could be cut off 
from its tail—so something about that past had to be glorified.  
Interestingly, in fulfilling these measures, Kemal and his contemporaries avoided 
the glorification of the Ottoman past in terms of rulership, empire and conquest (which 
contradicted with the aims of the nationalists to consolidate and internalize) and instead 
glorified the land itself, making it into something holy for the Turks. This served much 
better the purposes of raising up to defend the land demarcated by the 1920 National 
Pact, and was a key rallying point at a time when the nationalists could not glorify the 
sultanate because that was what they were about to challenge. As Armaoğlu illuminates:  
…a historical relation between a ‘nation’ and ‘motherland’ is inevitable. Atatürk, 
on the one hand was putting forward the concept of a new ‘nation,’ that is Turkish 
Nation, and at the same time was making the concept of ‘national motherland’ 
which was Turkish for nine hundred years and started from 1071 as an 
inseparable part of it. It is doubtless that the relation of a ‘national society’ with a 
‘national soil’ is a basic element of a ‘national state.’ For this reason, Atatürk 
when mentioning a ‘Turkish state,’ he emphasized the salvation of ‘motherland’ 
which depended on ‘national borders’ above all other things.175 
 
This fit well with the rhetoric of historical homeland/territory and thus another 
one of Smith’s five prongs of identity. The Anatolians were not aware of a sacred 
homeland until Kemal gave meaning to it. Kemal, in effect, reached into the past to 
package a way in which Turks could understand their history and be proud of it, all the 
while linking it indelibly to the land that was now sovereignly theirs.  
Another part of connection to the past (or another strand of the identity-tail) came 
through in Turkism rhetoric, especially that of Ziya Gökalp, a contemporary of Kemal’s. 
Gökalp stimulated the homeland rhetoric. The Promised Land or Utopia of the Turks was 
                                                 
175
 Armaoğlu, 32. 
 81 
sociologist Gökalp’s poetic Kızıl Elma,176 or “Red Apple” of hope. He advocated a trend 
that helped begin a new look at being “Turk.” To Gökalp, a turn-of-the century advocate 
of Turkism, and many of his contemporaries, unification of all Turkic brothers in 
“language, thought, and action”177 was possible and promising. Worth mentioning for his 
heavy influence on Atatürk and thus on Turkish identity, Gökalp was the “theoretician of 
Turkish nationalism,” as Lewis calls him—first a professor, but also a philosopher, 
journalist, publicist, and propagandist. He grew up in the Kurdish city of Diyarbakır, but 
like Atatürk and many others of their contemporaries in the intellectual realms, he was 
heavily influenced by French thought and writing. Especially influential was the idea of 
“religion as social cement.”178 Gökalp’s patriotism started out in defense of a common 
Ottoman-ness, but “before long, he became the chief ideologist of a Western-oriented 
Turkish nationalism, based not on ethnic origin, but on common culture and language.”179 
To Gökalp, Turkism was a word that could be defined at various levels and scopes, but in 
its most general sense, he said, “Turkism means to exalt the Turkish nation,” and in a 
more specific definition, stated: 
Turk is the name of a nation, and a nation can be defined as a group which 
possesses a culture peculiar to itself. Therefore, a Turk can have only one 
language, only a single culture. Some branches of Turks, however, are trying to 
create a language and a culture which differ from those of the Turks of 
Anatolia…180 
 
Rather than recognizing these peoples as potentially different ethnicities or nationalities 
altogether, they were viewed as deviant Turks. He argued, “the only solution is to 
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recognize as a Turk every individual who says, ‘I am a Turk,’ and to punish those, if 
there be any, who betray the Turkish nation.”181 Kurdish by descent, Gökalp himself was 
a Turk because he said “I am Turkish.”182 
There were also the less-visible parts of the tail: the lessons learned from the 
empire’s mistakes. Not aligning with the West soon enough, attempting to govern too 
vast a territory, and allowing judicial capitulations for foreigners to have special rights in 
Ottoman lands, were among some of the mistakes the Ottomans made and Kemal 
avoided. Additionally, Kemal, while still distancing from the Ottoman government, used 
his superb rhetoric and speaking skills to emphasize the parts of Ottoman-ness that could 
be harnessed for the edification of the Turks’ identity. In a famous speech given when he 
first arrived in Ankara in December 1919, he “boldly asserts that a people who for 
centuries have ruled over others has certain proven talents of organization and a 
dedication to independence, and will not willingly submit to being colonized by 
others.”183 
Finally, there were some dark strands to the tail—not mere mistakes, but scars on 
the Ottoman record. The most clear of these today is the alleged “genocide” of 
Armenians in 1915, which many outside of Turkey claim was orchestrated as an ethnic 
cleansing by the Ottoman government, but which Turks claim was a two-way war in 
which partisans on both sides were massacred. Dark strands such as this give Sakarya, 
the Identity Horse, the need to stand all the stronger and prouder in the face of 
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international investigation and accusation. It is preferable to be looked in the face and not 
from behind. Turkey would rather only the grandeur of the tail to be seen, waving 
proudly behind, when the horse is viewed from the front.  
 
4.5  Front Leg #1: Civilization 
The hind quarters and main body bulk of the Identity Horse thus established, we 
now move to the fore section—those parts of the horse representative of the actual 
reforms and forward-moving actions of the Kemalist regime to (1) civilize, (2) 
modernize, and (3) westernize the new Republic of Turkey. They did this through 
political, legal, linguistic, social, educational, and economic reforms—actions carried out 
in tow with the powerful rhetoric already discussed. The civilization and modernization 
will represent the two “arms,” or front legs of the horse, stepping forward and reaching 
ahead. Westernism is the head. The mind, senses, and eyes were focused ever-toward this 
goal of being Western.  
The action of “civilizing” can be defined as: “to cause to develop out of a 
primitive state; especially: to bring to a technically advanced and rationally ordered stage 
of cultural development.”184 This describes how Kemal viewed the Anatolian peasantry, 
in terms of where they were and where they needed to be. Many of Kemal’s first reforms 
targeted religious traditions that he felt were keeping the people backward and 
uncivilized. After abolishing the most symbolic of religious figureheads, the sultanate, 
the caliphate, and the sheikh ul-Islam in 1922-1924, two of the first areas of change were 
the most visible ones: clothing and religious communities. In November 1925, Kemal 
instituted what became one of the most controversial reforms: the banning of the fez, or 
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religious185 hat worn by Muslim men in the Ottoman Empire. In response to the outrage 
that erupted, “Mustafa Kemal justified it by stating that the fez was, in a way, the emblem 
of fanaticism and symbolized the hatred of progress and civilization.”186 In fact, this hat 
was not an inherently Ottoman accessory; it was of apparent Moroccan origin, and in 
1832 Sultan Mahmud II made it the official headgear for subjects of his empire, both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, “to abolish external distinctions between communities.”187 
But Kemal preferred the broad-rimmed hat of the West in place of this stiff rimless hat, 
and modeled the new style for the public as an example. 
Islam itself was being reformed and ‘Turkified,’ according to the Kemalists’ new 
understanding of “Turk”: “It was one thing to exclude professional exponents of Islam 
from the workings of a modern, national state. It was quite another to modernize and 
nationalize Islam itself. But the attempt was made.”188 While the fez prohibition was 
taken the most seriously, that same month, Kemal also closed Dervish lodges and tarikats 
(Sufi religious brotherhoods) although both continued to operate clandestinely. The 
Grand National Assembly also abolished religious courts, closed some places of worship, 
and condemned the women’s religious garments (veil and çarşaf).189 He wanted women 
to look and behave more “civilized,” to be more refined and “culturally developed”—
meaning, in essence, more on-par with the West.  
 Continually admiring the European ways, the Kemalist regime in 1926 adopted 
the Swiss Civil Code, changing the Turkish family structure, for example, preventing 
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polygamy. Regarding minority rights,190 those who were not taken under the umbrella of 
being “Turk” (i.e. Christians and Jews) were allowed to maintain their educational and 
religious institutions, with use of their own languages. But “no such rights were accorded 
to the Turkish Kurds, who probably accounted for about 10-15 percent of the population 
at the time, since they represented an ethnic rather than religious minority.”191 
Education was also reformed, in the context of separating it from religious 
authority. The state took over education, and the medreses (theological seminaries) were 
closed down. The Ministry of Education192 began to run schools for imams and 
preachers, and universities opened departments of divinity. One such department, at the 
University of Istanbul, appointed a committee to study the modernization of Islam and 
make recommendations. Their final list of suggestions would have all but transformed the 
mosque into a European church.193 As Lewis writes, “It was possible to turn the Ottoman 
sultanate into a national republic, with a president, ministries, and parliament. It was not 
possible to turn the mosque into a Muslim church, with pews, organ, and an imam-
precentor.”194 
 
4.6  Front Leg #2: Modernization 
 
The other forward-reaching “arm,” or front leg, of Sakarya is modernization. “To 
modernize” is to “make modern, as in taste, style or usage,” and “modern” is “involving 
recent techniques, methods, or ideas: up-to-date.”195 So, how does one “make modern”? 
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How does one change the taste, style, and usage of a whole nation? Kemal did this 
through more reforms.  
First, he endeavored to Europeanize the Turks’ tastes. To be modernized meant to 
be more European, because the West was “modern.” He had a fondness for women, 
cigarettes, and alcohol, all of which was known to the public in terms of his more 
“modern” lifestyle. Although the Koran strongly recommends abstinence from alcohol,196 
Kemal highly enjoyed rakı (the Turkish strong, clear, aniseed alcohol) and encouraged 
production of domestic alcohol by opening breweries in the Ankara area. This was one 
way he encouraged an aspect of culture already present; for generations, rakı has been 
consumed generously throughout Anatolia. 
More immediately influential, however, were the reforms in language. As one of 
his many modernizing reforms for Turkey, Kemal in 1928 overhauled the writing system. 
From the Arabic script used under the Ottoman Empire for Turkish writing,197 he 
switched the nation’s usage to the Latin script, especially the letters in German and 
French. There was even a brief stint of popularity for the Sun Language Theory,198 which 
claimed “on the basis of a heliocentric view of the origin and nature of human languages, 
that Turkish was the Ur-language from which all civilized languages derived.”199 The 
complete overhaul of the alphabet and reading system of course tied in with his 
westernism, which can hardly be separated from his drive to “modernize” Turkey. 
“Adopting the Latin script, as some Turkish reformers had advocated even before the 
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Great War, would put Turks in the same camp as the Western Christians.”200 Indeed 
Kemal’s intention in this reform was to advance the Turkish people educationally and 
intellectually: 
My friends [he said], our rich and harmonious language will now be able to 
display itself with new Turkish letters. We must free ourselves from these 
incomprehensible signs, that for centuries have held our minds in iron vice. You 
must learn the new Turkish letters quickly. Teach them to your compatriots, to 
women and to men, to porters and to boatmen. Regard it as a patriotic and 
national duty…and when you perform that duty, bear in mind that for a nation to 
consist of 10 to 20 per cent of literates and 80 or 90 per cent of illiterates is 
shameful… The fault is not ours; it is of those who failed to understand the 
character of the Turk and bound his mind in chains. Now is the time to eradicate 
the errors of the past…201 
 
The literacy rate was 10 percent in the empire, but with the new alphabet jumped 
to 45 percent.  
 Atatürk also modernized by means of industry, transportation, and technological 
and economic reforms. This included the foundation of the Turkish State Railways in 
1927, and the abolition of the hazardous “capitulations” of the Ottoman Empire, which 
had been granted by successive sultans to Christian nations, allowing Europeans to 
interfere far too much in Ottoman affairs, from economic privileges to education to the 
judiciary rights of foreigners living on Ottoman soil. These were abolished in the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne, which stated: “Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, 
in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every 
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respect.”202 This was a big step for ensuring that Turks had their sovereignty and could be 
taken seriously as a power in the West.203  
Lastly, within progress and modernization there is often a desire to change camps 
and somehow break from that past, but when the past is viewed as something like an 
animal’s tail, we know that is not really possible. Still, the elites in Kemal’s regime tried: 
Implicit in this ideology was the conviction that the Kemalist elite was distinct 
from the Anatolian ‘masses’ in terms of national intelligence and adaptability, and 
was therefore responsible for leading Anatolian townsmen and peasants out of 
darkness and into light. The Kemalist conception of progress derided institutions 
and cultural accretions – especially religious beliefs and practices – associated 
with the Ottoman-Islamic past; it reflected not only the elite’s limited 
understanding of but also its hostility towards the very beliefs and rituals crucial 
to the definition of Anatolian Muslim identities.204 
 
Just as the tail symbolizes the crucial role in identity of the past, the Kemalists 
also had a clear idea of the ‘light’ toward which they were heading. The front legs of the 
horse support the head: westernization. 
 
4.7  The Head: Westernization 
No term better describes the mind and senses of Turkish identity than 
westernization. Raised in the Western end of the empire and educated in Western 
thought, Kemal faced distinctively Westward and called upon all of Turkey to do the 
same. This is a theme running from the tail to the head. The Ottoman state had been 
trying to become a member of the European state system since 1815. The Ottomans were 
proud in the powerful days; they did not even condescend to start permanent diplomatic 
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relations with European countries until 1836. Until then, Ottomans had only been sending 
envoys—never a permanent resident to reside in foreign countries as ambassador. After 
this late entry, however, the Ottomans never fully made it “in,” so to speak.205 Kemal was 
determined to overcome this distance; even though the Western powers were his former 
battlefield enemies, he saw value in aligning with their way of life.  
In addition to the reforms thus listed, a few more of Kemal’s key reforms paid 
clear service to his westernization goal. In 1926, he switched the country to the Western 
calendar, reserving the Muslim calendar only for commemorative religious affairs. He 
also changed the break in the work week from the Muslim holy day of Friday to the 
Western-style weekend of Saturday and Sunday. In 1934, all the “Ahmet”s and “Ayşe”s 
of villages across Turkey could no longer be known only by their first name. The 
“backwardness” of single names was eliminated with the required adoption of surnames. 
This reform is one of the most fascinating, as a nation of people scrambled to choose 
their new family name. Turks chose their surnames based on professions, 
accomplishments of their relatives, or by adding “son of” to the name or position of their 
father, similar to the Western “Johnson” or “Watson.” Some even chose from lists 
distributed by the state with good, suitable names, like Yılmaz (“Dauntless, undomitable”) 
or Şimşek (“Lightning”). Naming a whole country was an interesting affair—names were 
as pretty as Şafak (“Dawn”), as menacing as Karaaslan (“Dark Lion”), or as silly as 
Yarımbıyıkoğlu206 (Son of the Man with the Half-Mustache). Only one name was 
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forbidden for the common people, and that was the one chosen by Kemal: Atatürk, or 
“Father of the Turks.” 
  Yet, despite all of Atatürk’s reforms and modernizations in Turkey, there are 
complications for Turkey’s “European-ness.” Referring to the situation as the “Never-
Ending Story,” Meltem Müftüler-Bac writes that Europe views Turkey as alien and all 
political-democratic grounds aside, there remains the “perception of Turkey as the Other 
of Europe.”207 Still, the head of Sakarya remains a Western-facing identity, with Turkey 
currently jumping through the necessary hoops, albeit more slowly and unwillingly 
lately, to meet Europe’s official standards for acceptance into the Union.   
 
4.8  Routes: Delivering the Identity Package 
With Sakarya, our Identity Horse model thus established, this issue remains: by 
what means or channels was all this identity delivered and enforced among the people of 
Turkey? A clever and charismatic politician, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had his fingers on 
the pulse of the people of Turkey, and appealed first of all to their emotions. Rallying the 
people against the enemies who had tried to divide and conquer them (first, the European 
encroaching powers, and second, the Istanbul government who had allowed the 
Europeans to do so), Kemal instilled a national pride and defensiveness. This message—
coming from a single patriarchal type leader like himself—worked because of the 
peoples’ prior inclination toward paternalism and attitudes toward leadership.208 “The 
state tradition in Turkey is that the people exist to serve the state rather than the state 
existing to serve the people.  The is a tradition that has prevailed for hundreds of years, 
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and which characterised the Ottoman Empire.”209 This instinctual attachment to 
leadership has allowed Turkey’s leaders, especially Atatürk, to deliver an identity and 
shape the national hearts of the people.  
 
4.8.1 Education 
 
And there was no better way to cultivate the emotional attachment of a nation 
than to focus on the youth, the soon-to-be citizens of the new republic, which Kemal did 
astoundingly well, utilizing every channel of public reach. “Naturally, the Republican 
party was engaged in intense propaganda in favor of the reforms. All the means of action 
were mobilized: schools, press, radio, cinema, literature, theater….”210 The first of these, 
the education system, was a primary means of inculcating nationalism. In the 
schoolroom, children begin the early development of their beliefs and attitudes, adopting 
a worldview and a filter through which concepts and events are appraised. Thus, 
cultivation of the young mind is vital, and Atatürk realized this, as noted in a paper on his 
educational modernization: “He realized that the essence of modernity lay in the minds of 
people, and he embarked upon a radical policy of transforming the very nature of the 
polity and culture through reforms that would change not only the outward appearance 
but ideally the mentality and behavior of the people as well.”211 Thus, the minds were 
targeted, and the young minds especially, as curricula were reorganized to fit the new 
ideologies. Ottoman history and Islamic religion were removed from the curriculum and 
“textbooks were rewritten to include discussions of the establishment of the Republic, its 
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principles and goals.”212 The “Student’s Vow,” cited above, was another method of 
implanting national devotion and service in the nation’s youth.  
Outside of the formal classroom, the whole country itself indeed became a 
classroom, with literature and textbooks disseminated among the people to instruct them 
in their new lives and identity. There were so many reforms and changes that people 
needed manuals for how to function. The Kemalist regime was more than happy to 
provide such manuals, and within them to foster national devotion. Authors were 
commissioned by the government to write books like “Lessons for Religious Peasants,” 
or “My Religion,”213 whose titles resonated with the people’s connection to Islam but 
whose contents furthered the government’s ideal of how the Turkish citizen should 
behave:  
Whether in verse or in prose, the precepts were the same; A Muslim truly worthy 
of the name had to love his country, pay his taxes regularly, respect the laws of 
the Republic, submit to the progressive guidance of the State cadres, do his 
utmost to learn modern techniques, apply scrupulously the principles of good 
hygiene, consult a doctor in case of illness to avoid giving rise to epidemics, and 
work energetically for the development of his country. In short, the principal 
characteristic of a Muslim was to be a model citizen.214 
 
In short, as Zürcher summarizes, “an extreme form of nationalism, with the attendant 
creation of historical myths, was used as the prime instrument in the building of a new 
national identity, and as such was intended to take the place of religion in many 
respects.”215 This furthers the idea of nationalism-as-religion described above.   
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4.8.2 People’s Houses 
 
Moreover, a type of formalized public classroom, called Halk Evleri (People’s 
Houses) or Halk Odaları (People’s Rooms) was established to function as a center of 
socialization for the masses. Initiated in 1931, the project expanded to include over 400 
People’s Houses in cities and 2,338 People’s Rooms in rural areas by 1945.216 These 
venues became centers for adult education, as articulated in a speech by Atatürk 
announcing that “an education system not supported and complemented by adult 
education could never achieve nationalist goals. According to the RPP [Republican 
People’s Party] elite, the People’s Houses were supposed to create a mass society which 
in turn would serve to create the true nation.”217 These centers accordingly emphasized 
modernization, laicism, and nationalism, fulfilling an important role of political 
communication, “disseminating new patterns, symbols, and loyalties throughout the 
society and helping to socialize the masses in the values of the Republic.”218 Their 
mission was to propagate and infuse the principles of Kemalism, and in this way they 
became a kind of “Republican mosque.”219 This is a strong example of the idea of 
nationalism as the new religion. 
 Significantly, the People’s Houses were a means by which the elite could reach 
the masses, bridging somewhat a huge societal gap that left the majority of Turkey—
peasants of Anatolia—unattached and often unaware of what was going on in Ankara. 
The People’s Houses thus served like distant cells through which the lifeblood of 
nationalism could be transferred. “The masses had to be educated by the elites into their 
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new status as citizens with a Turkish national identity. In this respect the establishment of 
the republic was not only a political task but also an undertaking in national education 
that still continues.”220 
 
4.8.3 Media 
 
Another tool of republican propaganda was that of the media, which even before 
Kemal’s rise to political power displayed a heavy patriotic leaning. In 1918, after U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s famous “Fourteen Points” speech, the Turks latched onto 
point number 12, which called for the “secure sovereignty” of “Turkish portions of the 
Ottoman Empire.” According to the recollections of a leading Turkish newspaper editor 
at the time, “The Turkish papers of patriotic tendencies, which included all but two 
newspapers, agreed among themselves to publish every day, on their first page with as 
much emphasis as possible, Wilson’s twelfth point.”221 Thus, even before Atatürk’s 
nationalism, the newspapers were promoters of patriotism and national defense. Then, 
during Atatürk’s time, the media were expected to conform to the new republican 
principles, and those that did not were denounced. In his Great Speech, Atatürk depicted 
his opponents in the media as both small in number and hesitant: “The proclamation of 
the Republic was received with joy everywhere and enthusiastic demonstrations took 
place. Only a few people, together with two or three newspapers in Istanbul, hesitated to 
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participate in the general festivities.”222 Atatürk’s words deliver a stark contrast between 
the “joy” of the people following him, and the “hesitancy” of the few who did not. 
 
4.8.4 Transport of Words and Messages 
 
Other methods of distribution and communication of principles included 
telegraphy and railways. Atatürk heavily utilized the telegraph services, which gave him 
a vital link to other politicians and to the rest of Turkey. The telegraph held the value of 
being able to quickly reach distant places in the country with important information. 
Reed’s article emphasizes this tangible communication method as one of the most 
important: “This telegraphic link was used effectively to encourage, cajole or 
congratulate fellow nationalists or to warn, castigate and threaten opponents…It is fair to 
say that the Turkish National Liberation movement could hardly have succeeded without 
the availability of the telegraph machines….”223 
Atatürk’s “social engineering”224 through all these methods was highly successful. 
His heavily emphasized key words, and his pithy quotations in the media helped ensure 
his words would reverberate over the Turkish nation for years to come. His methods 
succeeded. His speeches are posted on walls, his quotations show up in the media every 
day, and his orations are literally carved in stone. The establishment of state traditions 
and holidays was another means of socialization or instillation of identity. Thus the 
holidays honor the anniversaries of events such as the tide-turning independence battle 
(1922) and establishment of the Grand National Assembly (1920). These types of 
                                                 
222
 M. K. Atatürk, The Speech: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, trans and abridged by Önder Renkliyıldırım 
(Istanbul: Metro, 1985), 105. 
223
 Reed, 106. 
224
 Nur Bilge Criss, “Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War,” in Terrorism and Politics, ed. 
Barry Rubin (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 124. 
 96 
triumphs were to be the raw material of the “existing, living memories and beliefs of the 
people” who were to compose the nation. Around triumphs such as these, traditions, 
myths, history, and symbols could be drawn and then celebrated.    
 
4.8.5 Law Enforcement and the State 
 
Moving away from popular societal forms of identity delivery, law enforcement 
was another means of ensuring implementation of new reforms and the new shape of 
identity. “Some heads fell for having refused to abandon the fez. This state of affairs 
lasted for some time until the clerics conceded. The revolution then freely pursued its 
course.”225 In chapter 5, some of the non-benign means of identity delivery, through law 
and the state apparatus, will be explained.  
Mustafa Kemal found plenty of avenues for his rhetoric of identity to penetrate 
the masses, but ascribing a national identity upon the people was only half of the task; the 
other half was to create a state structure to govern them. This state structure had to mirror 
Kemal himself, so that it would last long after his own death. It would have to rule 
effectively, and demonstrate his same ability to keep his hand on the pulse of the nation 
in order to guide it successfully. Whether or not his new state system could match the 
demands of the identity he packaged and delivered for Turkey is an important question 
that did not seem to be asked at the time, but is staring Turkey in the face today. Kemal’s 
patriarchal role worked well in pulling the nation quickly from one era to another, and his 
accomplishments are astounding by any measure, but questions remain. Were some 
problems not really solved, but merely covered up? Was it healthy for Turkey to revere 
and idolize one man as the sole founder of its nation? How would the rest of the world 
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react, and how would other nations contribute to or even condemn Turkey’s own identity 
understanding? Did Atatürk successfully build in the prospect for change after him, and 
would Turkey be able to change with the times and veer from the specific prescriptions of 
Atatürk when necessary? The next chapter will examine devlet, the mighty state, which 
inherited Atatürk’s paternal, fatherly role over the nation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE STATE REI(G)NS 
 
 
In addition to “national identity,” there is a “state identity” for every nation of 
people that is bound within a political state. In Turkey’s case and in many other cases, 
this political unit lies over the nation. This is not always the case; for example, in the 
U.S., the state unit was established early-on, then the people filled it. The former pattern 
for nations is more common and difficult, in terms of state and national identity meshing 
together throughout the life of the nation-state. Anthony Smith describes a “partial 
success” that is linked to a country’s relative “homogeneity”: 
In [such countries’] nationalism, the ideology and symbolism, has grafted a new 
concept of national political identity [what I call “state identity”] on to a pre-
existing ‘lateral’ ethnic identity. This process has met with only partial success, 
depending on the degree of cultural homogeneity of the state’s population – that 
is, the degree to which it constituted an ethnic state – and whether it was able to 
divest itself of empire and hence of culturally different communities. Where the 
process has been relatively successful, nationalist ideals and symbolism have 
helped to redefine an imperial community as a fairly compact nation and political 
community.226 (emphasis added) 
 
This last sentence, I believe, was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s main goal. The demarcation 
of tighter borders, the National Pact, the population exchanges, the umbrella of everyone 
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being ‘Turk”—all of these speak of the quest for a “fairly compact nation and political 
community” mentioned by Smith. And Kemal was successful in his project, at least at 
first. It is only in recent years that the linkage between state and national identity seems 
dismembered. In terms of our analogy, the state can be symbolized by a horse jockey, or 
perhaps the horse’s owner, walking ahead of the horse and leading him by the reins over 
a rocky mountain pass. The jockey has two major responsibilities, both of which Mustafa 
Kemal carried out brilliantly: to see the path ahead, knowing which path will be 
successful and where danger lies; and to know the horse, sensing its needs and abilities to 
follow, keeping its safety in mind. In his era, Mustafa Kemal was the state, the horse 
jockey himself, as this chapter will show, but since his death that role has been 
bequeathed elsewhere, with much less success.  
 
5.1  Defining State 
Here it is helpful to first define what is meant by “state,” especially as opposed to 
nation. The state itself represents the institutions, government structure, and overall 
political unit on a map, all of which are used to govern the people and give them a sense 
of location, and to represent the Turkish nation in concrete form in the international 
system. A formal definition, a synopsis by John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, 
characterizes the concept “state” as: 1) a set of institutions, manned by the state’s own 
personnel 2) institutions at the center of a geographically bounded territory, usually 
referred to as a society 3) a monopolizer of rule-making within its territory, tending 
toward the creation of a common political culture shared by all citizens.227 There are 
many other definitions as well, but for this study it should suffice to think of ‘state’ as 
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institutions, geographic political territory within the international system, and the 
government and law that rule the people within the country.  
At this point, definitions in mind, one must note that the state is not universally 
present, but rather a constructed entity. Societies tend to assume the state to be true, 
everlasting, and necessary. As Gellner strongly asserts, “The existence of a centralised 
state is an important part of the background of the nationalist vision of the world. But the 
state itself is not universally present: there are, for instance, stateless tribal societies…”228 
Telhami and Barnett’s work, which was largely the springboard for applying this state-
national divide to Turkey, agrees on this matter, describing the state as inherently non-
universal but speaking of it as a “project”: “Indeed, a state-building project can be 
understood as a social engineering exercise intended to generate the very state-national 
conflation assumed by international relations theorists.”229 In fact, this complete state-
national overlap is quite rare. Smith stresses the low number of “genuine ‘nation-states’” 
today. “If ‘nation-state’ is taken to mean a single ethnic community and common culture, 
then only about ten percent of existing states would qualify. If some ‘tiny minorities’ are 
left out of the calculation, a ‘few more’ would qualify.”230  
 
5.2  A Statist View 
Within this understanding of the state as non-universal,231 this chapter will 
approach it with a statist view, that the state “is an actor in its own right as either an 
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exogenous or an intervening variable.”232 It is produced outside of the system of 
nationhood, and acts as an agent upon it. This is a political—not economic—statism, 
based on powerful state tradition; the state is a strong and separate actor.233 However, the 
state is still composed of individuals at its core. Eric Nordlinger understands the state as: 
“all those individuals who occupy offices that authorize them, and them alone, to make 
and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society. Quite simply, 
the state is made up of and limited to those individuals who are endowed with society-
wide decision-making authority.”234 
In turn, those individuals and their institutions, grouped collectively as the “state” 
in a geographically bounded and rule-making body, must provide political, judicial, 
economic, and societal leadership for the nation. This may be done in line and in step 
with what the nation wants and needs, or apart from the “heartbeat” of the nation and its 
identity. This makes sense as the state is made of individuals, for individuals are fallible, 
and power-hungry. In this way, it is possible for the state and nation no longer to overlap, 
but to diverge, just as it is possible for a dog to “walk” its owner (picture a large dog gone 
wild, dragging its owner down the street) or, in our case, for a horse to pull its own 
jockey. Alternatively, the jockey could be pulling the horse in a direction it is not able or 
not willing to go. Both scenarios would create discord, and could turn harmful or even 
violent.  
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And yet the line between the state identity and national identity is not always 
completely clear, especially considering, as mentioned in chapter 2, “the lack of overlap 
between state and national identity can generate an inherently unstable and precarious 
situation, one that results in political, economic, and symbolic exercises by the state in 
order to shift subnational loyalties to the symbols of the state”235 One can see such 
exercises in the aforementioned “Student Vow,” for example, which is a manifestation of 
national identity but also reinforces the overlap with state identity by linking it to the 
state. Gellner offers a word picture with an insightful synopsis of how the nation and state 
are linked in practice: 
In simpler terms – Ruritania for the Ruritanians! Let all the Ruritanians be joined 
in the sacred fatherland! And let no one other than Ruritanians – bar perhaps a 
small number of well-behaved visitors who know their place as guests, and who 
do not occupy key decision-making positions – take up much space in the sacred 
land of Ruritania.236 
 
The bottom line, for Turkey, is an overall strong state. Sources in general agree 
that Turkey is at least partially a strong state, with some for example attributing this to 
the strong state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire,237 and others saying it 
cycles between being weak and strong.238 But judging by various standards, including its 
own, the devlet239 in Turkey has a deep and protective bearing over Turkish society. This 
                                                 
235
 Telhami and Barnett, 9. 
236
 Gellner, 16. 
237
 See: Selim Deringil, “The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal,” 
in The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics: Collected Essays, ed. Selim Deringil (Istanbul: The 
Isis Press, 2000), 177-198, which argues that the state structure Kemal established was actually quite 
Ottoman-like in nature, rather than a movement that can be recognized “purely as the brainchild of Mustafa 
Kemal,” as many authors, especially foreign ones, tend to assume. 
238
 See: Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation 
of Democracy in Turkey,” Turkey Before and After Atatürk, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 
1999),259-277, an article which calls the state strong in terms of prudence, but weak in terms of 
responsiveness, highlighting the various waves of political personalities, parties, and coups.  
239
 This word translates to ‘state’ in English, but carries with it a connotation of greatness and authority not 
present in the English equivalent.  
 103 
is distinguishable in some countries, but absent from others. In a hallmark book about the 
strength of states, Joel S. Migdal writes: 
Some states have gained much more mastery than others in governing who may 
heal the sick and who may not; the duration, content, and quality of children’s 
education; numerous specifications of a house one may build for oneself; with 
whom one may or may not have sexual relations; and countless other details of 
human actions and relationships. It is not simply that some states have leaders 
who purposely have the state do less.240  
 
Turkey is one such state that has, as Migdal puts it, “gained mastery.” Turkey can also be 
understood as a transcendental moderate state, when applied to a different set of state 
categories, that of transcendentalism (‘statist orientation’) versus instrumentalism 
(‘societal orientation’).241 In the former, the state transcends society and acts as an 
independent force influencing it, while in the latter, society instead is the higher force, 
and the state is an instrument in society’s hands to serve its own needs. Metin Heper 
expounds on these categories, using them to explain the cause of deficient political 
analyses of Turkey in the past. He notes that the extreme form of transcendentalism is 
when the state smothers society, and in extreme instrumentalism, society smothers the 
state. But, “in moderate transcendentalism, a ‘consensus’ is imposed upon society in the 
form of static norms. The state is institutionalized around those norms.”242 This is exactly 
Turkey’s case. The “consensus” was “imposed upon society” by the Kemalist regime, 
and the regime’s reforms and rules became accepted “norms,” and even more 
appropriately “static norms” in that those who carry them forward expect them to be 
unchanging. Furthermore, “in an extremely transcendental polity the state is often 
structured in the person of the ruler. The rule is of a personal type…The most desirable 
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trait on the part of the civil servants is their loyalty to the person of the ruler.”243 Thus, it 
is possible that Turkey was extremely transcendental during the time of Atatürk .  
This established, the rest of this chapter will discuss the identity of the state in 
Turkey, then Turkey as a state. The roles of the state will be grouped into two main 
sections: first internal, then external. One concerns the state’s relationship with its own 
society, and the others concern the state’s relationship with the rest of the world.244 
 
5.3  The State in Turkey (Governing Society) 
An interesting term in Turkish, Devlet Baba (Father State) is used to refer to the 
paternalistic role of the state in caring for the Turk, with the idea being—especially for 
the lower classes—that if there is a bad harvest or similar economic disaster, the state will 
come to the rescue. This idea got its start with the adoption of statism in the new republic 
in 1931, while the government was facing a financial crisis spurned by the Great 
Depression that started in the United States in 1929. It was at this point that devletçilik 
(statism) became one of the official pillars of Kemalism. “What this term meant exactly 
was never clearly defined. It was certainly not a form of socialism: private ownership 
remained the basis for economic life. Rather, it meant that a state took over responsibility 
for creating and running industries for which the private sector could not accumulate the 
necessary capital.”245 
While Devlet Baba as a term was not used by Mustafa Kemal, he can be 
considered the first “Father State.” He was the rescuer, guide, and protector of the people, 
and the one whose newly adopted surname meant “Father of the Turks.” However, he 
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was the only leader to fulfill this role. Atatürk modeled a savior role, but he knew that if 
the republic was to continue without him, the state itself must join in that role with him 
and then inherit it. Thus he glorified the state, raised it upon a pedestal, and gave it a 
“strong state” character that was both a continuation of the Ottoman inheritance and a 
requisite (as he saw it) for the success of the newborn republic. Hence, fatherhood was 
passed to the state, the main representatives of which were and are the military and its 
elites. Thus, after Atatürk, the horse’s jockey became the state.  
 
5.3.1 Military Heirs 
 
In this way, the horse’s jockey once was Atatürk,246 because he himself 
symbolized and epitomized the state, but after him and still today the jockey is the state. 
Not since Atatürk has another person been able to embody the term “Father State.” The 
role of the state, and an accompanying “National Protector” role, have been assumed by 
the Turkish military. They consider themselves the heirs of Atatürk and indeed resurrect 
and honor him through their regular practices. This status continues today and it remains 
true in polls that Turkish citizens trust their military most. When there is a political 
problem internally or a foreign threat externally, it is the military who comes to the 
rescue, and the public broadly approves:  
The Turkish people as a whole are proud of their army, want it to be strong, and 
accord it a status which no army enjoys in any other NATO country. In Turkey, 
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the army is always praised, never criticized, and, in an emergency, it is seen as the 
nation’s saviour.247 
 
The military, by way of inheritance, is not only expected to be the main bearer of 
the idea of the state, but to hold unwaveringly to the fundamentals of Kemalism, as 
established by Mustafa Kemal and his regime. Political Kemalism itself is difficult to 
define. Kemal defined it with six arrows248 but it was more than just principles. Its vague 
character encompassed nationalism and homogeneity and all the principles Atatürk  
packaged into national identity. Many have taken it to be an ideology all its own, the 
foundations of the identity for the state. By encoding Kemal with an ‘-ism’ people look 
for an ideology, but there was not one; at best it was a guideline. “It never became a 
coherent, all-embracing ideology, but can best be described as a set of attitudes and 
opinions, which were never defined in any detail.”249 When taken as ideology, it is broad 
enough and vague enough to be anything and everything: 
Sometimes Kemalism was even described as the ‘Turkish religion.’ Nevertheless, 
as an ideology it lacked coherence, and perhaps even more importantly, emotional 
appeal. This ideological void was filled to some extent by the personality cult 
which grew up around Mustafa Kemal during and even more after his lifetime. He 
was presented as the father of the nation, its saviour, its teacher. Indoctrination in 
schools and universities (where ‘History of the Turkish Revolution’ became a 
compulsory subject in 1934) focused on him to an extraordinary degree.250 
 
Within this, though, Atatürk himself said a lot of things, many of which can be 
interpreted, re-interpreted, or even construed to support any and every political policy 
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across the spectrum. “As a result, Kemalism remained a flexible concept and people with 
widely differing world views have been able to call themselves Kemalist.”251 
Thus, with the political manipulation and lack of clarity in Kemalism, what has 
grown up in the military in its place (since the late 1970s and 1980s) is an “Atatürkism,” 
which dotes not on notions, but on the man himself—carrying on his essence. In the 
words of a general who has disseminated Atatürkism in the Armed Forces: 
Communism is considered an ideology but in my opinion it’s Atatürkism that 
really fits the definition of an ideology, as it has an answer for any event or 
development. It is dynamic, not static like communism. We put this ideology into 
practice in every field, in the family as well as in education.252 
 
New recruits, in their initial training, as recorded by Birand in the 1980s, heard the 
following in a speech from one of their commanders: 
Your flag will be the great Atatürk. Your ideology will be his principles, your aim 
will be the direction he showed us. You will follow unswervingly in Atatürk’s 
footsteps.253 
 
This is indeed tantamount to the devotion of some religions, such as dedicated Christians’ 
attitude toward Jesus, or pious Muslims’ attitude  toward Mohammed.  
Indeed, his soul is living on, somewhat resurrected, through the army. Each year 
on 27 December, the military celebrates Kemal’s initial arrival to Ankara during the War 
of Independence:  
On this occasion the cadets in the Army Academy race to the building where the 
Grand National Assembly was first held, wearing battle-dress to ‘represent the 
arrival of Atatürk.’ The underlying point for all to see is that the ‘Atatürks are not 
dead but living and, if need be, will save the country from disaster, keep the 
Republic alive and deliver it to the nation.’254 
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And so it is with the assumed blessing of the leader, and as the torch-bearers of 
Kemalism/Atatürkism, that the military takes up the state banner, and for the eighty years 
of the republic, it is the military that has been “acting as the state elite.”255 Those in the 
military see it as their main job to protect and preserve the Turkish state. The military 
guarantees the Republic of Turkey, safeguarding it as if by contract passed down from 
Atatürk. “The Turkish Chief of Staff’s declaration one day before the 24 December 1995 
General elections that ‘the Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the 
Turkish Republic which is a secular, social and lawful state’ succinctly clarifies the 
military’s position in Turkey.”256  
 
5.3.2 Swerving and Rectifying 
 
Should the republic start to swerve from secularism, or other Kemalist/Atatürkist 
principles (as the military elites perceive them), democracy is called into question. This 
has been seen in three military coups to overthrow a misbehaving government, in 1960, 
1971, and 1980.257 In an interview with young military cadets, investigative journalist 
Birand had the following interaction: 
‘Sir, we are the army of the regime. It is our duty to defend and guard this 
country, and to keep the state sound and the regime secure.’ 
‘Do you believe in democracy?’ 
‘Of course, is there a better form of government?’ 
‘Fine. But what happens if a government elected by the people’s votes takes a 
decision that you consider to be against Atatürk’s principles; do you still consider 
that you have the right to intervene?’ 
A hand shot up in the back of the hall. I received a reply in a firm voice. ‘We are 
opposed to anybody, no matter whether they are there by the grace of the ballot 
box or the votes of the National Assembly, who attempts to violate Atatürk’s 
                                                 
255
 Heper and Keyman, 265. 
256
 Müftüler-Bac, 247. 
257
 There was also a “postmodern” coup, smaller in scope, in 1997. Although the military never demanded 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s resignation, their actions and pressure prompted him to step down. 
 109 
principles. We have a right to act to this end in the interests of our people, and for 
their protection.’… 
‘But, lads, don’t you have faith in the people? You are, after all, talking about 
those chosen by the people.’ 
‘My people are poorly educated. They may be misled by politicians and the self-
interested.’ 
‘So you see yourselves as Turkey’s guardians?’ 
‘Of course we do. As long as we are surrounded by external enemies, and face 
perverted ideas at home, we are the country’s guardians. We need, therefore, to be 
very well-prepared.’ 
‘Who has given you this task?’ 
‘Atatürk and our elders. We have been told this is our right, even our duty. And 
we have accepted it as such.’258 
 
This illustrates the superior position of Kemalism/Atatürkism even over democracy, but 
this issue quickly becomes complicated; Kemal’s original intent for the government 
structure and political institutions of Turkey (i.e. the state) seems to have been a firm and 
realistic straightforwardness: 
Gentlemen! Every one of our compatriots and coreligionists may nourish a high 
ideal in his mind; he is free to do so, and no one will interfere. But the 
government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey has a firm, positive, 
material policy, and that, gentlemen, is directed to the preservation of life and 
independence … within defined national frontiers. The Grand National Assembly 
and government of Turkey, in the name of the nation they represent, are very 
modest, very far from fantasies, and completely realistic…259 
 
But, ripe with desire for modernization and reform, Atatürk strove for radical change, and 
one would think he expected his own reforms and principles to be re-reformed and re-
considered in the years to come.  
His disciples, however, have largely not gotten that message; despite 
conservatives interpreting Devrimcilik or İnkılapçılık (revolutionism) as “a commitment 
to ongoing change and support for the Kemalist reform programme,”260 it seems that the 
idea of ongoing change is frightening and avoided at all costs by the bearers of the state 
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today. Regarding leadership and change, it is important to note that Atatürk himself 
embraced change, and it is only after his lifetime that the “norms” mentioned earlier by 
Heper have become “static.” As Arnett explains: “Those who loudly invoke ‘Atatürk’ 
attempt to use his memory as an obstacle to change, although the man himself was the 
very embodiment of change.”261  
Turkey’s strong state role appears undisputed. The people in fact expected it to be 
so. “There was nothing democratic about the Ankara regime, and it was in many respects 
as ‘statist’ and undemocratic as its Ottoman predecessor.”262 But one question remains 
regarding the strong state leadership given to the new Turkish nation. This chapter has 
been asserting so far that the state and the national identity coincided well, if not 
perfectly, during Atatürk’s years, based on his knowledge and skill in instituting and 
packaging them. But did all the constituents of the new Turkey accept the state that was 
being organized over them?  
 
5.3.3 Violence and Law 
 
The state, in addition to the definitions relating to geography, government and 
institutions, has an instrumental purpose too, as we have seen. It is the “result of a 
political process, one in which the state system was used as an instrument for generating 
national identity and commitment.”263 This “instrument” is usually benign enough, and in 
truth, “under the benevolent authoritarianism of Atatürk, there was little overt opposition 
to [the] reforms.”264 But the instrument also possesses a deep force with which to silence 
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opponents. The new Kemalist state was pressed to do this during darker days of 
opposition to the various principles of the empire, whether the Turkish identity, 
secularism, or modernizing reforms. 
The first and largest violent revolt after the establishment of the republic came 
from the east, in February 1925. It was waged under the green flag of faith in the name of 
Islam, of upholding the cause of Allah and the religion of the people, but was possibly 
more deeply rooted in the Kurdish cause, after the hope given them by the Allied Powers 
of an independent Kurdistan was dashed by the demise of the Sèvres Treaty. Led by 
Sheikh Said of Palu against “the abolition of the Caliphate and the godless policy of the 
Kemalist government,”265 the movement represented the largest rebellion against Kemal 
and his regime. Response was swift and fierce. If Turkey was to be the unified and 
homogenized nation Kemal wanted it to be, Kurdish uprisings were not to be tolerated. 
As Kemal said, “If we can manage to keep the right wing under control, we do not need 
to fear the left…One should not wait before crushing a reactionary movement…One 
should act at once.”266 And act they did.  
On March 3, the “Law for the Maintenance of Order” was pushed through 
Parliament, “giving extraordinary and, in effect, dictatorial powers to the government for 
two years,”267 along with its instrument of implementation—the İstiklâl Mahkemeleri,268 
or “Independence Tribunals.”269 By the end of March, Sheikh Said’s rebellion was put 
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down and he was brought to Diyarbakır, where a month later the Independence Tribunal 
established there sentenced him and 46 of his followers to death as traitors. Regarding 
this new law and the tribunals (which were established in Ankara and in the east), 
Mustafa Kemal  
explained that these extraordinary measures had ‘given to all government officials 
the task of preventing an incident before it happens rather than repressing it after 
it has happened.’ The state must have the power to suppress speedily ‘the 
aggressive actions of drunkards in the streets, bandits in the mountains, rebels 
who dare oppose the armed forces of the Republic, and those who create 
confusion in the innocent mind of the nation.’270 
 
The Law for the Maintenance of Order was further utilized, once in effect and operating 
successfully, for the protection of the nation’s “innocent mind.” This included, 
apparently, the change in headgear for Muslims, and was used half a year later to enforce 
the new law that made it illegal to wear the fez. Two years later, in his marathon speech 
of 1927, Kemal explained the ban in light of legality: 
We did it while the Law for the Maintenance of Order was still in force. Had it 
not been, we would have done it all the same, but it certainly is true that the 
existence of the law made it much easier for us. Indeed, the existence of the Law 
for the Maintenance of Order prevented the large-scale poisoning of the nation by 
certain reactionaries.271 
 
The reactionary ‘poisoning’ came not only from the religious or Kurdish zealots of the 
east, but also from remnants of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) in the 
west,272 where the Kemalist regime foiled a plot to assassinate its great leader. In June 
1926 in Izmir, police discovered a conspiracy to throw a bomb into Mustafa Kemal's car. 
One month later, following trials at the Independence Tribunal that was quickly 
transferred to Izmir from Ankara, conspiracy leader Ziya Hurşid and accomplices were 
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executed. The Ankara Independence Tribunal then returned to the capital, where it 
carried out further trials and executions of major political opponents of Mustafa 
Kemal.273 Politically too, experiments in opposition parties were tested, but ultimately 
failed to satisfy Kemal in his direction for the Turkish state. “Experimentation with 
multiparty democracy in 1924 and 1930 failed because the new parties’ opposition to the 
tenets of the Turkish revolution was perceived to be harmful.”274  
In sum, in purging opponents as in other areas, the state was an actor in and of 
itself, guardian of the nation Mustafa Kemal had defined. Its job was to be strong, 
protective, paternalistic—to take the young nation by hand.275 
 
5.3.4 Turkishness 
 
To be fair, there are also components of the strong state hand outside of the 
military, although they often come under the military’s watchful eye. One is the 
legislation of Turkishness. How does one prove or legitimize being Turk, so that the 
concept as defined, shaped, and packaged by Atatürk might be protected? What does 
Türklüğü, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, really mean? There is not much of an 
exact definition outside the minds of Turkish people. The constitution includes the direct 
Turkish word for “Turkishness” in the fourth paragraph of its preamble276 (as amended 
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on 17 October 2001) but the official English version of the same paragraph277 omits the 
exact word, using instead the “Turkish historical and moral values” instead of 
“Turkishness’s historical and moral values.” This is the only mention of the word in the 
constitution, as the term itself is newer, and in fact its mention in the fourth paragraph is 
one of the changes added as of 2001.  
The vagueness of the concept notwithstanding, The Turkish Penal Code offers 
descriptive legal measures surrounding it: 
1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months 
and three years. 
2. Public denigration of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial 
institutions of the State, the military or security structures shall be punishable by 
imprisonment of between six months and two years. 
3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen 
in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 
4. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime. 
 
Some would say ‘Turkishness’ is whatever the state wants it to be, according to the 
circumstances and the time period and the situation under investigation. According to one 
scholar, Turkishness is not completely equivalent to Turkish citizenship, which bears a 
political-territorial definition. Turkishness, rather, includes a political and ethnicist 
logic.278 He asserts instead that: 
…there are different degrees of Turkishness, being a subject of the Turkish 
Republic, being a Turkish subject, and being Turkish and, more importantly, that 
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Turkish citizenship fails to overlap with or exhaust Turkishness in the full sense 
of the term. What is even more interesting is that there is a remarkable correlation 
between the different levels of state apparatus and different degrees of 
Turkishness. For instance, the institutions at the heart of the state (military) match 
themselves with being of Turkish race, while the institutions at the edge of the 
state (state dormitories) are content to match themselves with Turkish Republic 
citizenship.279 
 
There seems to be a fundamental problem between what is intended by Turkishness and 
the result. The intention may be an entirely political one, encompassing and inclusive of 
all people;280 but the outcome is different.  
Official intentions and doctrine aside, Turkishness is instead used by the state to 
mean the values they, as the protectors of Kemalism, and meaning usually the military 
elites, want to uphold. One of the chief issues is refutation of the so-called Armenian 
“genocide,” on the grounds which two of the biggest-name charges were filed.281  From 
these, we can assume that denying “genocide” is one of the absolutes of state-defined 
Turkishness. 282 
 
5.3.5 Measuring Sticks 
 
In searching for what “Turkishness” could possibly mean, being Turk is certainly 
(or officially, at least) not defined by ethnicity. Practicing Turkish culture is too broad 
and undefined of a measurement. And just being a Turkish citizen does not bring a person 
to the point of Turkishness, as shown above. There must be other concrete measuring 
sticks by which being Turk is evaluated. One is language and another is religion. “The 
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language of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish, according to the constitution.”283 As 
Lewis noted as early as 1961, “A visitor to Turkey will encounter at once the first and 
unmistakable sign of Turkishness—the Turkish language, which, despite long subjection 
to alien influences, survives triumphantly. Scholars have noted the remarkable capacity 
of Turkish to resist, displace, and even supplant other languages with which it has come 
in contact.”284  
The Turkish religion is an odd reality. The ancient Turks with whom modern 
Turks often valiantly link themselves were not Muslim; Islam was imported later. But 
today, although of course unofficially, to be Turk is to be Muslim. When a baby is born 
in Turkey, unless requested otherwise by their parents, which is very rare, the religion 
“Muslim” is recorded on their Personal Identity Card. There is debate as to whether it is 
possible to be a Turk and also be Jewish, Christian, or any other religion; different people 
will give vastly different answers.285 As Yeğen mentions indirectly in a footnote on 
Turkish citizenship, it is possible, as a non-Muslim settled in Turkey, to be a Turkish 
citizen, but not to “assimilate into Turkishness”; but non-Turkish Muslims, on the other 
hand, “may become Turkish.”286 And, as Lewis asserted in the 1960s, but which still 
holds generally true today, “To this day the term Turk is never applied to non-Muslims, 
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though they be of Turkic origin and language like the heathen Chuvash and Christian 
Gagauz, or citizens of a Turkish state, like the Christians and Jews of Istanbul.”287 
Above are some of the ways the state has defined itself and its people internally. 
What was the rest of the world to see of this newly born state? 
 
5.4  The State of Turkey (In the World) 
At the founding of the republic in 1923, Turkey proclaimed to the world its own 
sovereignty and statehood. Yet sovereignty itself is somewhat elusive; no country on 
earth is ever purely sovereign. Even a relationship makes an entity less sovereign. 
Kenneth Waltz clarifies and limits the often-murky definition, serving our understanding 
of Turkey’s ability to be sovereign: 
The error lies in identifying the sovereignty of states with their ability to do as 
they wish. To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they 
want. Sovereign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways 
they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would like to. 
The sovereignty of states has never entailed their insulation from the effects of 
other states’ actions… Sovereign states have seldom led free and easy lives. What 
then is sovereignty? To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself 
how it will cope with its internal and external problems.288 
 
So Turkey is sovereign; it can decide for itself. But a sovereign state still needs a region, 
an affiliation, a network of relationships in which to belong. As Turkey has painfully 
learned, it cannot comfortably hang regionally unattached by itself.  
In this regard, what remains unclear today is the place of this sovereign state in 
the world. As Turkish scholar Criss writes, “we are still discussing the importance of 
being European, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, at the dawn of the twenty-first 
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century.”289 Turkey’s international region, role and rough neighborhood are all crucially 
intertwined with its identity as a nation. Each of these will be explained in the sub-
sections to follow. 
 
5.4.1  A Region  
 
A state is in some ways free to choose its own regional affiliation and identity. 
Turkey chose Europe, quite adamantly, although at times has courted the Middle East,290 
or tacitly accepted a role, suggested by the U.S., as “model” for the Middle East. But a 
state is in some ways bound by what others say. If the EU doesn’t accept Turkey, and if 
Westerners think of Turkey as “Middle East,” then can Turkey still call itself European? 
Who decides the regions and who belongs in which one? According to critical security 
studies scholar Pınar Bilgin, a professor at Bilkent University, Turkey has been moving 
in and out of different regional configurations. In the 1920s, the Royal Geographical 
Society (of Great Britain) moved Turkey from “Near East” to “Middle East,” which was 
a broadening regional term at that point.291 Then, directly after World War Two, in which 
Turkey was neutral, Stalin made heavy demands on Turkey, which partially contributed 
to Turkey’s choice to ally with the West. But more so, Turkish policy-makers used the 
Soviet threat “for domestic security purposes, to curb the ‘extreme’ left and re-
inscribe…Turkish state identities as staunch Western allies, thereby strengthening their 
economic as well as military relations with the United States.”292 Thus, during the Cold 
War, “nobody questioned Turkey being Western”; but U.S. interests shifted with the end 
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of the Cold War, and “now we’re Middle East.”293 Turkish identity is thus very much 
influenced by outside forces, whether they are determining Turkey’s regional 
understanding of itself, or directly influencing the inscription of state identities. Processes 
of labeling and categorizing—and re-labeling and re-categorizing—leave their mark on 
Turkey’s ability to place itself in the world. 
These outside forces can be in the form of such perceptions and categorizations, 
or they can also be portrayed, in our horse-and-jockey metaphor, as winds and rains that 
effect the pair as they travel. Rains of disaster (wars, enemies, failed alliances, 
embargoes, etc.) and winds of international politics (globalization, changing structures of 
polarity, integration and exclusion, etc.) are all outside circumstances that have a direct 
bearing on the nation-state’s operation. The horse will function differently in various 
climate conditions, and the jockey must be aware of this too.  
And yet the public within Turkey has an opinion all its own, a factor attracting 
more attention recently.294 Somehow, in Turkey as in other countries, the nation must 
follow the political leadership of the state, but the state must also follow the heartbeat of 
the nation. Determining this heartbeat is a very difficult task indeed. According to some 
preliminary qualitative research among highly educated Turkish female students in 
Ankara, I found the direction and desire for European regional affiliation to be not as 
clear-cut as Atatürk once planned.295 Cursory survey results reveal an identity affiliation 
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of “European” to be last on a list of six identity possibilities in which the students could 
characterize themselves.296 Also, among about half of the survey respondents, there 
seemed to be a resentment toward being regionally or geographically identified, as if to 
say that it undermined their importance as individuals or Turks. Responses like these call 
into question Turkey’s regional desires and directions, and also suggest an inward retreat. 
These responses should also cause scholars to ask: “Why are we so anxious to 
geographically locate this country? Is the West nervous about it being a loose and 
unanchored factor in between Europe and Asia? Is Turkey anxious about fitting in and 
being ‘at the table, not on the menu’?297 Is that why all feel such a need to label Turkey 
geostrategically?” 
 
5.4.2  A Role or Label 
 
Bilgin refers to Turkey’s specific tendency to be represented based on its crucial 
location as the “assumption of geographical determinism.”298 Lesser refers to this, in 
layman’s terms, as “the real estate connection.”299 The connections provided by the 
Anatolian peninsula, the sea access afforded by the straits, the proximity to larger powers, 
the closeness of natural resources, the division point between continents, and a host of 
other factors make Turkey a geostrategic game piece. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s hallmark 
                                                 
296
 The others being, in ranking order from most selected to least selected, “Turk,” “Muslim,” 
“Mediterranean,” “Middle Eastern,” “Eurasian.” Several students refused such an affiliation or checked all 
of them, then described themselves as “of the whole world,” or “all of these and none of these.” Another 
respondent refused the categories and wrote “I am of Turkey.”  One student said her primary identity is not 
geographical, but as a woman. Another student checked the “Turk” and “Muslim” identities, but next to the 
rest wrote “I don’t believe in these categories.” About 20 interviews in total were conducted.  
297
 Famous quotation by late President Özal, spoken in regard to his energetic support for Turkey to 
participate in the anti-Iraq coalition of the first Gulf War. See, Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in 
Turkish Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey 1:2 (April-June 1999). 
298
 Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation,” European 
Journal of Political Research 44 (2005), 185. 
299
 Lesser, 94. He refers to this perspective, thankfully, as an outdated, stale, and uncreative way to think 
about the Turkish-American relationship in the future. However, in the end he still advocates “strategic 
cooperation.” Cold War conceptions die hard. 
 121 
book marks Turkey as one of the five “Pivotal Players” on the globe’s grand game 
board.300 This is one of many game-like or strategic analogies for Turkey’s position. 
The title of Criss’ aforementioned work, “Turkey as a Metaphor Between Europe 
and Asia,” is thus quite appropriate, for there is no shortage of labels and metaphors, used 
extensively by both Turks and foreigners, to characterize Turkey’s strategic importance 
on the world stage, mostly with regard to the purposes it can serve relative to its more 
powerful neighbors. Among the most common labels are: Barrier, Buffer, Bridge, and 
Model. The first two referred to blocking the Soviet Union by being NATO’s “Southern 
Flank”—an “anchor” on the Soviets’ “Soft Underbelly”—thus playing a role of 
“containment” of Soviet Power. The latter two refer to the more recent goal of a hopeful 
way of entering and influencing the Middle East through an ally. Turkey was thus an 
“important pillar” of NATO. There are also lesser used labels like Pawn, Bastion, Tool, 
and Forward Base (all of which denote the idea of being used by the West in reaching the 
East). Further degrading are terms that seem to imply Turkey to be in deceptive cohorts 
with the U.S. or West in the Middle East, referring to Turkey as America’s 
“subcontractor” or “agent” of the West.301  
These nicknames are more metaphorical, but there are also labels based on 
strategic terminology, like “stalwart ally” or “staunch ally” or “strategic partner,” or 
“stable island,” all of which characterize Turkey primarily for its geographic location and 
instrumentality. In these terms, Turkey’s main importance to others lies in where it is, not 
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who or what it is.302 Finally, there are vague and generalized labels that attempt, mostly 
unsuccessfully, to identify the Turkish state and nation based on characteristics like 
democracy and Islam, whichever suits the purposes of the label-bestowing country at the 
time. One hears “Muslim Democracy,” “Democratic example in the Middle East,” and 
even, quite alarmingly to the Turks, “Islamic Republic.” 
These labels are not altogether healthy. While useful at times, these labels can be 
quite influential—even damaging. Bilgin emphasizes the power of representations in 
shaping a country’s identity from the outside. For example, the way Turkey is 
represented in America is not merely a foreigner’s view or helpful word picture for 
political strategists, but reinforces what Turkey actually is and will become. In other 
words, it if is treated according to certain codes and standards, it will probably live up to 
those set for it. Bilgin acknowledges “the different impact representations have on those 
who produce the representations and those who are represented. What all share is the 
damaging effect representations have had on both groups of actors.”303 
The Turks do not always want such labels given to their state. The “bridge” or 
“model” illustration is worn out:  
Turks will continue to be uncomfortable with prevailing American thinking about 
Turkey’s role in the broader Middle East and North Africa. Few Turks, even those 
keen to expand Turkey’s relations to the south and east, welcome the notion of 
Turkey as a ‘model’ for the Middle East, either because they prefer to see 
Turkey’s role described in Euro-Atlantic terms, because they are skeptical about 
the exportability of democracy to the Arab world, or both.304  
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In his balanced article assessing Anti-Americanism in Turkey, Ömer Taşpınar writes that 
“The [U.S.] Administration has come to realize that it was a mistake to portray Turkey as 
a successful model for the Islamic world after September 11. The Kemalist establishment 
is not impressed by such calls.”305 
Accordingly, Islamic depictions have lost their flavor as well, if they ever had 
any. Secular educators, politicians, and many journalists, have publicly shown resentment 
of religious labels, whereby the U.S. attempts to use Turkey as a Muslim example: 
“But…the U.S. administration still appear[s] to be betting on religion, a policy that is 
extremely irritating to many in Turkey. During the first anniversary of the Iraq War, US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, said that Iraq would become an Islamic republic, just 
like Turkey and Pakistan. The faux pas stirred Turkish ire.”306 In a May 2005 U.S. Senate 
hearing on the State of U.S.-Turkey Relations, panelist Zeyno Baran, a Turkish woman 
who is director of the International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon Center, 
explained it this way to Congress members: “Following 9/11, when America searched for 
Muslim allies, Turkey stood as the most obvious and most promising one. For the United 
States, promoting Turkey as a country with moderate Islamic traditions made perfect 
sense.”307 The problem is, many Turks do not want Turkey to be known in the world for 
its “Islamic traditions.” That is the last identity label many secularist Turks want affixed 
to their state and, by association, nation. However, in a good-intentioned effort at 
repairing relations, which was the main goal of the hearing, Baran continues:  
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If this role is explained correctly, I am certain that a majority of Turks would 
agree. However, incidences in which senior United States officials have 
misspoken, with one labeling Turkey an Islamic Republic, have brought out the 
worst fears among Turks and many genuinely believe that the United States wants 
to experiment with creating a moderate Islamic Republic of Turkey and therefore, 
are strongly opposed to any U.S. initiatives that highlight Islamic elements in 
Turkey.308 
 
Overall, Turkey seems to be viewed by strategists as a stepping stone. No one uses such a 
term because it is not politic, but it boils down to this. Turkey, by nature of its land’s 
location, cannot seem to escape attempts at its geostrategic utilization by other countries. 
To Turkey itself, however, there is one factor that supercedes all these instrumental labels 
in terms of how the state views itself: its tough neighbors. 
 
5.4.3  A Rough Neighborhood 
 
The threat from enemies is one of the most important unifying factors, keeping 
the Turkish nation on its toes to defend the Turkish state. This is one area where Atatürk  
masterfully overlapped the national and state identities for the long-haul. Enemy logic, 
emphasized for nationalist goals, presents another form of continuity with the living past. 
Born out of the “Eastern Question” and then the Sèvres Treaty, both of which showed 
Ottomans/Turks just how few friends they had, the idea of being surrounded by hostile 
enemies eager to snatch Turkey’s territory still resonates strongly today. The first strands 
of this passionate lament can be seen in Atatürk’s famous “Speech to Turkish Youth,” 
(also quoted above): 
With force and deceit, all the fortresses of your beloved homeland might be taken, 
all its ships seized, all its armies scattered, and every corner of the homeland 
invaded by the enemy…Oh youth of the Turkish future! Even in these situations 
and conditions your duty is to save the Turkish independence and Republic. The 
strength that you need to do so exists in the noble blood flowing in your veins.309 
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As mentioned above, at the establishment of the republic, the most important value was 
sovereignty—Turkey was its own and belonged to its people, Atatürk declared. 
Furthermore, no one could again try to interfere to break it apart. To drive this point 
home, Turkey’s Constitution says in one of its opening articles: “The Turkish state, with 
its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”310 Today, this 
idea of local enemies being a threat to Turkish unity is still manifested in terms like 
“Sèvres Phobia”311 or “Encirclement Syndrome”312 or Turkey being surrounded by a 
“Rough Neighborhood.”313 The enemies ready to divide Turkey are seen as inside too. In 
a passionate description of “Armenian Terrorism” in former Turkish Ambassador to the 
America Elekdağ’s speech, he exemplified what is engrained in Turkish mentality, from 
grade school civics courses: “The only real winners of this terrible campaign are the 
forces of totalitarianism which would like nothing better than to de-stabilize Turkey and 
divide her from the West.”314 
The link to the past inherent in this fear cannot be overstated. Mustafa Kemal 
himself put it bluntly:  
But after every offensive, one must be prepared for a counter-attack. Continuous 
counter-attacks from the west, and discontent and insurrections in the Islamic 
world, had the ultimate result of burying the Ottoman Empire under the pall of 
history.315 
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In this way, Kemal wrapped state identity and national identity together, packaging them 
in the same box.   
While enemy threat contributes to the unity of the Turkish nation and state in 
some ways, the unfortunate outcome is a continual reification of geographic paranoia, of 
Turkey’s traditional fears of abandonment, of territorial loss, and of outside interference 
in its sovereignty. This reification generally works well for Turkey, especially in terms of 
the military elites’ hold on power, except that the nature of neighboring threats leads to 
making neighbors into a national security issue, and eventually to over-securitization. 
Socially constructed insecurities get produced and reproduced,316 sometimes to the 
detriment of what soon becomes a security-obsessed country. Over-securitization then 
interrupts and retards democracy.317 Philippos Savvides, writing from the Greek point of 
view, typically antagonistic to Turkey, argues that Turkey cannot democratize because of 
a fixation on security issues. “Democracy becomes the victim of the securitization 
process…The expansion of laws establishing dress codes or making illegal certain 
cultural practices are indicative not only of Turkey’s legitimation [sic] crisis, but also of a 
vulnerable state agonizing to preserve its ailing ideological character.”318 
Still, the enemy logic resonates well with the public, and prevails in classrooms 
and newsrooms. Students across the country take a required course in middle school 
called Vatandaşlık (Citizenship),319 and in high school called Milli Güvenlik (National 
Security) in which they learn about issues like the ever-present threat of Turkey’s 
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bordering neighbors. Respondents of the aforementioned qualitative survey (graduate-
level females) referred to Turkey’s bordering neighbors as “quite problematic” and “able 
to influence Turkey for the worst.” One student said, “all the countries are in a 
competition to be the regional leader.” A physics student wrote bluntly, “None of them 
love us and they are all our enemies,” and an archeology student wrote, “They are ready 
to attack at every moment.” 
However, students are also beginning to think differently and see a need for 
change in the relationships. One or two thoughtful students wrote positively of the shared 
cultural terrain with neighbors and how Turkey should take advantage of this. A history 
student specializing in Greece said that the neighboring countries have the “people she 
feels close to.” And a literature student viewed Turkey’s neighbors “as the countries 
about which we should be more informed, and which are close to us but unfortunately 
‘far,’ and which we are afraid of and consider as enemies.” 
Overall, while international society and an over-emphasis by strategists and 
politicians is mostly to blame for Turkey being stuck in various geostrategic labels, 
Turkey is also to blame for reinforcing fears about its geographical precariousness.  
 
5.5  Conclusion on the State 
Amidst public opinion, international views, carrots and sticks, pulls and pushes, 
Turkey clings just as strongly as ever to its sovereign choice. While it can be a “staunch 
ally,” it has demonstrated that it makes its own decisions and refuses to be a submissive 
pawn, tool, or instrument in the hands of larger powers. It demonstrated this most 
recently on 1 March 2003, when the Grand National Assembly voted against allowing 
American troops to use the İncirlik air force base as a northern front to invade Iraq. 
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Interferences in sovereignty make any country feel threatened, but perhaps Turkey even 
more so, with tender wounds of capitulations and other interferences from its Ottoman 
past that are not easily forgotten.  
The problematic presented in this chapter is between the horse and the jockey: the 
nation and the state. National identity (represented by the will of the people, public 
opinion, direction of academics and journalists, desires of the youth) cannot remain 
suppressed under state identity. It worked for a time—a time of radical change when 
opponents were silenced and transformation reigned. In that case, identity was not 
suppressed, because Atatürk worked to harmonize the two. The nation felt a privilege, an 
honor, in belonging to the state. This may not be the case today.  
If there is an identity complex in Turkey, it is between the nation and the state. 
Granted, there is plenty of polarization between the Islamists and the Secularists, the 
Right and the Left, the “pure” Turkish nationalists and the Kurds. But identity issues run 
deeper than political polarization. Identity issues are about the foundation of the state and 
nation, the very depths of who they are and how their knowledge of themselves formed. 
In the case of Turkey, the state and nation formed in an overlap, but did not stay that way. 
Does this have any implications for the Turkish-American relationship? The next 
chapter will explore whether the context above will have any consequence in Turkey’s 
relationship with its former “intimate strategic partner,” the United States. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE OLD FRIEND ACROSS THE POND: TURKEY AND AMERICA 
 
 
The Republic of Turkey and the United States of America are allies. But does 
anyone realize it? This was the question that first prompted this thesis topic.320 Whatever 
the case, the relationship between America and Turkey today does not much resemble an 
alliance, especially on the public level. Many Americans are practically oblivious to 
Turkey (“Is that in the Middle East?” “Do they speak Arabic there?” “Do they eat a lot of 
turkey?”), and Turks are experiencing a rising and alarming tide of anti-Americanism—
along with much of the rest of the world. “When the spirit has gone out of a relationship, 
an alliance is effectively dead,” wrote Parker T. Hart, former U.S. Ambassador to 
Turkey.321  
A recent newspaper headline seized my attention, proving this point: “Iraqi Kurds 
Ponder: With Turkey or With the Americans?”322 That such a title can appear is evidence 
that the social, popular-level disconnect between the allies is impacting parties outside of 
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the relationship itself. Turkey and America are not currently functioning like a team, but 
as two separate entities with diverging options pulling this third party in different 
directions.  
It is this disconnect between two supposed allies that interests and concerns me. 
As an individual, I have received wonderful hospitality and welcome from my Turkish 
friends, roommates, and hosts. They are gentle, helpful, kind, and self-sacrificing. And 
yet from all these same people, there is no shortage of seething attacks on the American 
government and foreign policy.  
This begs the question: is the passion we are seeing in Turkey not really anti-
Americanism, but a mere anti-Bushism or “anti-Iraq-Warism,” as Nancy McEldowney, 
Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. in Turkey, suggests? 323  Would it end if Bush left 
office and the Iraq War ended tomorrow? My answer is no.324 There is something else 
going on underneath the surface, under the politicians and policies—something to do 
with Turkish identity, something that relates to its very foundation, its very makeup.  
Part of the problem, as alluded to in the introduction, is the lack of a framework 
through which to study country relationships outside of a military-strategic or strategic-
diplomacy comprehension. This is especially the case of America and Turkey, whose 
alliance has been based almost wholly on geostrategy and mutual defense.325 The reason 
words and approaches are important is because we can no longer rely on military strategy 
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and group alliances to bind us. Cold War terminology is old, stale, and unhelpful. Even 
writers who still employ it are beginning to write about the importance of understanding 
between the two countries. The Cold War thinking and terminology that has dominated 
most326 of the past writings on the America-Turkey relationship does not leave much 
room for understanding in this sense. It helps us understand the game board of the world 
and geostrategic imperatives to blockade the enemy, but does not allow for the kind of 
mutual understanding of identities, desires, processes, temperaments, attitudes, 
insecurities, and vulnerabilities. It masks those in a detrimental way. This 
understanding—and what exactly that entails—will be the main theme of this chapter. 
Keeping in mind the importance of both identity and understanding, this chapter 
will apply what has been learned about Turkish identity to the U.S.-Turkey relationship. 
In the first section it will be argued that America needs to better understand Turkey, in 
identity terms and not just geostrategic location, if the relationship is going to continue 
successfully in the post-Cold War Era. Secondly, Turkey likewise would benefit from 
taking on a better understanding of America, especially its policies and processes. This 
effort at understanding will be applied to a real example full of misunderstanding: the 
Kurdish Problem. This will relate to the Turks’ diversity. This is a delicate issue, but it 
must be addressed, as a thesis on Turkish identity would be amiss without it. Finally, a 
promotion of understanding between the two countries will be addressed. The 
relationship needs a more sensitive approach and a good deal of texture on the public 
level to meet the problems on the policy level.  
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6.1  America Understanding Turkey 
This section will explain America’s historical and current view of Turkey, full of 
negativity and miscalculations. Then, it will describe what the U.S. must keep in mind 
about Turkey’s side of the relationship story in order for America to better discern the 
specific brand of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This specific brand will be developed, and 
contrasted with other types of Anti-Americanism, such as Arab or European, that differ 
from Turkey’s type.  
 
6.1.1 America’s View of Turkey 
 
Heretofore only considered in a strategic light, with occasional but minimal 
tourism, the U.S. view of Turkey and the Turkish people is none too favorable. With a 
historical image of the ‘Terrible Turk’ adopted from Europe,327 compounded by anti-Turk 
lobbies by Greek-Americans and Armenian-Americans, the average American thinks of 
the Turk without much esteem, if at all. This view, however, is not deep-rooted, and 
easily transforms for anyone who knows a Turk directly or indirectly, visits Turkey, or 
even hears of another’s trip to Turkey. Yet the bottom line is a lack of comprehension of 
this “faithful ally” and “friend.” 
A cursory glance at Western newspapers reporting on the current political 
upheaval in Turkey is revealing. After a large-scale Ankara protest in mid-April 2007, 
The Washington Post unfortunately reverted back to the outdated metaphor: “Turkey 
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aspires to become the first Muslim member of the European Union, and has long touted 
itself as a bridge between the Western and Islamic worlds.”328  In reality, most Turks do 
not talk about being a bridge to the Middle East anymore. If a foreigner even mentions 
that term, words are met with rolling eyes and soft chuckles, or sometimes exasperation. 
Rather than Turkey “touting itself as a bridge,” the U.S. insists on touting it as a bridge, 
because it is a familiar metaphor making American politicians strategically comfortable. 
Another article, in The New York Times, announces “But there are two Turkeys now,” 
referencing the debate over the role of Islam in Turkey.329 This would be like saying there 
are also two United States, divided over the role of Christianity in America.  
To boil it down to “two Turkeys” is oversimplification. In a newspaper venue 
there is not much space with which to work, but there is a price to pay in America’s lack 
of understanding of its allies. Rather than “two Turkeys”—a simple polarization between 
left and right, or between religious and secular, or between Kurds and Turks—there is a 
fundamental disconnect between the national and state identity. But getting a coherent 
explanation of such a complex disconnect into a few inches of news page is no easy task, 
and thus Americans know very little about this faraway “secular” republic with an 
“Islamic Hue.”330  
 
6.1.2 America Does Not “Get” Turkey 
 
So what is to be understood? This section overviews identity characteristics of the 
Turkish-American relationship in history, and examines the problem today. This casts 
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light on the nature of Anti-Americanism in Turkey currently, to be explained in the 
following section.  
Turkey and America in fact have a very positive historical relationship. Even 
before the republic itself was born, Americans were present and influential. It was a time 
of high prosperity for the American-Turk relationship on a public and cultural level, for 
the Americans were respectful of the Turks’ newly emerging identity, and indeed the 12th 
point of Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech became a rallying cry in the 
Turkish press for their sovereign rights.331 The Americans in Turkey were usually relief 
workers and missionaries, but also some politicians, journalists, and researchers with 
such tasks as to “ascertain the desires of the indigenous near Eastern people,”332 which 
sounds not too unlike “go study the Turks’ identity.” Some twenty of these Americans 
were even in Sivas—where the influential September 1919 Congress of nationalists was 
held—as records indicate, and “were in close contact with the majority of Turkish 
citizens in Sivas.”333 
In the 1920s and 1930s, as the republic was being constructed, America and 
Turkey had good, if not extensive, relations. Both went through a period of isolationism, 
focusing on inward domestic structure and trying to stay neutral regarding the stewing 
world events. Mustafa Kemal had appeared on Time magazine’s cover in 1923 and was 
earning recognition in America, but it was not until 1927 that America sent an 
ambassador to Turkey. Other countries’ ambassadors began slowly moving to the capital 
in Ankara, but it then took until 1937 for the U.S. ambassador to make the move, marking 
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the United States as the last one to take up full-time residence in Ankara.334 Many in the 
West had not been confident the Kemalist Regime would last.335  
The 1940s were the tumultuous war years, during which Turkey, quite incredibly 
considering its position, managed to stay neutral until the very end, when it sided with the 
Allies and began to seek protection from the perceived threat of the expanding Soviet 
Empire to its north. The Turks then counteracted the recently acquired international 
reputation for military non-participation by fighting valiantly and faithfully alongside 
Western powers in the Korean War, sending nearly 5,500 troops. Following that war, 
stories circulated about the bravery and skill of Turkish soldiers. In sending men to such a 
far-off place in which it had no direct interest, Turkey had achieved its unspoken goal: 
the West was duly impressed, and in 1952 Turkey was admitted to NATO, earning a 
huge security umbrella and financial support for itself. 
Thereafter, Turkish loyalty to the U.S. was observed firsthand by a former 
American ambassador in Turkey, writing about this time frame: “Arkadaş, the word for 
friend, literally means ‘the one who walks behind you,’ i.e., to protect your back. For 
twenty-five years the attachment of the Turkish people to the United States was that of 
the arkadaş, affectionate, grateful and ready for sacrifice.”336 This was especially 
characteristic in the so-called Golden Era (1950s) of Turkish-American relations. 
“During the ‘golden era’ Turkey manifested a loyal, single-minded friendship with the 
United States. Turkish leaders lent almost blind support to the United States and the 
Western alliance, and displayed total confidence in U.S. commitments within NATO.”337 
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But then the severe “body-blow” in 1964 with the Johnson letter followed by a second 
“body-blow” of the 1975 U.S. arms embargo against Turkey both did “lasting damage to 
the foundation of trust which underpins U.S.-Turkish relations.”338 These were the first 
major breaks in the tranquility of the relationship. Today, it is highly unlikely that such a 
foundation of trust still exists.339  
While these blows to the Turks were unexpected and overall quite negative in 
their outcomes, one benefit was a professionalization of Turks’ foreign policy: “the 
political crises experienced in Turkish-American relations compelled Turkey to seek self-
sufficiency in matters of defence and re-kindled the spirit of equal partnership.”340 The 
Turks learned that they could not count on international friendships to be gracious. Very 
shortly before the arms embargo on Turkey passed in the U.S. Congress in 1974, the 
Chief of General Staff of the Turkish military turned to his secretary in the face of 
reporters’ questioning and expressed his shock that they would believe such a possibility 
could materialize. “Look at what they say, Orhan. The U.S. is going to stop the aid. 
Could something like this happen? The U.S. helps us. Would they ever stop aid?”341 A 
few days later he was caught with his foot in his mouth and a sizeable dilemma.  
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This “abandonment” hit hard. A sense of abandonment in fact pervades the Turks’ 
international identity. After World War I, everyone abandoned them and wanted to carve 
up their land, as history books inform Turkish schoolchildren. It was from this that 
Mustafa Kemal came in and rose up as a savior. But the abandonment theme continued, 
especially with regard to America “abandoning” Turkey in the Cyprus crises in 1964 and 
1975.342 Part and parcel of this is the idea of being used. As many Turks feel it, America 
needed Turkey for the Soviet blockade, for positioning of listening posts and locating of 
strategic weapons and forces, but when Turkey needed America’s help in the Cyprus 
crisis, the U.S. withdrew support. The Turks were outraged, in both instances. They 
asked themselves, “why should we be loyal when the U.S. is not?” 
It could almost be described, in Turkish minds, as a ‘hostage’ situation, with them 
as the weaker power being ‘held hostage’ to the demands of the greater power.  
In sum, Turkey perceived itself as hostage to US domestic policies that were 
basically sympathetic to Greece. It resolved at that point never again to submit its 
national security and foreign policy to the vagaries of such a narrow dependency. 
Thus, the special US-Turkish relationship ended with Turkey’s new perception of 
its precarious position, a position in which it had become enmeshed during almost 
three decades of total reliance… Whatever the future of Turkish-American 
relations might be, the special feelings for Americans will probably never be 
completely rekindled in Turkish hearts.343 
 
This points to some of the historical roots of anti-Americanism in Turkey.344 Rather than 
a brand new phenomenon, it is a trend with a history, a gradual development. 
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6.1.3 Anti-Americanism In Turkey 
 
It is against this backdrop that we look to anti-Americanism in Turkey today. 
There were always bumps in the road, but what has gone so terribly wrong lately? A June 
2006 Pew Survey published the percentage of Turks’ favorability toward the U.S. from 
1999 - 2006.345 Favorable opinions of the U.S. in Turkey were as follows. 
 
 
 
Column A Column B 
Year Fav. To U.S. 
1999/2000 52 % 
2001 no data taken 
2002 30 % 
2003 15 % 
2004 30 % 
2005 23 % 
2006 12 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
345
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This of course coincides with the events of the Iraq War, which Turks so vehemently 
oppose, but as mentioned earlier, this phenomenon is more than just a policy-related 
trend, and some scholars have begun to organize and characterize it.  
Very recently, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane published a book on the 
types of anti-Americanisms in the world.346 Not content to group it all under one 
category, they distinguished four major types and classified nations into these types, 
which differ in their intensity, causes, and perception of threat. In liberal anti-
Americanism, the United States is criticized for not living up to its own ideals, and faces 
charges of hypocrisy from nations that do not feel threatened and would never attack the 
U.S., but support popular anti-Americanism nonetheless. This would be the likely type 
for most Western European nations. Social anti-Americanism flourishes in democratic 
societies that contrast with America’s political institutions and market-oriented processes, 
favoring instead a deeper state involvement. This type is slightly more intense than liberal 
anti-Americanism, but these societies share America’s basic values and tend to be 
advanced industrialized countries as well; Scandinavian nations or Japan might be 
examples. The third type is sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism. Those who fit in this 
type:  
focus on two values: the importance of not losing control over the terms by which 
polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent importance and value of 
collective national identities. These identities often embody values that are at odds 
with America’s. State sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted 
intrusions from America.347 
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Turkey fits exactly in this definition. One of the foundations of this type is “nationalism, 
collective national identities that offer a source of positive identification”; 
correspondingly, “national identity is one of the most important political values in 
contemporary world politics, and there is little evidence suggesting that this is about to 
change.”348 The strength of Turkey’s national identity is one of the main ideas of this 
thesis. Another base of this anti-Americanism type is state sovereignty, which is highly 
celebrated and protected in Turkey. Every nation values sovereignty, but Turkey has a 
fixation with it. This is logical, for fitting within this type are the countries in parts of 
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa “where state sovereignty came only after hard-fought 
wars of national liberation [and] sovereignty is a much-cherished good that is to be 
defended.”349 
The fourth type of anti-Americanism, according to Katzenstein and Keohane, is 
radical anti-Americanism, which is the violent kind that believes America’s identity 
stands against the values of what is good and right in the world. In its most extreme form, 
this type leads to the belief that America should be destroyed. Some Arab nations fit in 
this category, but Turkey does not. 
 
6.2  Turkey Understanding America 
In parallel to the above section on “America Understanding Turkey,” this section 
will explain Turkey’s historical and current view of America, replete with stereotypes 
and poor channels through which information is obtained. Then, it will argue how 
important aspects of the U.S. that Turkey does not “get,” especially congressional 
procedure, lead to misperceptions and frustration.   
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6.2.1 Turkey’s View of America 
 
Just as America has historical and current misconceptions—or complete lack of 
understanding—about Turkey, the problem exists in reverse. Except for a few top-level 
universities recently, Turkish schools do not study America, as a government or from the 
viewpoint of its foreign policy. American studies is confined to literature, or social 
studies at best. Outside of the classroom, Turks learn of America via Hollywood movies, 
video games, Burger King, and Starbucks.  
The other main venue of information about America is politics, which tends to get 
blown out of proportion, as when Johnson’s 1964 letter, which hinted rather broadly at a 
U.S. unwillingness to come to Turkey’s rescue, caused such an uproar that rumors of a 
U.S. forceful attack on Turkey began to fly.350 Turkish government administrations have 
not made great efforts to promote the image of alliance and friendship to the Turkish 
public. Instead, it has become fashionable to be anti-American. Politicians, journalists, 
and students seem especially outspoken about it.  
The statistics are troubling. “Polls after polls confirm that growing numbers of 
Turks perceive their NATO ally more as a national security threat, rather than a strategic 
partner.”351 A recent Pew Research Center poll analysis coincided with the Pope’s visit to 
Turkey in 2006.352 The article analyzing the results mostly provides shocking statistics on 
how many Turks have an unfavorable view of the U.S., have no confidence in President 
Bush, and rate Americans negatively. Roughly two-thirds of Turks see Westerners as 
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violent, selfish, arrogant, and fanatical.353 Furthermore, 77% of Turks oppose the U.S.-led 
“war” on terrorism, which Turks perceive as working against them rather than with them, 
and as being directed against only America’s terror enemies rather than terror enemies in 
the world as a whole.354 Moreover, Turks’ anti-Americanism is greater than that of other 
European countries surveyed—more on-par with the Muslim World, with which America 
often groups it.355 Whenever Turkey is categorized with other countries, it is either 
“Middle East,” “Muslim World,” or “Conflict Area.” This might reveal how the U.S. 
perceives Turkey in terms of regional affiliation and strategic placement, but maybe these 
statistics reveal that America is correct to group it this way.  
Quantitative results from an informal poll among female graduate students in 
early 2007 reveal similar outcomes. When answering the question “How do Turks in 
general usually think of Americans?” answers were mostly negative. “Too self-assured, 
indifferent, and covetous/greedy,” wrote one respondent, while another said, “a large 
amount are below average,” and another, “ignorant.” But several refused to answer the 
questions, often citing the reason that they did not want to generalize, and others were 
more positive. This shows hope. One respondent even wrote that Americans are “hard-
working.” Still, even in the negative answers, the adjectives are not hateful, showing an 
anti-Americanism that is not radical or dangerous, and that can still be curbed.  
  
6.2.2 Turkey Does Not “Get” America 
 
Multiple scholars and authors point to an injurious lack of understanding, on the 
Turks’ part, of American policies and processes. “To be sure, many Turks misjudge 
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American strategy and intentions with regard to Kurdish separatism and Iraq. Successive 
American administrations have made clear that the United States does not…threaten the 
integrity and security of a NATO ally.”356 A well-spoken Turk advising U.S. 
Congressional representatives explained the understanding gap across the ocean:  
It is really about the long-term vision the United States has in the broader Middle 
East … and the support for democracy and freedom initiatives, which have not 
been correctly understood in Turkey. Instead, they are feared and associated with 
wars and with instability around Turkey … there has to be a much more deeper 
engagement, maybe at the Administration as well as the congressional level, on 
working with the Turks about the vision. The democracy and freedom agenda is 
debated in the United States as well, and when it crosses the Atlantic and comes 
to Turkey, it only leads to terrible speculations and concerns and, in fact, to 
Turkish lack of cooperation on a whole set of issues that actually would be in 
Turkey’s interest as well, if they understood what the vision was.357 (emphasis 
added) 
 
But then again, for the Turks, confusion and mistrust of America’s intentions is hard to 
avoid when mixed messages abound. A recent article in The New Anatolian published 
what appears to be an exposé by an American that the U.S. is deceiving Turkey. 358 Scott 
Sullivan, identified to readers only as a “former Washington government employee,”359 is 
cited from a different, and rather obscure, petroleum website that, “Turkey now knows, if 
it had any lingering doubts, that the U.S. favors an independent Kurdistan,” and that “The 
U.S. has demonstrated that it is prepared to deceive Turkey about its pro-Kurdish 
stance… U.S. assurances that it will restrain the PKK in Kirkuk are worthless and are 
humiliating for Turkey, while emboldening the PKK, when Turkey accepts them.” 
                                                 
356
 Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics,” Survival 48:3 (Autumn 
2006), 88. 
357
 Zeyno Baran (response to a question during House Subcommittee, The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations, 
Ibid), 34. 
358
 “Former US Government Employee: Turkey Must Strike Immediately to Take Kirkuk,” The New 
Anatolian, 01 March 2007.  
359
 He is also a columnist on the website http://www.t
 144 
Articles like this are published without any backup sources or ever direct correspondence 
with this “informant.” 
Policy is not the only point of misunderstanding. The political process is just as 
misinterpreted: spoken by a Turk who was a former ambassador to the U.S., 
…the abstruse American political system and the institutionalized conflict 
between the executive and the legislature are not comprehended by the average 
Turkish citizen, and the distinction appears largely irrelevant to the Turkish press, 
which views the consequences of the American foreign policymaking process as 
more significant than the process itself.360 
 
Writing seventeen years after Elekdağ’s speech, Kirişçi concurs on this issue: “an 
important source of Turkish resentment toward U.S. policies on several issues—including 
Turkish human rights, the Armenian problem, Cyprus, and Greek-Turkish relations—
stems from Turkish decisionmakers’ failure to appreciate the role of the Congress and 
civil society in crafting U.S. foreign policy.”361 This misunderstanding is more than a 
minor lack of information, because it means no effective Turkish lobby in the U.S., where 
ethnic lobbies against Turkey, in contrast, have quite a powerful voice. 
 
6.3  A Real Issue: The Kurdish Problem  
This thesis has outlined the complexity of Turkish identity. Now this will be 
applied to the example of the “Kurdish Question,” as it is commonly labeled. This section 
will address the issue of the 12 – 15 million Kurds who live in Turkey and particularly 
the segment within the Kurds who refuse to adopt362 Turkish nationality.363 The analysis 
thus far has demonstrated the complexity of the Kurdish issue. Below is an effort to comb 
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through the reasons the Kurds are a “problem” or “question” in Turkey, instead of just 
part of the population, and to shed light on the Western contribution to the problem as 
well. There is much need for understanding between the two. Misunderstanding often 
leads to conflict, and the current Kurdish problem in Turkey, and how it is interpreted in 
the West, is no exception. What seems at first obvious and clear-cut from a Western 
perspective takes on new shades and colors when seen through the frame of trying to 
understand the Turkish identity and people. This happened for me as I studied Turkey’s 
relative homogeneity or diversity.  
As has been examined throughout this thesis, Turks’ understanding of their 
nation’s makeup and identity is completely different from the Western mindset: 
“…perceptions and misperceptions abound. Turkey is overly sensitive about 
disintegration…Western Europeans, especially during the last decade, believe that they 
have reached the highest level of political, economic and humanitarian systems 
possible.”364 Regarding the Kurds, or most other Muslim minorities in Turkey, ethnicity 
was not a factor at the foundation of the republic, and they were welcomed and invited to 
join in becoming Turkish in nationality. In fact, to say “minorities” is even misleading 
and exhibits a Western viewpoint, for many Turks today do not see it that way at all: 
In Turkey, there is an estimated population of about 12 million people of Kurdish 
origin constituting about one-fifth of Turkey’s population. Problems basically 
centre around the recognition of the separate cultural identity of the Kurdish 
population and the use of the Kurdish language…The Turkish government does 
not recognize Kurds as a separate minority; and views the problem as being one 
of military conflict.365  
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This is still the case, although the outlook is somewhat jumbled now with the Western 
influence of ethnic minority protection and human rights. A lack of understanding 
pervades all this. The West raises positive values, like rights and freedoms, with 
presumably good intentions. But problems arise when these countries do not even have 
the concept of ethnic minorities,366 except as imported from the West, and thus it leads to 
fragmentation of a unit the people once thought was whole. But the case of how Turks 
identify their nation today is largely informed by the same values of the past 
 
6.3.1 Facing Kurdish Nationalism 
 
But what of the Kurds? “The Republic naturally reflected an ethnic mosaic 
because of the Ottoman heritage; the shrinking borders had brought in Muslim émigrés of 
many different ethnic backgrounds. Kurdish nationalism was eschewed both deliberately 
and subconsciously.”367 Some Kurds chose to integrate into Turkishness. Those who did 
were assisted by government measures to educate everyone in how to be a Turk and how 
to fit into the newly packaged Turkish identity. The wealthy Kurds, especially, had their 
kids sent to schools in the big cities that taught integration, but some Kurds chose not to 
integrate. “The Republicans defined nationalism, not as one based on race, ethnicity, or 
religion, but on a common culture of nationality, of being united during good times and 
bad. Nationalism…was not accepted by all the Kurds at the time…. Denialism was to 
make it formidably difficult.”368 Some Kurds revolted and were quickly put down by the 
nationalists, as mentioned in earlier chapters. This violent squashing of opposition was 
later explained—and still is explained—to Turks as a “British provocation,” which 
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Taşpınar attributes to simplistic reductionism. According to him, it is a resistance to 
assimilation and centralization that constitutes the heart of the matter.369 (Whether it was 
assimilation or mere integration that was asked of the Kurds is another hot topic in itself.)  
Other Kurds stayed quietly determined, through multiple generations, to keep 
their identity as Kurd instead of Turk. Observations by journalist Stephen Kinzer, while 
dramatic, present a picture of the continuing separateness of identity. He records the 
translated words of an old man in Diyarbakır, a traditionally Kurdish city of southeast 
Turkey: 
‘Even though it is dangerous for me to say this, I have been greatly 
oppressed in my lifetime,’ he told me as he leaned his chin on his wooden cane. ‘I 
have been tortured many times. One of my sons died after forty days of torture by 
the police. All of this has happened to me and to so many of us because we claim 
our rights. Kurds don’t even have minority rights in a region where we are the 
majority. But we have to keep demanding them. We can’t stop…Each generation 
produces a leader who fights for our rights.’ 
Sitting silently nearby, taking it all in, were a handful of earnest-looking 
teenagers. They are the new generation of Kurds, eagerly absorbing stories that 
fire their political commitment…I had the sense of a torch being passed. As long 
as Kurdish consciousness is nourished this way, no amount of military or political 
pressure applied by the Turkish authorities will be able to pacify these people.370  
 
Smith’s assertion, mentioned in chapter 5, that there are very few actual nation-
states, in the true sense of the term, is revealing. Turkey seems to fall in this category—
hoping and assuming itself to be a true nation-state, with the political unit and borders of 
nationality perfectly overlapping—but it is not. It is heterogeneous. And yet, since the 
start of the republic, Kurds were not acknowledged. They were not treated poorly, but 
simply, in Turks’ minds, as equals—as fellow Turks. Taşpınar simplifies it in one 
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sentence: “Kürt varlığını kabul etmeyen, laik bir ulus-devlet ortaya çıkmış.” (A secular 
nation-state that does not accept the existence of Kurds came into the picture.)371  
 
6.3.2 Turkish versus Western Views 
 
Thus some Turks operate with the assumption of homogeneity, perhaps quite 
validly, for it is what they have always known and been taught, and their actions based on 
this assumption come to appear as repression of the Kurds—especially to Western eyes. 
But most Turks tend to see it as a matter of inclusion versus exclusion, and thus in their 
own eyes they are playing the “good guy” role of including the people of Kurdish origin 
in the privilege of being a Turk. Columnist İlnur Çevik recently wrote about the issue as 
it affects current events today, saying “We are against exclusion and we support 
inclusion. We believe in showing our Kurdish brothers and sisters that we see them as a 
part of us….”372 In reality, there is generally not a sense of racism accompanied by forced 
assimilation, but a deeply felt fundamental belief that Kurds in Turkey simply are 
Turks.373 It is not as black and white as the West, or Turkey for that matter, might think.  
A good example to illustrate this is former President of Turkey, the late Turgut 
Özal. Easily one of Turkey’s most popular presidents, he was also a Kurd. If by being 
Kurdish, Özal was considered an outsider of a different race or nationality, he could 
hardly have been elected to lead Turkey. One of the primary characteristics of a 
sovereign nation is refusal to allow outsiders to be in leadership posts.374 Thus, Özal was 
Turkish. He was Turk, but he was of Kurdish origin: a Turk and a Kurd. Not either/or, 
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but both,375 like being a Japanese American or Italian American. The problem is, some 
Kurds are not content to have “Turk” in their title, and some nationalistic Turks are not 
content with those same people keeping “Kurd” in their identity title.  
As explained throughout this thesis, and relevant to the conflict-ridden issue at 
hand, Mustafa Kemal tried to make Turkey fit into a perfect nation-state. He intended for 
the political borders of the state to encase a group of people who all embraced Turkish 
nationality. The incentive for such congruence is powerful: 
The nationalist principle requires that the political unit and the ‘ethnic’ one be 
congruent. In other words, given that ethnicity is basically defined in terms of 
shared cultures, it demands that everyone, or very nearly everyone, within the 
political unit be of the same culture, and that all those of the same culture be 
within the same political unit. Simply put: one culture, one state.376 
 
Kemal’s efforts worked for the most part, through peaceful means and sometimes force. 
He attempted this—for better or for worse depending on one’s angle—by making “Turk” 
into a supra-ethnic, culturally and religiously based category. What results is an 
ethnically diverse but cultural-nationally homogenous (in theory) country, which worked 
since ethnicity as a separate category was not in their vocabulary.377  
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On the opposite side, the findings of a European author writing as an observer 
about the republic shortly after its founding are incredibly revealing of the differing 
views of how it all happened:  
From the national and religious point of view, Turkey had become an 
almost homogenous state. The Christian minorities hardly existed any longer… 
Today there are neither Greeks nor Armenians left in Asia Minor; the only 
national minority still existing is composed of the Kurds, in number about 
1,200,000. Mustafa Kemal has made an effort to solve their problem by trying to 
make Turks of them. He has pressed his action with cruel determination. In 
sanguinary fights his incomparably superior army has succeeded in quelling the 
repeated risings of the Kurds, who cherish their liberty; and for the time being 
their rebellious spirit has been broken. There was no room for national minorities 
in the Europeanized national state which Mustafa Kemal created, and none have 
been tolerated.378  
 
Thus, Kemal’s actions worked in theory, but problems resulted then, manifested in 
uprisings and revolts, and result even more in a world where today the definitions of 
nationality and ethnicity everywhere blur together, and where some of this country’s 
constituents clearly place their ethnic identity over their national one. According to the 
“Biz Kimiz?” (Who are we?) series in the newspaper Milliyet in March 2007, only 39.2% 
of those who identified themselves as ‘Kurd’ in a survey said they feel they can live out 
their identity, however they define it personally, with freedom and peace. The rest said 
that in regard to living their identity, “there are some problems” (33.4%), “there are legal 
barriers” (22.7%), and “there are barriers from my environment” (4.7%).379 In terms of a 
solution, today, “Kurdish nationalism can only be satisfied in a pluralistic society,”380 but 
Turkey overall does not view itself as pluralistic or diverse. 
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In short, Turkey does not have homogeneity, but it can have unity. That unity 
must be pursued, however, apart from a desire for homogeneity. Nevertheless, what 
should be a drive for unity—a healthy goal—within this diversity gets interpreted by 
many as an unhealthy preservation of nationalism and drive for homogeneity—an 
unhealthy goal if it is not the reality. The West then views all this as human rights 
violations, and Turks look at the same situation as a valid threat of separatism. Whether 
each side is right or wrong is not clear, but what is clear is that a lack of understanding 
produces much violence and condemnation. This Kurdish issue is just one important area, 
but what is required is more general understanding, in both directions, beyond this issue.  
 
6.4  Reaching the American Political Machine 
If America’s role in this, based on what has been argued, is to understand Turkey 
better, it follows that Turkey needs to take action as well. It could help America 
understand better, but it requires Turkey comprehending the U.S. politics and entering 
into the system, as has been starting to happen quite recently. This can be done through 
lobbying on American soil, or by a clearer message conveyed from Turkish soil. 
 
6.4.1 In America 
 
 In the U.S., lobbying plays an extremely influential role in Washington. Some 
say Turks do not have the lobbying mentality. One small explanation might be that the 
concept itself is shady. The Turkish term for the verb ‘to lobby’ (kulis yapmak) is a 
combination of the word for ‘backstage’ and the verb ‘to do’—so it is like ‘to do 
backstage,’ which sounds dubiously deceptive, not at all a neutral term. Meanwhile, the 
English homonym conveys the idea of openness and transparency, as the ‘lobby’ of a 
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building is open to everyone and not at all concealed. Some Turks are frustrated by the 
idea that successful lobbying is a condition to having a good relationship with America. It 
does not seem natural. Another explanation might be the Turkish attitude that it is the 
government’s job to do government work, and not up to the average citizen to interfere. If 
interference is needed, the military will do it. 
Turkey expert David Barchard emphasizes how much this hurts Turkey in the big 
picture. “The Turkish Diaspora, especially embassies abroad in the West, and Turkey 
itself aren’t doing a good job of networking, spending money, hosting diplomats, 
bankers, politicians, and journalists,” he explained to a mostly-Turkish student 
audience.381 As recently as 2001, the Turkish Diaspora in America was generally 
considered scattered and unorganized: 
Despite growing Turkish visibility in American society…the Turkish American 
population remains largely unknown and undocumented. Questions about their 
socio-economic status, their integration in American society, their relations with 
other groups, their organizations, the interest they have in Turkish American 
affairs, and most importantly, the roles they play in promoting Turkish culture and 
Turkish interests in the United States have not yet been examined.382  
 
The Greeks and Armenians in America, by contrast, have long been doing a steady job of 
convening and lobbying, often to the detriment of Turkish-American relations.  
A question puzzling many Turkish scholars is why the Turks, even after having 
realized the value of this political activity, do not lobby very effectively in America. 
Rather than any sort of purposeful policy choice, the lack of a thriving Turkish lobby is 
the result of natural circumstances. An in-depth article published in 2004 by Şuhnaz 
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Yılmaz entitled “Impact of Lobbies on Turkish-American Relations,” elaborates on the 
Turkish lobby, a “relative latecomer to the Washington lobbying scene”: 
Due to the absence of a large Turkish-American community, the configuration of 
the Turkish lobby differs significantly from its Greek, Armenian, and Jewish 
counterparts. Because of its size, the Turkish community is at a highly 
disadvantageous position regarding its base of support and grass-roots action 
capabilities. The Turkish community numbers around 300,000-350,000 people. 
Unlike the Greek, Armenian and Jewish groups, who started immigrating to the 
US in large numbers at the turn of the twentieth century, most of the Turks are 
either first- or second-generation immigrants. The Turkish community mainly 
consists of middle-class and upper middle-class families. While attempting to join 
mainstream American society, most of the Turks try to maintain their Turkish 
identity, traditions, and culture. Religion is also a more private affair for the 
Muslim Turkish community, unlike the Greeks and Armenians, who, through 
their Christian identity, share an important common denominator with most of 
American society.383 
 
One of the keywords here is “grass-roots,” which can be defined as “the identification, 
recruitment, and mobilization of constituent-based political strength capable of 
influencing political decisions.”384 But in Turkey, “grass-roots democracy is not a 
tradition,” explained Criss. “We don’t have it in Turkey so we don’t know how to use it 
in the U.S. either,” added political science professor Aylin Güney.385 In Turkey, political 
activism and volunteering tends to be limited to older ladies, not seen as a duty of 
individuals from a broad range of views.  
The Armenian lobby, by contrast, “founded the Armenian Assembly of America 
as a grass-roots organization in 1972. It grades members of Congress on votes concerning 
Armenia.”386 One of the chief goals of the Armenian lobby is to get Congress to pass a 
resolution officially labeling and condemning the event of 1915 as “genocide.” Greek 
                                                 
383
 Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Impact of Lobbies on Turkish-American Relations,” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı 
Erhan, eds. Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London & New York: Routledge, 
2004), 195. 
384
 Yılmaz, 182. 
385
 Roundtable discussion, Bilkent University, May 2007.  
386
 Kamer Kasım, “US Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American Relations,” in 
Aydın and Erhan, Ibid, 143. 
 154 
lobbies then center largely around conflicts with Turkey regarding the Aegean Sea and 
the island Cyprus, both of which are huge sore spots in the Turkish-Greek relationship.  
Against all this, Turkey’s government “might seek to develop a stronger proactive 
lobbying effort on its own behalf, advancing its case through educational or other 
outreach programmes aimed at members of the House and Senate.”387 While there is at 
least some effort at a Turkish lobby currently,388 the fact remains that Greek and 
Armenian lobbies have had more success in producing results favorable to their causes. 
 
6.4.2 From Turkey 
 
Barchard also asserts that the Turks must learn how to better court international 
opinion, such as making some of their placards in English when they have political 
demonstrations. That way, the foreign press can pick up on the message and it can be 
conveyed to the West. Write on your posters “No more veils and the right to drink wine!” 
or “We want freedom!” he suggests. “Turks need to improve their English terminology—
you need to get into the mindset of him to whom you’re trying to convey the message.”389 
The American Embassy’s Cultural Affairs Officer, Elizabeth McKay, said that Turkey 
“does not play its cards well, and it has a full deck to play.” She echoed the idea that 
Americans are not favorable toward Turkey because Turks are not reaching American 
minds: “They don’t tell their story well. They let others tell their story.”390 Barchard also 
conveyed the idea that thousands of protestors draped in Turkish flags (as has been the 
case at recent political demonstrations in Turkey’s major cities) might look like a proud 
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display of solidarity to Turks, but it looks frightfully nationalistic to the West, which does 
not always comprehend that by waving the flags and posters of Atatürk, a Turk is trying 
to convey a message of secularism and modernity.391 The flag appears Islamic and many 
Westerners do not know Atatürk. 
 
6.5  Promoting Understanding 
 
A poster in various rooms of the main library at Bilkent University, the top 
private university in Turkey, reads “Okumanın bittiği yerde şiddet başlar.” (Where 
reading stops, violence starts.) A more appropriate phrase in the context of this paper 
might read: “Where understanding stops, hatred starts.” This section will provide some 
follow through on the understanding factor, including increased sensitivity, person-to-
person contacts below the government level, scholarship in each country on the other, 
visits between the countries, and public relations efforts. In the end, both countries need 
to grow and mature in their perspectives in order to make headway.  
 
6.5.1  A More Sensitive Approach 
 
The idea that the U.S. does not understand Turkey is emphasized by American 
and Turkish authors alike. Criss writes of the “American government’s failures to respect 
Turkey’s own geo-political concerns and to understand how Turkey seeks to balance…” 
(emphasis added)392 Taşpınar describes “Turkey’s identity dilemma” which has been 
overlooked by America and by Turkey because of the mask of the Cold War that 
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artificially bound them into an alliance of supposed like-minded ideology.393 As a result, 
America did not understand Turkey from the outset of their relationship, and the identity 
dilemma “was neither addressed by nor carried onto the U.S. agenda during the Cold War 
years.”394 In a passionate speech in 2003 to the Turkish-American Association, Akif Işık 
asserts that the U.S. misunderstands Turkey, and needs to adopt a more caring and gentle 
approach to its valuable ally. The bottom line of his diatribe was this: “The U.S. 
administration should be more sensitive towards Turkey’s security concerns,” otherwise 
Turkey will be forced to look elsewhere for international partnerships.395  
In another published speech to the Turkish-American Association, this time by the 
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey in 2000, the concept of understanding is mentioned. Quite 
interestingly, in listing “three strong impressions” Westerners have of Turkey, the first 
one he notes is that “people understand Turkey’s importance to the region.”396 
Revealingly, the “understanding” mentioned by other authors was there, but not in the 
way they would hope for: some Americans understand Turkey’s importance, but do not 
understand Turkey. This is not helped by Turkish politicians’ pandering to the America’s 
geostrategic carrots. When Özal, for example, had a tendency to play back everything the 
U.S. State Department had offered, it appeared as though Turks not only agreed with all 
the characterizations, but maybe even came up with them on their own: 
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Turkey is a country situated in the extreme west of Asia and extreme south of 
Europe. Therefore, this country, geographically, constitutes an intersection of two 
socially and culturally different worlds. Turkish people have successfully 
compromised and integrated those differences in this society. So, Turkey is a 
cultural bridge between East and West. Turkey is also an economic bridge 
between the technology-rich West and oil-rich Mid-East and the developed North 
and developing South… this dual affiliation of Turkey is an advantage especially 
for the Western countries.397 (emphasis added) 
 
Özal clearly delivered such a message for the sake of America continuing to see Turkey 
as advantageous to itself. In short, the U.S. sees a Turkey that fits into crisp geostrategic 
metaphors and whose strategic and political importance will continue to grow. But does 
the U.S. see anything deeper? 
This reality has been enormously problematic, and though it was recognized 
decades ago by more insightful individuals, their voices were apparently too small to be 
heard. “From the American perspective, the US must revise the assumptions that have 
guided its relations with Turkey since World War II,”398 wrote Francis P. Butler, who 
was raised partially in Turkey and attended the Turkish War College. It is the experience 
of individuals like Butler—who have lived in Turkey and know more than what can be 
observed by mapping a game board on the globe—that is invaluable. In 1980 he wrote: 
Two questions need to be resolved at this point. In view of the changed 
assumptions as discussed above, what will be Turkey’s actions and policies in the 
community of nations in the future? And what can the US do to guide its 
developing relationship with Turkey into policy as favorable as possible for itself? 
The order in which these questions are asked does make a difference: No longer 
may the US ordain general policy and expect Turkish policy to conform. Turkey 
intends to develop policy independent of US interests, an intention which must 
necessarily alter the approach the US takes to its ally.399 (emphasis added) 
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Such prudence has gone unheeded in the decades since Butler wrote that.  
 
6.5.2 Seeking Texture 
 
In understanding all this, America can see where and how Turkey feels threatened 
by it. In the areas of sovereignty and nationhood, in Turkey’s strong state tradition and its 
self-determinism, America appears to be interfering and encroaching. Its activities in 
Turkey’s border states are unnerving, as evidenced in an outrageous but wildly popular 
recent novel that tells a shocking tale of America moving from Iraqi invasion to Turkish 
invasion, with greedy eyes set on Turkish boracite mines. Metal Fırtına (Metal Storm)400 
may have been sensational fiction, but Turks bought a half million copies, as it fits with 
the theme of the day that America is overstepping its bounds; any nation must fear that it 
could be next.  
In the past five years, and especially after the March 2003 decision not to allow 
American troops to invade Iraq from Turkey’s İncirlik base, it has been very fashionable 
to be anti-American in Turkey, especially among the youth.401 To Turkish youth, 
America is somewhere between a menace and a threat, falling neatly into their political 
lessons on a “rogue state.” In the midst of this, the strength of governmental ties appears 
quite feeble. “What can be done together to strengthen and enhance relations between our 
countries and our peoples?” the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, asked at a 
conference. He described the “Privatization of U.S.-Turkish relations,” which means 
people-to-people contact among the two publics: universities, sister cities, and other real-
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life interactions. “There’s not enough texture there—private texture that provides balance 
when government-to-government relations hit some potholes and turbulence.”402 
Unfortunately the texture that was once there has been lost. For decades, the 
texture was there in some small form. As mentioned above, Americans were present and 
overall well-liked and accepted in Turkey as missionaries, relief workers, educators, 
doctors, government specialists, and journalists throughout the waning years of the 
empire and the foundational years of the republic.403 Turks were in America too. One 
Turkish girl wrote of her experiences, after a trip to America in the 1910s, in a novel 
Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl: 
Here in America lived a legend made of blood and thunder. The ‘Terrible Turk’ 
ruled the minds of the American. A huge person with fierce black eyes and bushy 
eyebrows, carrying daggers covered with blood. I did not fit into the legend of the 
‘Terrible Turk’ so I was not one. In fact many people were disappointed to meet a 
real true Turk who turns out to be fair, meek and not very unlike an American.404 
 
It often takes real people to dispel myths. Stories like this—which do not sound too 
unlike a role reversal of some of the experiences I have had as an American in Turkey 
today—prove that residents in each country know stereotypes and preconceptions and 
generalizations about people in the other, but do not really know their identity. They are 
surprised when they meet a citizen from that country who does not fit the identity mold in 
their minds. But the opportunity for meeting citizens is rare on both sides. The Turkish 
Diaspora in America is not making itself known, and Americans in Turkey, especially 
outside of the three major cities, are few and far between.  
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In comparison to today, many more Americans once lived in Turkey. From  the 
start of Turkey’s participation in NATO in 1952, there was heavy American presence, 
propaganda, and popularity in Turkey: 
From the 1950s through the 1970s, Americans had wide access to the Turkish 
society by living among the Turks. Many middle class apartments in Ankara and 
Izmir had at least one American family resident. And even if the Turkish families 
could not speak English, their children were beginning to study it as a second 
language. Short of linguistic aptitude, the medium of reciprocal hospitality was 
the common language. Probably, similar informal contacts took place in Turkish 
provincial cities where several US bases were located.405 
 
Now, however, “privatized” cultural relations are slim. Misunderstanding reigns, and not 
just on America’s side. As Mark Parris, another former ambassador to Turkey, pointed 
out at a 2005 congressional hearing, the “first lesson is that this relationship, even less 
than most, does not run on auto pilot.”406 
 
6.5.3 Increased Scholarship and Dialogue 
 
Turks and Americans have very different worldviews. Consequently, 
understanding occurs all too easily. One remedy might be more in-depth scholarship. “So 
long as intellectuals who work on Turkey don’t know the language or the literature, how 
can anyone really understand Turkey?”407 Finally, the scholarship in each country on the 
other one is inadequate. As stated above, Turks’ main vein of learning about America is 
through popular culture and films (and a biased media). Everybody remembers the 
inflammatory issues—the “body blows”—but nobody studies these, with a determination 
to understand why they actually happened, and dig a little beneath the surface story that 
the media sensationalizes. “In this culture, critical thinking is not cultivated. People think 
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they know America when they don’t.”408 Americans, as mentioned above, know very 
little, if anything, about Turkey. Turkish or Ottoman studies is no longer funded in the 
U.S. as it was in the past. Scholarship and government are too intertwined; federal 
funding for studies goes up and down depending on America’s foreign policy priorities—
like oil flow, terrorism, or Islamic extremism. “Even then, studies that result from 
fashionable topics are instrumental at best or message laden at worst.”409 
The upper echelons of American public diplomacy in Turkey advocate learning 
and dialogue whole-heartedly. Nancy McEldowney, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 
Embassy in Ankara, points out that to improve the image of America in Turkey, “the 
solution is not advertising. It’s understanding, being prepared to enter into a dialogue. Be 
willing to overcome the idea that ‘If you disagree with me, you’re not only wrong, but 
there’s something wrong with you.’”410 Ambassador Wilson talks about “confidence-
building,” to put this into action. He advocates “getting our senior people together for 
meetings—meetings where people actually listen to what the others say, not just stuffy 
VIP meetings.”411 
 
6.5.4 Visits Between Countries 
 
In the past, there were more U.S. citizens in Turkey: Erhan writes that American 
presence in Turkey in the early part of the twentieth century helped to dispel the “Terrible 
Turk” myth back home. American visitors in Turkey “provided an important outlet in 
publicizing Turkey in the US and means of promoting closer ties between the two 
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countries.”412 Of course, the presence of Americans in Turkey or Turks in America could 
always have the potential to backfire. Turks are highly present in Europe, especially 
Germany, but that does not lead to German favorability toward Turks and Turkey overall. 
Additionally, the idea of sending people could be construed as imperialism, especially if 
coming from America. Even so, it is always dependent on whether the people sent are 
well liked and well received.  
Ambassador Wilson heavily stresses this point of human exchange—“getting 
more Americans here”—and his embassy in Ankara promotes it as well. Statements on 
the website encourage Americans to come to Turkey for tourism, while the official 
programs bring Fulbright scholars and English teachers to all parts of Turkey. Still, 
Turkey is not high on Americans’ tourism list, and there is very little civilian-to-civilian 
contact. As for Turks visiting America, there is a much greater number going in that 
direction; in fact, there are an average of 12,000 Turks in America per year only as 
students, aside from tourism and visits to family/friends, and trips for other purposes. 
These Turks have a much greater understanding of America and its culture and identity, 
but they are not doing much to promote a positive view of America in Turkey, said the 
Cultural Affairs Officer Elizabeth McKay. We want them to speak up, she said. “They 
need to build an alumni organization.” McKay also said that the biggest division between 
Turks and Americans is “preconceptions—being uninformed about each other.” She said 
Americans are guilty of believing stereotypes and of a lack of awareness. “And both sides 
are guilty.”413  
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 Meanwhile, Turks have no incentive to build such an alumni group—if they do 
not have a trend of organizing and lobbying for their own country (in the U.S.) are they 
going to do it for another country? And even if they did, these embassy soft power and 
people power measures are a good tactic for trying to eradicate anti-Americanism as 
much as possible, but they will not harness political support in the long run.414 American 
soft power/propaganda was a deliberate Cold War policy. It worked then but did not 
necessarily translate into longer-term political support. Oddly, what does seem to work is 
not “backstaging” or persuading, but personal visits and sincere emotional connection: 
For example, the genuine affection of the Turkish people for Bill Clinton stems 
not from any policy decisions that he made in regard to Turkey when he was 
President but rather from the simple human act of picking up a Turkish baby and 
allowing it to play with his nose when he was visiting the region struck by the 
devastating 1999 earthquake.415 
 
Turkey’s news stations have a tendency to replay powerful scenes for the Turks over and 
over again, entrenching coverage in the collective mind. If America better understood the 
Turkish mindset and culture, its current leaders could build bridges in this way.  
 
6.6  Growth and Maturity 
 Both countries need to grow and mature in this process. Americans, especially 
policymakers and diplomats, need to appreciate Turkey’s differing view, with an 
awareness of historical background. Turkey, on the other hand, needs to mature in 
valuing diversity, let Kemalism blossom and develop, and move away from conformity to 
past tradition if necessary. Atatürk didn’t intend for everything to remain the same and be 
set in stone, so Turkey needs to be able to grow and change beyond what he prescribed, 
just as he advocated. “Ataturk himself, an avid reformer and one of the greatest 
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visionaries of the 20th century, would surely resent his artificial image of stern ultra-
conservative as crafted for him by contemporary nationalists.”416 
 The U.S., for its part, misses out on vital elements of nationhood and identity 
when it only considers a country strategically. In fact, a low understanding of identity 
taints strategic imperatives, with the result being that no one wins the day. Despite the 
constraints of realpolitik in international relations, the Turks have a high sensitivity to 
U.S. perceptions, and an emotion-ridden past experience. “The task of the United States 
is to be aware of such emotionalism in Turkey and to acknowledge it in ways that are 
positive and productive for both countries.”417 
 If both sides grow in these ways, they can meet in the middle, but if these 
impediments continue, anti-Americanism is going to grow in Turkey and both sides will 
be injured. America is going to continue to face an “unreliable geostrategic ally.” 
Although this terminology does not facilitate understanding, I recognize this is what top 
U.S. officials are ultimately seeking. America will continue to “lose” Turkey, as many 
analysts have described the situation. And Turkey, for its part, is going to be hindered in 
its Western ambitions—the entire front half of its identity as put forth by Atatürk and 
depicted in the horse analogy. Modernization and civilization in the Western direction 
require that Turkey is understood in the West. But in the West’s perception, currently, 
one of Sakarya’s hind legs, homogeneity, is unfortunately impeding its front, forward-
moving legs.   
 Creatures that live must change and grow. Movement and blood flow, not 
stagnancy, characterize a living animal. As body parts and environmental circumstances 
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change, it must adapt. Organisms either grow or die; they cannot remain the same. As a 
tree grows, it changes shape and appearance, but it is still the same tree. This is also true 
for a horse. Blossoming, adaptation, and growth are positive actions. 
 Creatures that live are also complicated. They have intricate systems with 
complex functioning. Biologists seek to understand these systems. They study, 
investigate, diagram, and explain these organisms to the rest of us. Could we benefit from 
“nation biologists,” armed with the task of dissecting national identity, in order to 
promote foreign relations? It is not a pure, natural science, but perhaps country leaders 
and decisionmakers could profit from a separate science for the strange animal of the 
nation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
“No major country in the Middle East has been less studied by American scholars 
or more ignored by the American media,” commented Alvin Z. Rubenstein of the 
University of Pennsylvania, referring to U.S. ignorance of Turkey. “Turkey is simply the 
most important country in the Middle East,” he added.418 
With that, I peeled away the film of geopolitical strategy and embarked on a study 
of Turkish identity. Trying to pin down a nation’s identity is virtually impossible, but in 
studying it, valuable lessons can be learned. This thesis has covered a broad and often 
unwieldy topic, but has developed a model and some conclusions to promote 
understanding. 
 
7.1  Theoretical Additions 
 I developed a conceptual framework for understanding Turkish identity in a 
metaphorical way. The horse figure, Sakarya, developed in this thesis attempts to take the 
hazy notion of Turkish identity and simplify it into a comprehensible model. This model 
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is largely based on the identity as Atatürk defined it 80 years ago, but the Turkish 
people’s fierce and continued devotion to this leader and his principles and directives 
means the model is still relevant, and applicable to today. However, it might need to 
change in the near future, as Turkey tries to adopt the norms of the European Union and 
globalization, both of which are presenting problems for the back half of the Sakarya 
model, particularly the hind leg of homogeneity.  
 Additionally, I add the state character into the model of national identity. If 
Turkey’s national identity, and thus the nation itself, is represented by the horse, then the 
horse is being led by the state—its institutions, laws, military, and international role. It is 
the state that governs the people of the nation, and the state that represents them in an 
international system. It is the task of the state (or jockey) to lead the nation (or horse) 
successfully.  
 
7.2  Findings 
 
7.2.1 State versus National Identity 
 
 A first conclusion reached through the course of this paper is the significant state-
nation disconnect. A recent political cartoon depicts Prime Minister Erdoğan running 
forward full-force with his arms wrapped around an EU flag, as if about to finish a race. 
In the next block, he runs smack into what looks like a soft wall, causing him to drop the 
flag and smash his face. In the third block, we see what he has struck: two huge feet 
(shown only up to the ankles) are planted on the ground, with the label “silent majority” 
(sessiz çoğunluk) written on the side of them. What looks at first glance like a scar on the 
tip of the left big toe is actually a miniscule Erdoğan who has just run into it.419 See 
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Appendix C. He is being criticized by the cartoonist for rushing ahead blindly, almost 
unthinkingly, while a gigantic silent majority opposes him.  
 However, on the same token, the leadership cannot just cater to the will of the 
people, as Ömer Taşpınar emphasizes in his discussion. He offers policy suggestions for 
Turkey to steer away from enmity with the U.S., but adds that the current administration 
“is unlikely to pursue such initiatives because of its preoccupation with Turkish public 
opinion.”420 Zeyno Baran, also based in Washington, D.C., makes a similar comment: 
“For their part, the Turkish leadership and influential opinion makers need to be more 
responsible and lead their people, rather than themselves being led by populism. If they 
believe in the United States-Turkish partnership, they need to nurture this partnership and 
defend it.”421 This goes in accordance with the idea that the dog should not be walking its 
owner. A leader should know the pulse of the public, but not be controlled by it. It is fair 
to say that this is a tough balancing act for the jockey, and few nations’ leaders get it 
quite right. Taşpınar too refers to the jockey’s job: “Of course, a successful foreign policy 
would desire the backing of the Turkish public. However, real leadership entails the 
ability to steer the population in the right direction” (emphasis added).422 
Turkey scholar Henri J. Barkey makes this same point, but pits it as government 
versus establishment, with a crisis and lack of trust between them: “…there is a serious 
crisis between, shall we say, the Turkish establishment and the current government. The 
establishment doesn’t trust the government and the government doesn’t trust the 
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establishment.”423 If one considers the government as representing the state,424 and the 
“establishment” as representing the people or nation, then this comment rings familiar. 
 
7.2.2 Geostrategy Not the Answer 
 
One of the clearest findings is that deeper answers do not lie in the field of 
geographic strategy. Ian O. Lesser’s most recent article, while presenting a turnaround 
from his former geographical emphasis on Turkey, still suggests that we take “steps that 
could bolster damaged perceptions on both sides and help to restore the strategic 
character of the relationship.”425 This first half of this phrase is heading in the right 
direction; the second half is lacking. The character of the relationship has always been 
“strategic”—the problem is that it has never made it much deeper.  I argue that instead of 
restoring the “strategic character” of the relationship, we see it as an issue not of strategic 
character, but of a deeper problem of identity. A relationship based on strategy was too 
shallow. It masked real problems,426 and it keeps the thinking narrow and outdated—
hindering understanding and creativity in problem solving. 
In a hearing before the U.S. Congress, Barkey seems more in-line with this new 
thinking: “…despite the overused ‘strategic relationship’ expression, the U.S. and Turkey 
have never managed to deepen their friendship beyond certain limits… The U.S. has not 
had with Turkey the same cultural, normative and historical bonds that it has with many 
European countries.”427 A distancing from Cold War strategic lingo will help each nation 
not only better understand the other, but also understand their own changing identities. 
                                                 
423
 Barkey (statement during House Subcommittee, The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations, Ibid), 13. 
424
 But sometimes rather than representing the state, the government may represent the umma—the Sunni 
religious community. This is continually an issue in Turkey.  
425
 Lesser, 92. 
426
 Lesser himself remarks on this earlier in the same article.  
427
 Henri J. Barkey (statement during House Subcommittee, The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations, Ibid), 16.  
 170 
World patterns are shifting and unstable, and Turkey especially is going through great 
pains of identity searching in its continued march toward westernization.  
In America, a post-Cold War triumphalism and sudden unipolarity has produced a 
nation unsure of how to handle its world leadership role. Some U.S. leaders expect the 
same Cold War alliances and faithfulness from NATO members. Thus on 1 March 2003, 
many in America were shocked when Turkey’s Parliament voted against opening its land 
for U.S. use in the war in Iraq. But this is the fruit of democracy being cultivated in 
Turkey; Turks, as represented by their parliament, will make their own decisions, even if 
they contrast with U.S. plans.  
Strategists, scholars, and policymakers who grew up under Cold War tutorial are 
often uncomfortable with such shifts in imperatives requiring attention, and particularly 
the need to study topics like identity when they expect good strategy to be sufficient. It is 
especially surprising with Turkey, where even the military, which once bore the 
American-Turkish relationship on its back, is no longer so pro-American. The 
expectations from the U.S. are met with disappointment. “They’re looking for things that 
are no longer there.”428 Later in the same aforementioned House hearing, Rep. Thaddeus 
McCotter added this to what the various Turkey experts had said:  
So it would seem to me that much of the problem that we are facing is the nature 
of a transforming relationship with the additions of new partners on each side, and 
I don’t know that you can find one single way to address that relationship, if, as 
the Prime Minister has pointed out, this is a mature and positive relationship. I 
think you would have to proceed from that premise that this is not the Cold War 
relationship that we had in the past.429 (emphasis added)  
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In this vein, Nancy McEldowney, last year, emphasized the use of “soft power” in the 
relationship, whereas in her student days, “I was ignoring that and counting nuclear 
weapons.”430 New forms of approach, and therefore study, have developed. 
It must be added that some officials in the U.S. government are taking steps 
toward understanding Turkish identity. Insightful strategists have stopped focusing on 
simplistic Cold War analogies and moved to the realm of caring about Turks’ 
international frustration, humiliation, and—most of all—identity: 
The volatility of debate has given rise to and coincided with an undercurrent of 
popular nationalism, frustration with Europe, and even anti-Americanism. One 
cause of these trends is Turkish citizens' frustration with PKK terrorism from Iraq, 
and a popular belief that the United States could do more to combat the PKK 
terrorists, whom Turks view as the greatest threat to their national security. 
Another cause is the identity crisis dominating Turkish society as Turkey strives 
for admission in the European Union. Many Turks feel humiliated by what they 
perceive as the shifting of accession requirements by the EU...431 
 
Clearly, feelings and frustrations get stirred into the current political events, mixing 
identity with politics and policy. Analyses like these are hopeful in terms of getting to 
deeper levels of truth, but it still remains unclear whether such ideas as Turkish identity 
factors are really reaching decision makers and influencing policy. It is also unclear how 
(and if) the Turks, nation and state together, will handle the humiliation from the EU and 
pave their own way—to Europe or elsewhere. 
 
7.2.3 The Turkish People 
 
It would also be safe to say, as another conclusion from the research for this 
paper, that the previous incentives behind the U.S.-Turkish friendship have led us astray. 
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Kirişçi cites former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott as saying in 1998 that 
the two “driving forces” behind the U.S.-Turkey alliance were: 1) values central to the 
United States, and 2) the importance of Turkey’s strategic location.432 Where, in the 
midst of these two, is an understanding of Turkish values? Is it irrelevant? The Turks end 
up being known only for their strategic position, when they would like to be known for 
more than that. Even when discussing “Turkey’s critically important contribution to 
Western defense and to United States security,” former ambassador to the U.S. Şükrü 
Elekdağ said that Turkey’s contribution “stems from three elements: Turkey’s strategic 
and military value; her political commitment; and the moral fiber and strength of the 
Turkish people.”433 This last element is important. The first one is of course always 
mentioned in the U.S.-Turkey political dialogue, and the second often accompanies it, 
with Turkey being upheld for its democratic pursuit, but the third is often overlooked. 
“The Turkish people” (i.e. the Turks’ identity) themselves hardly appear on the radar. By 
contrast, the American people often enter into America’s image and role, as evidenced by 
President Bush’s frequent references to “the American people” in his speeches.  
 
7.2.4  Influence but not Interference 
 
Turks clearly, as another conclusion, want to be known for something in the 
world. Like any other nation, they desire a reputation and influence abroad, something 
bigger and deeper than geostrategic necessity for others’ pursuits. “Turkey oscillates 
between feelings of insecurity about its waning influence in global politics and a sense of 
strategic indispensability,” Baran explained to Congress.434 This stems from Atatürk’s 
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vision for Turkey. Alongside the obvious benefits of civilization and modernization for 
Turkey internally was Atatürk’s thirst for international recognition for Turkey. His 
rhetoric called for a Turkey that contributed to the betterment of the world. In 1930 he 
told Turks, “Our nationalism, within the contemporary world and as an important part of 
it, is aimed at the development of the world and to make people live in wealth and 
happiness.”435 Recognition was also important in the sense that the more it was received 
from the international community, the more the sovereignty and boundaries of the new 
republic would be secure as it was still trying to make its way in the world.  
In this vein of recognition and influence internationally, what Turkey seems to 
want to be known for in the world today is a willingness to help peace operations, and 
even balanced and faithful sacrifice for the cause of good, but not interference in the 
sovereign rights of another country. Their contributions can be seen in the UN operation 
in Somalia, the NATO sanctions during the war in Yugoslavia, and the UN peacekeeping 
force in Bosnia. Their stabilizing role in the Balkans is evidenced by participation in 
NATO exercises on the Albanian-Serbian border, and then eventually an active role in 
NATO’s intervention against the Serbian army in Kosovo, followed by troops to assist 
refugees and peacekeeping.436 In the end, this was good for the U.S., but also for Turkey 
in that “its military presence in such humanitarian and peacekeeping operations has 
helped allay some exaggerated fears of Turkey, particularly in the Balkans.”437  
However, in all of this, Turks clearly also want to be known for always respecting 
territorial integrity and not meddling in the domestic affairs of another sovereign nation, 
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with the same respect they would expect for their own country:  “Further, Turkish 
officials are very much against interference in the internal affairs or territorial integrity of 
Iraq or Iran. In principle such non-interference is a well-established norm of Turkish 
foreign policy, and this tradition also heightens Turkish decisionmakers’ discomfort over 
U.S. policy toward northern Iraq and the support for the Iraqi opposition.”438 
 
7.2.5 Sovereign Pride 
 
Additionally, a related conclusion is that what Turks exactly do not want to be 
known for are some of the major themes that have sprouted in the America-Turkish 
relationship. There was already—from the tail of the Ottoman past—a historical 
insecurity about international vulnerability or abandonment, which the U.S. has only 
served to exacerbate. There are also fears of allying too closely, leading to the 
psychological frustration of over-dependence and to the anxiety of a lack of 
reciprocation. During the early years of the Cold War, there was a phrase in Turkey, 
“Allah vermezse, Amerika verir” (“If God does not provide, America will.”) Later on, 
Turks learned this was not true; the U.S. was not able or even willing to give them 
everything. At times the reality of this felt like a slap in the face to Turks. These are all 
major themes, summed up well in Francis P. Butler’s opening lines of his essay 
“Reassessing Turkey: A Faithful Ally Disillusioned and in Trouble”:  
To assess the relationship between Turkey and the United States, one must deal in 
perceptions. It has been Turkey’s contention since the mid-1960s that the US has 
employed a paternalistic and condescending attitude in relations with its NATO 
ally. To the policymakers in Turkey, this perception further means that American 
decisionmakers feel that Turkey’s need for close ties is far greater than that of the 
US. Actions by the US have increasingly been perceived as those of a tolerant 
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master who feels justified in bullying a dependent that reaps most of the benefits 
of the relationship.439 (emphasis added) 
 
These words still hold true today, evidenced by the attitudes surrounding 1 March 
2003 and 4 July 2003. The response from America to the March 1 vote of Parliament was 
harsh, even “condescending.” Then on July 4, when American troops mistakenly 
captured and “hooded” Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, “bullying” would be a good 
word to describe how the Turks felt they were treated, even humiliated, by their ally. 
“Many Turks saw this episode—in which the Turkish troops were disarmed, hooded, and 
detained—as a deliberate provocation and a clear sign that Washington favored Iraqi 
Kurds over a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally… More than a year later, 
the Turkish military remains furious about this episode.”440 This event has become 
infamous in Turkey, known simply and treacherously as Çuval Olayı (Hood Event).  
Rather than serving as a “tool of U.S. policy”441 or a “pawn of the West”442 or a 
“client” of America,443 in the Middle East or any other region, and rather than being 
regarded in terms of servility, submission, or dependence, Turkey wants to be known for 
its own contribution to the world, of its own will and sovereign choice. Turks are heirs of 
a great empire, and while they have no imperialistic designs, they do have a certain 
natural pride that is inherent from the glory days of the past.  
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7.3  Practical Applications 
7.3.1  In the United States 
 
 The national identity of Turkey—or the model horse Sakarya—is made up of 
parts that the U.S., and the West, do not understand. They pulled that horse on their team 
at a time of dire need, at the start of the Cold War, but did so without knowing the horse 
fully, and with a false assumption that Turkey therefore fit neatly into their Western 
views and attitudes. The horse’s face pointed toward that West, and that was enough. 
And its two front legs of modernization and civilization made it seem advanced and in-
line with what the West would expect in an ally.  
What the U.S. did not see was the rest of the body, the tail, and especially the 
back legs. These influence the horse’s functioning just as much as the front half, but the 
U.S., and West in general, do not really see and understand them, so it causes confusion 
when this “modern” and “civilized” nation does not behave according to Western norms 
and expectations. The West, misunderstanding this and other aspects of Turkish identity, 
often treats Turkey in a way perceived as that of a child in need of discipline. The Turks 
resent this, and, more every day, resent America especially.  
If the U.S. is going to halt this tide of anti-Americanism flowing widely in the 
streets and sokaks of former good friend, the first step is an effort at understanding. 
Turkish studies in America need more attention and funding—and not just at critical 
strategic moments. Average Americans are often concerned about travel to Turkey—they 
need to know it is not a danger zone, not a “conflict area” where they are going to get 
caught in a war. The State Department’s official stance may be that Turkey is grouped in 
Europe, but the typical American thinks of it as “Middle Eastern.” Additionally, it seems 
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unfortunate that often times when Turkey is addressed in the news, it is accompanied by 
the phrase “an important NATO ally,” as if readers consistently need to be reminded that 
in the official U.S. view, the Turks are “good guys.”444 European countries do not get the 
same NATO ally label in daily articles, but Turkey remains murky in the American 
collective consciousness.  
Lastly, knowledge of the “importance” of being a NATO ally is becoming stale 
information. Despite continued activity, NATO is not as important as it once was in the 
international community. Instead, the U.S. should be wondering about the “importance” 
of the Turkish people, and their long-standing pro-American attitude that is slowly 
fading. Turkey’s geographic location will always be there, but not the heart of its people 
with the West. Turkey and America might always stay “married,” as alluded to in the 
introduction, but life can be wretched in a marriage of two people who only stay together 
for “strategic necessity.”   
 
7.3.2  In Turkey 
 
Turks, for their part, are responsible for misunderstanding too. They could help 
America understand their country’s point of view better, and could seek to actually learn 
and understand the U.S. instead of just condemning it. Helping the U.S. might be in the 
form of organizing in Washington to lobby or just make their presence known. The 
Turkish American Association445 is doing this now, but the anti-Turkish Greek-
Americans and Armenian-Americans have been doing it much longer and more 
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effectively. Turks in America could also write articles, editorials, or other short pieces to 
get out into the mainstream media and make their point-of-view known accurately. As 
Mustafa Kibaroğlu remarks,   
The pool of publications pertaining to Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and 
the great powers has recently grown with the inclusion of new books, journal 
articles and media pieces. Nevertheless, it is hard to say with confidence that all 
of them are worth reading, let alone using them in academic research as valuable 
sources of reference, due to the simple fact that, some of them really do seem to 
have been written by people who have never even set foot in Turkey. Thus, 
credible material that can be found regarding Turkey’s attitude vis-à-vis other 
nations and their foreign policy behaviors are not plentiful, especially at a time 
when there is growing need for timely and accurate information.446  
 
Turkish-Americans could help resolve this by proactively getting their views into the 
popular press. The freedom of expression and freedom of press in America can be an 
asset to them.  
Back in Turkey, students especially need to take a deeper, more intelligent look 
into America, and learn about it not from just popular novels, television series, and 
movies that villianize it. Anyone can condemn without really knowing much, but it takes 
more effort to understand.  
Turkey also needs to open up, to be receptive to growth and change, as mentioned 
at the end of chapter 6, though it may be painful. The condemnation of critical thinking is 
only self-injurious in the long run. The recent suspension of a professor at Ankara’s Gazi 
University for criticizing Atatürk’s legacy is not suitable for a growing, maturing country. 
“News reports said the professor was suspended after he referred to the late soldier-
statesman as ‘that man,’ criticized the statues and pictures of Ataturk that adorn 
government offices and schools, and said an era of one-party rule under Ataturk had led 
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to ‘regression rather than progress.’”447 This kind of comment was apparently 
incompatible with the university’s goals. The president of the university commented that 
“a professor ‘does not have to like Ataturk but I cannot allow a person who is opposed to 
the Republic’s main principles to educate students.’”448 Even if the whole country is not 
ready for it, universities, in particular, must be places for freedom of expression. 
In a book review, Bilgin refers to a view that the moment of “identity crisis” is 
one of “opportunity for policy-makers to reinscribe the state identity in line with 
changing perceptions of national interest.”449 Turkey must take this chance to do exactly 
that: get the jockey to effectively lead the horse. Picture the state and nation as a jockey 
and horse currently struggling through a rocky mountain pass. Winds and rains are 
blowing in both directions, sharp rocks poke up from the ground, and the compass is 
broken. It becomes more vital than ever for the jockey to be in-tune with the horse, to be 
paying attention to its well being and make sure it is not tripping on stones, or in dire 
need of food, or being bitten by a snake. If the jockey only looks ahead—even if the 
landmark ahead is the European Union—he will miss out on the needs of the horse. He 
might even arrive at the landmark only to find the horse is not behind him anymore. 
Both the state and the nation have the same goal in the end: to uplift their country 
and make it a prosperous place, both domestically and on the world stage. They are now 
at a critical juncture, with the needs and desires of the nation changing rapidly in the face 
of world events. It is up to the state to lead well, with gentleness and firmness, through 
the storm. 
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7.4  Future study 
If I had more time to work, or if another scholar were to pick up with this study 
after me, I would recommend more extensive interviewing and polling among Turks 
across the country. More than halfway through my studies, I found in the newspaper 
Milliyet a comprehensive identity survey that largely supplemented and confirmed some 
of my own conclusions about the Turkish people overall.450 (See Appendix D.) Also, at 
the very end of my studies, I came across the results of a survey conducted in 2000 by a 
Fulbright scholar and professor at Ankara’s Middle East Technical University, analyzing 
international relations students’ knowledge and attitudes about the United States.451 
Lastly, a Fulbright fellow’s 2005-06 study on the “youth perspectives” on politics in 
Turkey, obtained by interviewing and polling university students, reveals more about the 
perceptions and identities of the coming generations of Turkish leaders.452 This study 
produced expected results, and could have gone further by really probing Turks’ ideas 
about the Turkish-American relationship.  
I recommend a deeper analysis of all these survey results and traveling around 
Turkey to follow up with interviews and questioning of youth specifically on the issue of 
America, so as to obtain more hard answers, to move further from the theoretical realm 
and published ideas, and into the real-life groundwork. These would need to be done in 
Turkish, as it is difficult to get real, personal, identity-related answers outside of one’s 
native tongue. Additionally, interviews around Turkey would supplement what is missed 
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in mere polling. The extend to which identity influences opinion, (and in turn, policy), 
lies beneath the numerical figures of poll results. Polls or surveys often contain emotional 
reactions and spontaneous answers to yes/no questions, but interviews provide deeper 
layers of understanding, a window into one’s thought processes.  
 Another question is to what extent the public is influenced by various sources in 
forming opinions. Do so many people hate America because of what they see in the 
movies and television series that villianizes it? Do they react to what they hear from 
politicians? Do they learn it from the press? Are they influenced by their peers? How 
many actually feel threatened by America in their everyday lives, and how many just say 
it is a threat because that is what they are told? And this especially interests me: how 
many, outside of the big cities, have ever met an American? Equally interesting, how 
many Americans have ever met a Turk?  
 Lastly, there was not enough space or time to address specifically what the 
Turkish government can or should do to effectively attend to the horse. This involves 
politics and policy recommendations beyond the scope of this paper, but is a relevant 
question regarding the metaphorical model and the corresponding state-nation disconnect.  
 
7.5  Closing Remarks 
In an article written by a German ten years after the founding of the Republic of 
Turkey, the author takes a lighthearted, exploratory view of the new country, comparing 
Kemal’s reforms and new delivery of identity to the sudden and fantastic opening of 
windows in a stuffy room, letting in fresh air and sunlight for all the Turks.453 Thinking 
about this metaphor, it finally hit me—why are we all so eager to come up with 
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metaphors and analogies for Turkey? Westerners do it, but Turks do it too. Çağaptay 
referred to Turkey as being like Russian nesting dolls. The 2006 award-winning essay by 
Yanık, which similarly denounced “clichéd metaphors” from the Cold War era, also 
mentioned that Turkey could potentially play a “broker role” between the U.S. and the 
Middle East. A Turkish friend told me just as I was writing this last chapter that she and 
her nation are so identity-confused that it is as though Turkey is perpetually stuck as a 
confused teenager.454  
 Why the metaphors? There was once a formula in Turkey to describe this 
problem: nev-i şahsına münhasır, meaning that Turkey only looks like itself and 
resembles no one else. How appropriate: Turkey’s identity in the world and even in itself 
seems a bit of a mystery to all who attempt to tackle it. It follows that because Turkey is 
so complicated, we need metaphors to simplify matters, helping us to grasp something 
that might otherwise elude us. They serve as a point of desperate clarity as the world, and 
Turks themselves, try to grapple with the unplaceable, indefinable, misunderstood, and 
definitely over-simplified Republic of Turkey. 
                                                 
454
 Derya Dumlu, Masters student in the American History Department at Bilkent University. 
 183 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
Abramowitz, Morton, ed. Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. New York: The 
Century Foundation Press, 2000.  
 
Akgün, Birol. “The Turkish Diaspora in the United States and Its Role in Promoting 
Turkish-American Relations.” Published in Türk Yıllığı: The Turkish Yearbook of 
International Relations: 2000/2 Special Issue on Turkish-American Relations, 
Vol. XXXI, 99-115. 
 
Arıkan, E. Burak. “The Programme of the Nationalist Action Party: An Iron Hand in a 
Velvet Glove?” In Sylvia Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: 
Frank Cass, 1999.  
 
Armaoğlu, Fahir. “Atatürk and Turkish Nationalism,” in November 10, 1994 State 
Ceremony Speeches and Atatürk and Turkish Identity Panel. Trans. Serap 
Kızılırmak. Ankara, Atatürk Research Center, 1999. 
 
Armstrong, Harold. Turkey in Travail: The Birth of a New Nation. London: John Lane 
The Bodley Head Limited, 1925. 
 
Arnett, David L. “The Heart of the Matter: the Importance of Emotion in Turkish-
American Relations.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 5:4 (Winter 2006), 31-40. 
 
Arsu, Şebnem. “Court Acquits Author of Insulting ‘Turkishness.’” International Herald 
Tribune: Europe. 21 September 2006. 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/21/news/turkey.php>.  
 
Atatürk, M. K. The Speech: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Trans. and abridged by Önder 
Renkliyıldırım. Istanbul: Metro, 1985. 
 
Aydın, Mustafa. “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and 
Conjunctures during the Cold War.” Middle Eastern Studies 36:1 (January 2000) 
103-39. 
 
Barchard, David. “Analysis of Western European Attitudes Toward Turkey”: a speech at 
Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. 2 May 2007.  
 184 
 
Bilgin, Pınar. “Clash of Cultures? Differences Between Turkey and the European Union 
on Security” in The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and 
Pitfalls, A. L. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan, eds. Ankara: Foreign Policy 
Institute, 2004. 
 
———. Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective. New York: 
Routledge, 2005. 
 
———. “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation.” 
European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005) 175-201. 
 
Birand, Mehmet Ali. Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces. New 
York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1991. 
 
“Biz Kimiz?” A five-day series by Milliyet. 19 March – 23 March 2007. (Pure survey 
results without the reportage and analysis can be found at 
<http://www.konda.com.tr/ html/ ttya_tr.pdf>.) 
 
Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in 
Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. 
 
Brockett, Gavin D. “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a 
Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38.” In Sylvia 
Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: Frank Cass, 1999. 
 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives. New York: BasicBooks, 1997. 
 
Butler, Francis P. “Reassessing Turkey: A Faithful Ally Disillusioned and In Trouble.” In 
Francis P. Butler and Ralph E. Ropp, eds. Turkey: Time Honored Ally of America. 
Merrifield, VA: TPC Logistics Services Inc., 1985. 23-29. 
 
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 
 
Cevik, Ilnur. “Iraqi Kurds ponder: With Turkey or with the Americans?” The New 
Anatolian. 12 Feb 2007. 
 
———. “Inclusion of Kurds or Exclusion?” The New Anatolian. 11 May 2007. 
 
Cornell, Svante E. “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics.” In Dangerous 
Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations, edited by 
Michael S. Radu. Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2003. 
 
 185 
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/ 
anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm>. 
Criss, Nur Bilge. “Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War.” In Terrorism and 
Politics, edited by Barry Rubin, 125–50. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. 
 
———. “U.S. Forces in Turkey.” In U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 
1945–1970, Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press,1993. 331-50. 
 
———. “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case.” The 
Journal of American History 89:2 (September 2002) <http://www. 
historycooperative.org/journals/jah/89.2/criss.html>. 
 
———. “Book Review: Turkish Studies in the United States.” Donald Quataert and Sabri 
Sarayı, eds. Bloomington, Indiana University Ottoman and Modern Turkish 
Studies Publications, 2003. In Turkish Studies 5:2 (Summer 2004) 156-61. 
 
———. “Turkish Perspectives of the United States of America.” In What They Think of 
Us: International Perceptions of the United States and the War on Terrorism, 
edited by David Farber, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
———. “Change and Continuity from the Empire to the Republic.” London: Palgrave, 
forthcoming in an edited book. 
 
———. “Turkey as a Metaphor Between Europe and Asia.” Forthcoming in an edited 
book. 
 
Criss, Nur Bilge, and Yavuz Turan Çetiner, "Terrorism and the Issue of International 
Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Studies 20:1 (2000), 127-39. 
 
Deringil, Selim. “From Ottoman to Turk: Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey.” 
In Selim Deringil, ed. The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics: 
Collected Essays. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000. 
 
———. “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 
to 1908.” In Selim Deringil, ed. The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power 
Politics: Collected Essays. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000. 
 
———. “The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa 
Kemal.” In Selim Deringil, ed. The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power 
Politics: Collected Essays. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000. 
 
Douglas, William O. “Introduction,” in Turkey and the World, by Altemur Kiliç. 
Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959.  
 
 186 
Dumont, Paul. “Hojas for the Revolution: the Religious Strategy of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk.” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern 
Civilization 1: 3&4 (Autumn-Winter 1980-81) 17-32. 
 
Edgar, Alistair D. “The Shape of Things to Come? Defining US Foreign Policy on 
Turkey after 2001.” In Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, eds. Turkish-American 
Relations: Past, Present and Future. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 
230-46. 
 
Elekdağ, Şükrü. “The Future of Turkish-American Relations.” In Francis P. Butler and 
Ralph E. Ropp, eds. Turkey: Time Honored Ally of America. Merrifield, VA: TPC 
Logistics Services Inc., 1985. 35-44. 
 
Erhan, Çağrı. “The American Perception of the Turks: An Historical Record.” Published 
in Türk Yıllığı: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations: 2000/2 Special 
Issue on Turkish-American Relations, Vol. XXXI, 75-97. 
 
Ersoy, Mehmet Akif. İstiklal Marşı. Milli Kütüphane. <http://www.mkutup.gov.tr/i-
mars.html>. 
 
Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the 
Future of International Relations Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1989. 
 
“Former US Government Employee: Turkey Must Strike Immediately to Take Kirkuk.” 
The New Anatolian. 1 March 2007. 
 
Fraser, Suzan. “300,000 March Against Turkey’s Leader.” The Associated Press, in The 
Washington Post. 14 April 2007.  
 
Fried, Daniel. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. “U.S.-Turkish 
Relations and the Challenges Ahead.” Testimony Before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Europe. Washington, DC. 15 March 2007. 
<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/81761.htm>. 
 
Froembgen, Hanns. Kemal Atatürk: A Biography. Translated by Kenneth Kirkness. 
Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. Nationalism. New York: New York University Press, 1997.  
 
Gökalp, Ziya. The Principles of Turkism. Trans. Robert Devereux. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1968. 
 
Hale, William. Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2000. 
 
 187 
Hall, John A., and G. John Ikenberry. The State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989. 
 
Halman, Talat Sait. “Foreword.” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of 
Middle Eastern Civilization 1:3&4 (Autumn-Winter 1980-81) 3. 
 
Hart, Parker T. “Speech to Senate Foreign Relations Committee: In Support of Aid to 
Turkey.” In Francis P. Butler and Ralph E. Ropp, eds. Turkey: Time Honored Ally 
of America. Merrifield, VA: TPC Logistics Services Inc., 1985. 
 
———. “Testimony of the Honorable Parker T. Hart Before the European Subcommittee 
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.” (7 March 1984). In Francis 
P. Butler and Ralph E. Ropp, eds. Turkey: Time Honored Ally of America. 
Merrifield, VA: TPC Logistics Services Inc., 1985. 53-54. 
 
———. “The United States and Turkey: The Disintegration of a Twenty-Five Year 
Alliance.” Reprinted with permission of the American Foreign Policy Institute 
(1978) In Francis P. Butler and Ralph E. Ropp, eds. Turkey: Time Honored Ally of 
America. Merrifield, VA: TPC Logistics Services Inc., 1985. 61-64. 
 
Heper, Metin. “Transformation of Charisma into a Political Paradigm: Atatürkism in 
Turkey.” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern 
Civilization 1:3&4 (Autumn-Winter 1980-81) 65-82. 
 
———. The State Tradition in Turkey. Northgate, Great Britain: The Eothen Press, 1985. 
 
Heper, Metin, and E. Fuat Keyman. “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the 
Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.” In Sylvia Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before 
and After Atatürk. London: Frank Cass, 1999. 
 
Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. Explaining and Understanding in International 
Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav. “Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation.” In John A. Hall, ed. 
The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 91-106. 
 
Hunt, Michael H. “Ideology.” The Journal of American History. The Journal of American 
77:1 (June 1990), 108-15. 
 
Jacob, Jinnyn D. “Conflicting Voices: a Study of Youth Perspectives on Contemporary 
Turkish Politics.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 5:4 (Winter 2006). <http://www. 
esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_81.pdf>. 
 
Kafadar, Cemal. Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995.  
 188 
 
Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. “The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey.” 
In Sylvia Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: Frank Cass, 
1999. 
 
Karpat, Kemal. “An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman 
State: From Social Estates to classes, From Millets to Nations.” Princeton, NJ: 
Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1973. 
 
Kasım, Kamer. “US Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American 
Relations.” In Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, eds. Turkish-American Relations: 
Past, Present and Future. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 129-50. 
 
Katzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane, eds. Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.  
 
Kellas, James G. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan 
Education Ltd, 1991. 
 
Kelleher, Ann, Özlen Küncek, and Sevilay Kharaman. “Turkish Student Attitudes about 
the United States: Results from a Survey of 112 International Relations Majors at 
Two Universities in Ankara.” International Studies Perspectives 4:3 (August 
2003), 250-64. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=7&hid=12&sid= 
f435b6f1-155c-4bfa-abe3-21816f9cd5b0%40sessionmgr3>. 
 
Kışlalı, M.Ali. “ABD Bunu Hep Yapardı.” Radikal. 17 Feb 2007. 
<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=213250>. 
 
Kinross, Patrick Balfour. Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern 
Turkey. London: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1964. 
 
Kinzer, Stephen. Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2001. 
 
Kirişçi, Kemal. "Turkey and the Muslim Middle East," in Turkey's New World, Alan 
Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, eds. (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, 2000), 39-58. 
 
———. “U.S.-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership.” In Barry 
Rubin and Kemal Kirisçi, eds. Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multiregional Power Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001, 129-50. 
 
———. “Book Review: Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a 
Turk?” Soner Çağaptay London, Routledge, 2006. In Turkish Studies 8:1 (March 
2007) 165-69. 
 
 189 
Kohn, Hans. “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic.” Foreign Affairs 12 (Oct 1933) 141-55.  
 
Kramer, Heinz. A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
 
Lesser, Ian O. “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics.” Survival, 
48:3 (Autumn 2006). 83-96. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 
1968. 
 
Makovsky, Alan. “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 1:2 
(April-June 1999).  
 
Mango, Andrew. Atatürk. London: John Murray Ltd, 1999. 
 
———. “Foreword.” In Sylvia Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: 
Frank Cass, 1999. 
 
Manzo, Kathryn A. Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation. Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. 
 
Mayall, Simon V. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, McNair Paper 56. Washington D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997. 
 
McEldowney, Nancy. “Turkish-American Relations and the Future of Turkish-American 
Relations”: Lecture, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 29 November 2006.  
McKay, Elizabeth. Personal interview. 19 March 2007. 
 
McSweeney, Bill. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Meeker, Michael E. A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
 
Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union.” In 
Sylvia Kedourie, ed. Turkey Before and After Atatürk. London: Frank Cass, 1999. 
 
Öymen, Altan. “Bahçeli ile Baykal’ın milliyetçilik açıklamaları güzel, ama…” Radikal, 
17 February 2007, 9. 
 
Özal, Turgut. “Interview: Turgut Özal: Bold Moves in Turkey.” Defense & Foreign 
Affairs (November 1984) Reprinted in Francis P. Butler and Ralph E. Ropp, eds. 
 190 
Turkey: Time Honored Ally of America. Merrifield, VA: TPC Logistics Services 
Inc., 1985. 19-21. 
 
Pearson, Robert W. “200 Years of Turkish-American Relations.” Text of Key-Note 
Speech by US Ambassador to Turkey, at the opening session of the Conference 
on 200th Anniversary of Turkish-American Relations, Ankara, 6-8 November 
2000, published in Türk Yıllığı: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations: 
2000/2 Special Issue on Turkish-American Relations, Vol. XXXI. 
 
Pollock, Robert. “The Sick Man of Europe – Again.” The Wall Street Journal. 16 
February 2005. 
 
Price, M. Philips. A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic. New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1956. 
 
Robins, Philip. Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. London: 
Hurst & Company, 2003. 
 
Reed, Howard A. “Atatürk, the Turkish Nationalists and the United States: A Neglected 
Prospect for Peace in 1919.” Journal of the American Institute for the Study of 
Middle Eastern Civilization 1:3&4 (Autumn-Winter 1980-81) 99-111. 
 
Rustow, Dankwart A. “Mehmed Akif’s ‘Independence March’: Religion and Nationalism 
in Atatürk’s Movement of Liberation.” Journal of the American Institute for the 
Study of Middle Eastern Civilization 1:3&4 (Autumn-Winter 1980-81) 112-17. 
 
Saideman, Stephen. “Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign 
Policy,” in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity and Foreign Policy 
in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
 
“Şafak Exonerated of Insulting Turkishness.” The New Anatolian / Ankara with AP. 22 
September 2006. 
 
Savvides, Philippos K. “Legitimation Crisis and Securitization in Modern Turkey,” 
Critique 16 (2000) 55-73. 
 
Saymaz, İsmail. “Dikkat Irkçı Var!: Türkiye’deki Bazı Dernekler Hitler’i Aratmıyor.” 
Radikal. 18 Feb 2007. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991. 
 
———. “The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?” In Marjorie Ringrose and 
Adam J. Lerner, eds. Reimagining the Nation. Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1993. 
 
———. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 
 191 
 
———. The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2000. 
 
Snow, David. “Collective Identity and Expressive Forms.” Center for the Study of 
Democracy. Paper 01-07. (1 October 2001). <http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/01-
07>. 
 
Sonyel, Salahi R. Atatürk – The Founder of Modern Turkey. Ankara: Turkish Historical 
Society Printing House, 1989. 
 
Szyliowicz, Joseph. “Atatürk and Educational Modernization.” Journal of the American 
Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization 1:3&4 (Autumn-Winter 
1980-81) 118-25. 
 
Taşpınar, Ömer. “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey.” Brookings Institution 
Paper. 16 November 2005. 
 
———. “Kimlik Sorunlarımız Yine Depreşiyor.” Radikal. 14 May 2007.   
 
Tavernise, Sabrina. “300,000 Protest Islamic Hue of Turkish System.” The New York 
Times. 15 April 2007. 
 
Telhami, Shibley, and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
 
Tobin, Chester M. Turkey: Key to the East. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1944.  
 
Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923. Article 28. Brigham 
Young University: Harold B. Lee Library, 
<http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html>. 
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging 
Threats of the Committee on International Relations. The State of U.S.-Turkey 
Relations. 109th Cong., 1st sess., 11 May 2005. Serial No. 109-48. 
<http://www.house.gov/international_relations>. 
 
Uzgel, İlhan. “The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilizing Role.” In Barry Rubin and Kemal 
Kirisçi, eds. Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001, 129-50. 
 
Villalta, Jorge Blanco. Atatürk. Translated from the Spanish by William Campbell. 
Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1979. 
 
 192 
Wike, Richard. “Turkey: Troubled Terrain for Pope Benedict: The Pontiff Visits a 
Country Where Negative Views of Christians and the West Are on the Rise.” Pew 
Research Center. 27 November 2006. 
 
Wilson, H.E. Ross. Speech and roundtable discussion. Bilkent International Security and 
Strategy Seminars, Bilkent IR Dept. Bilkent Hotel, Ankara. 28 February 2007.  
 
Yanık, Lerna. “Beyond 'Bridges,' 'Crossroads' and 'Buffer Zones': Defining a New 
International Role for Turkey.” Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. <http://www. 
brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_1.pdf>. 
 
Yeğen, Mesut. “Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey.” Middle Eastern Studies 40:6 
(November 2004). 51-66. 
 
Yılmaz, Şuhnaz. “Impact of Lobbies on Turkish-American Relations.” In Mustafa Aydın 
and Çağrı Erhan, eds. Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 181-209. 
 
Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993. 
 
———. “Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-national State.”  Turkology Update 
Leiden Project Working Papers Archive, Department of Turkish Studies, Leiden 
University, October 2004. 
<http://tulp.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/wap/ejz19.pdf>. 
 
———. “The Core Terminology of Kemalism: Mefkûre, Millî, Muasır, Medenî.” In Les 
mots de politique de l’Empire Ottoman a la Turquie kemaliste, ed. François 
Georgeon (Paris: EHESS/ESA 8032 CNRS), 55-64. 
 
 
 193 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 194 
APPENDIX B 
 
 195 
APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
 
“WHO ARE WE?” 
 
 
 
 
 In 2006, the Turkish research and consultancy organization KONDA conducted a 
Turkey-wide survey, including 2,685 villages and 2,286 cities, in 79 of the 81 provinces, 
with a grand total of 47,958 people.  Many of the surveys were conducted through face-
to-face interviews, and more than 1,500 researchers were involved. Many of the results, 
along with analysis and commentary, were published in a one-week series called “Biz 
Kimiz?” (“Who are we?”) in the newspaper Milliyet in late March 2007. A PDF file of all 
survey results, along with further background information on the survey, is available 
through the KONDA website at <http://www.konda.com.tr/html/ttya_tr.pdf>. Four of the 
charts from the site have been included in this appendix, with English translations.  
 
D.1 The Breakdown 
 
Turks today appear to be generally living the same identity as was packaged by 
Atatürk’s principles. The entrance of the concept of “ethnicity” presents an interesting 
factor. Among the options for defining their identity, ethnicity was not among the top 
three, but this seems to reflect that fact that this Western-originated word is a new 
addition to the language, and therefore is not how Turks have historically been taught to 
conceive of themselves. Instead, it is about a simple description of “being from Turkey” 
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followed by the categorizations of religion and city of birth. Ethnicity is then in a much-
lower fourth place, followed by occupation, gender, clothing, and lastly, age group.  
 When forced to give an ethnic description, the vast majority of the population 
identifies themselves simply as Turk (81.33%). The only substantial departures from this 
are the Kurds/Zazas (9.02%) and a general—actually non-ethnic—category of citizenship 
in Turkey (4.45%). Atatürk taught that for one to live in the republic of Turkey and to say 
he/she is a Turk is enough to therefore be a Turk. Thus, it is not surprising that poll 
respondents largely classified themselves simply as “Turk.” There were deeper 
distinguishing categories available, sometimes based on roots, but respondents seemed to 
avoid those, proving the lack of an ethnic differentiation mentality overall.  
 Supporting ethnic groups, however, is a different matter altogether. Here the 
norms and expectations of the international community appear to have had their 
influence. Most likely the demands of the EU factor into this section heavily. In all of 
Turkey, 66.58% said the state should support ethnic groups, whereas another 33.42% said 
it expressly should not support them. Not surprisingly, the question of state support for 
religious groups yielded a substantially different response, with 76.45% saying it should 
and 23.55% saying it should not. The ten percent difference on either side with this 
category, could be expected, for it was religious minority groups that were recognized 
and respected as such since the beginning of the republic. The minorities that were 
acknowledged were the religious ones. State support for them in some form has existed 
since the founding of Turkey. 
 Lastly, there is the question of Turkish citizenship. This chart is perhaps the most 
interesting of all, for here we see the passion and emotion of the Turkish people, the 
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inherent love-for-country instilled and cemented in each mind. An immense 82% 
consider their citizenship in Turkey to be directly dependent on their love for Turkey. 
Saying that one is from Turkey (63.8%) and being Muslim (54.31%) also have the 
majority of Turkey believing in these conditions as requisites for Turkish citizenship. The 
ethnic category, however, is a complicated one, with respondents split down the middle 
over whether Turkish ethnic origin is a condition for citizenship. Slightly more said it is.  
This last graph shows a profound confusion about ethnicity and where it falls into 
the citizenship terms. Even the phrase “to be Turk by ethnic root,” to which they had to 
respond, is muddled. What, then, is “Turk”? If Turk is to live in Turkey and say “I am a 
Turk,” then does it even have ethnic roots? Who, then, is an ethnically pure Turk? These 
are identity questions with unclear answers, if any. What does remain clear is that 
Turkish identity is founded on the hind legs of religion and of a homogenous 
Turkishness—which may be ethnic, may be geographic, or may just be the ability to say 
“I love Turkey.”  
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D.2 Definitions of Identity in Turkey 
Options respondents wanted to use to express their identity 
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D.3 Ethnic Identity 
How the people of Turkey define themselves in ethnic terms 
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D.4. Identity-State Relations 
Supporting Ethnic and Religious Minorities? 
 
• Should the state give support or not give support for ethnic minorities’ 
preservation of their own traditions and customs? 
• Should the state give support or not give support for citizens to be able to live out 
their religious beliefs, their own principles, and worship as they wish? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Should give Should not give 
 
Support to Ethnic Groups 
Should give Should not give 
 
Support to Religious Groups 
 Turkey 
 Women 
 Men 
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D.5 Conditions of Citizenship 
What do you understand from your citizenship? 
 
Some people say that in order to really be a citizen of the Republic of Turkey 
there are the conditions below. But others say these are not conditions. In your opinion 
are the ones listed below conditional or non-conditional? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
To be Turk  
by ethnic root 
To say ‘I am 
from Turkey’ 
To be Muslim To love Turkey 
 Condition   Neither condition                Non-condition 
         nor non-condition 
